Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality

The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories.     

The Embodiment of Birth

This paper rejects dualism between mind and body toview the self as an embodied biological entity. Rather thanseeing the body operating by passive mechanisms as Descartesargues, it holds it actively moves in and even defines its world. Carrying this perspective to medicine presents an attempt toincorporate or work with internal processes of the body; it issensitive to how patients identify with their bodies. Thecurrent discussion over the extent to which women should try tohave natural childbirths provides a concrete example of thedifferences between mechanistic and embodied approaches tomedicine.     

Dissociational body experiences: Differences between respondents with and without prior out‐of‐body‐experiences

Many people report having had an experience in which they felt as if their phenomenal self was separated in Cartesian space from their physical body. This phenomenon is often referred to as an ‘out‐of‐body’ (OBE) experience. Prior work has found OBE experients to score higher on measures of dissociation and to differ in regards to the perceptual experience of their body. Based upon this work, we theorized that the daily bodily experiences of people with and without a prior OBE would differ along a number of dimensions. In order to test this theory a questionnaire study was conducted. Of 243 respondents, 62 reported at least one prior OBE. Six scales on different aspects of bodily experience were administered. Respondents reporting a previous OBE were found to score significantly higher on measures of somatoform dissociation, self‐consciousness, body dissatisfaction, and lower on a measure of confidence in their physical self‐presentation than respondents without a previous OBE. The findings are discussed as supporting a dissociational theory of the OBE.     

EVANS’S ANTI‐CARTESIAN ARGUMENT: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

This paper evaluates the anti‐Cartesian argument given by Evans in chapter seven of The Varieties of Reference. It focuses on Evans’s claim that bodily awareness is a form of self‐awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to errors of misidentification. However, Evans’s argument suffers from a crucial ambiguity. Once disambiguated, it turns out that Evans’s argument either begs the question against the Cartesian or fails to be plausible. Nonetheless, the argument is important for drawing our attention to the idea that bodily modes of awareness should be taken seriously as possible forms of self‐awareness.     

KNOWING OURSELVES AS EMBODIED,EMBEDDED, AND RELATIONALLY EXTENDED

What does it mean to know oneself, and what is the self that one hopes to know? This article outlines the implications of an embodied understanding of persons and some aspects of the “self” that are generally ignored when thinking about our selves. The Cartesian model of body–soul (or body–mind) dualism reinforces the idea that there is within us a soul, or self, or mind that is our hidden, inner, and real self. Thus, the path to self‐knowledge is introspection. The alternative view is that persons are embodied (entirely physical creatures), embedded (formed by our physical and social environment), and at times extended (cognitively soft‐coupled to artifacts or other persons). This article emphasizes the bodily, active, contextual, relational, often simulated, and sometimes extended nature of the selves that we are, and that we hope to know.     

Rousseau's Descartes: The Rejection of Theoretical Philosophy as First Philosophy

Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar makes creative use of Descartes's meditative method by applying it to practical life. This ‘misuse’ of the Cartesian method highlights the limits of the thinking thing as a ground for morality. Taking practical philosophy as first philosophy, the Vicar finds bedrock certainty of the self as an agent in the world and of moral truths while distancing himself from Cartesian positions on the distinction, union and interaction of mind and body. Rousseau's Moral Letters harmonize with the Vicar's view. Descartes would reject the Vicar's appropriation, as real-life problems cannot wait on meditation to answer them.     

Illness and the paradigm of lived body

This paper suggests that the paradigm of lived body (as it is developed in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Zaner) provides important insights into the experience of illness. In particular it is noted that, as embodied persons, we experience illness primarily as a disruption of lived body rather than as a dysfunction of biological body. An account is given of the manner in which such fundamental features of embodiment as bodily intentionality, primary meaning, contextural organization, body image, gestural display, lived spatiality and temporality, are disrupted in illness causing a concurrent disorganization of the patient's self and world. The paradigm of lived body has important applications for medical practice. It provides a fuller account of illness than does the prevailing reductionist Cartesian paradigm of body, more directly addresses the existential predicament of illness, and orients the clinical focus around the personhood of the patient.     

Between Actor and Spectator: Arnout Geulincx and the Stoics

The work of Arnout Geulincx (1624–1669), a Flemish Cartesian that developed a highly curious ‘parallelistic’ view on the universe, shows striking prima facie resemblances to Stoicism. Should we label Geulincx a reinventor of Stoic tenets, albeit within a strict Cartesian theoretical framework? To answer this question, my contribution begins by discussing relevant aspects of Stoicism and by introducing the ‘existential’ philosophy of Geulincx, whose metaphysical views on man brought him to adopt an ethics based upon absolute obedience and humility. It will discuss Geulincx's own views on the Stoics and, finally, compare Geulincx's philosophy with the Stoic world view. The main argument will be that, despite a deep affinity and many parallels, one crucial difference remains, as the dualism any true Cartesian metaphysics implies has important consequences for Geulincx's ethics in general and for his view on man in particular. As we will see, man plays a very peculiar role in the cosmic drama that we call the ‘universe’.     

我们需要一场医疗观念的革命——关于文化医学与物种医学的思考

现代文明的本质特征是用文化秩序取代自然秩序,用文化选择取代自然选择。现代文明的生活方式同人的生命原理的冲突,是现代许多疾病产生的文化根源。因而我们需要一种对现代疾病的“文化治疗”。传统医学只是关注个体生命的“个体医学”。由于个体健康同物种健康之间的内在冲突,我们需要一种防止物种衰退的“物种医学”。     

中国古代养生体育思想简论

中国古代养生体育思想是建立在其关于生命的认识基础上.传统文化从天人合一、天人相应的高度观照人的生命现象,认为人的生命是天地自然运化的产物,人的生命与天地自然运化具有相同的节律,与此相应,传统养生观要求顺应自然大化,遵循自然规律,按照自然运化节律调养身心;传统哲学认为人的生命是一个形体与精神相结合的整体,因此,在养生观上主张养神与养形相结合,提出了静以养神,动以养形的养生法则.     

The spread and impact of Cartesian philosophy in China: historical and comparative perspectives

Cartesian philosophy has had a profound influence on modern Chinese intellectuals since the mid 19^th century. After the May Fourth Movement, there have been many Chinese scholars who worked immensely on Cartesian philosophy and conducted fruitful research including translations, biographies, monographs, and a large number of papers. The examination of mind/body has been one of the most important philosophic issues and also a fundamental truth-searching of the various great thinkers, from Confucius and Socrates to many later Eastern and Western philosophers. There are certain similarities and distinctions between Confucian ‘mind/body’ and Cartesian ‘mind/body’. As a super country with the highest population in the world, the studies of Cartesian philosophy in China have been very inadequate; it should be more prosperous and successful.     

CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY AS SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

Although Descartes has in some ways become a symbol of academic isolation, we can dispel this misunderstanding by taking into consideration the holistic nature of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes understood the various branches of philosophy as constituting an organic totality of knowledge that, because of its dependence on imagination and sensation, remains irreducible to intellectual comprehension. Ethics holds a particularly significant place in Cartesian philosophy, and this essay both demonstrates the spiritual nature of Cartesian ethics and explains why Descartes saw ethics as “the ultimate degree of wisdom” so as to illustrate how we can interpret Cartesian philosophy as a spiritual practice. This takes place through a discussion of the distinctions and interconnections of Descartes’s three primary notions (soul, body, and the union of soul and body) and concludes by reflecting on the specific temporality of nobility as well as addressing several objections to Cartesian ethics.     

儒学的现代意义

As we enter the new millennium, it has become more important to review and discover ancient wisdom. The project to build a harmonious society requires us to know our own “culture.” The biggest conflicts we human beings face are the conflicts between man and nature, man and man (man and society), and body and mind. The three philosophical propositions, “the unity of Heaven and man,” “the unity of self and others,” and “the unity of body and mind” of Confucianism may provide precious insight in dealing with the three above-mentioned conflicts, and we should pay special attention to these resources. Translated by Yan Xin from Jianghan Luntan 江汉论坛 (Jianghan Tribune), 2007, (1): 5–14     

Spirituality and Intersubjective Consensus: A Response to Ciocan and Ferencz-Flatz

In The Human Place in the Cosmos Max Scheler argues the question of philosophical anthropology must address three problems: (i) the difference between man and animal; (ii) the Cartesian problem of the mind and body; and (iii) the essence of spirit. In a recent issue of Human Studies, two articles by Cristian Ciocan and Christian Ferencz-Flatz addressed the first of these problems through investigations of Husserl’s Nachlass. In this paper, I respond primarily to Ciocan by drawing on Scheler’s phenomenology and the implications this has for understanding Husserl’s phenomenology. By looking at Husserl’s published comments, we can see how the attempt to differentiate between man and animal is bound up with his understanding of spirituality. This allows an alternative way of understanding normality and abnormality which shifts emphasises away from how far we can empathise with the Other (be they man or animal) to emphasise what it means to be normal or abnormal. This will allow us to address an ambiguity of Husserl identified by Ferencz-Flatz.     

The anthropological tradition in the philosophy of medicine

The tradition of anthropological medicine in philosophy of medicine is analyzed in relation to the earlier interest in epistemological issues in medicine around the turn of the century as well as to the current interest in medical ethics. It is argued that there is a continuity between epistemological, anthropological and ethical approaches in philosophy of medicine. Three basic ideas of anthropologically-oriented medicine are discussed: the rejection of Cartesian dualism, the notion of medicine as science of the human person, and the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of disease. Next, it is discussed why the anthropological movement has been superseded by the increasing interest in medical ethics. It is concluded that the present-day moral issues cannot be interpreted and resolved without clarification of the underlying anthropological images.     

The Body as the Ground of Religion, Science, and Self

The human body is both religious subject and scientific object, the manifest locus of both religious gnosis and secular cognition. Embodiment provides the basis for a rich cross–fertilization between cognitive science and comparative religion, but cognitive studies must return to their empiricist scientific roots by reembodying subjectivity, thus spanning the natural bridge between the two fields. Referencing the ritual centrality and cognitive content of the body, I suggest a materialist but nonreductionist construct of the self as a substantial cognitive embodiment that embraces not just perception and cognition, mind and spirit, but the forceful physicality of the moving body. Proprioception of the body's moving mass constitutes a mode of knowing that resonates strongly with the experience of self, not only across religious traditions but also within the physical sciences. By way of illustration, two directions are suggested in which a construct of the self as a substantial cognitive embodiment might lead us: first, a body–based interpretation of the Islamic myth of Adam and Iblis that reveals an internal substantiality as constitutive of the divinely imaged Self, and second, a new, religious direction for human evolutionary theory based on the implications of an embodied intentionality.     

Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality.     

Body of knowledge and the ontology of the body

The notion of competence in A Philosophical Basis of Medcial Practice presents a problem concerning the ontology of the body. This paper will maintain that an ontology of the body can only be based upon Cartesian grounds whereby the scientific knowable order is supposed to be identical to the natural order of things. Moral questions are not a part of this order and depend upon free will. Foucault has demonstrated that such a dualism between nature and morality cannot be warranted for contemporary medical practice. Medical science does not derive its foundation from a natural order but from the order of knowing which is present in the body of knowledge (episteme). This body of knowledge is the significative cultural force in the way of looking at problems of disease, life and death. Thus in contemporary medical practice, concepts of morality and competence which are based on notions of free will, shall be discarded as non-sensical, even for the patient.     

How deep is skin‐deep? The relationship between skin color satisfaction,estimation of body image,and self‐esteem among women of African descent

The study of skin color and its relationship to body (dis)satisfaction and self‐esteem is critical to expanding upon the research that explores the intersection between body image and the sociocultural experience of women of the African diaspora. To this end, the relationships between skin color satisfaction, body dissatisfaction, and self‐esteem were examined in a sample of 328 women of African descent. Results revealed a significant effect for ethnicity and employment status on body dissatisfaction, skin color satisfaction, and self‐esteem. Follow‐up analyses revealed that Afro‐Caribbean women were the most satisfied with their body shape, biracial women were most satisfied with their skin color, and women who self‐identified as professionals had the highest self‐esteem. Implications for the findings are discussed.