From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality: Temporality,Truth, Modality,and Identity

The essay introduces a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal modal semantics based on part-whole, rather than class, theory. Formalizing Edmund Husserl’s theory of inner time consciousness, §3 uses his protention and retention concepts to define a relation of self-awareness on intentional events. §4 introduces a syntax and two-valued semantics for modal first-order predicate object-languages, defines semantic assignments for variables and predicates, and truth for formulae in terms of the axiomatic version of Edmund Husserl’s dependence ontology (viz. the Calculus [CU] of Urelements) introduced by The Ontology of Intentionality I & II. It then uses the §3 results to define the modalities of truth, and §5 extends the semantics to identity claims. §6 defines and contrasts synthetic a priori truths to analytic a priori truths, and §7 compares Brentano School noetic semantic and Leibnizian possible-world semantic perspectives on modality. The essay argues that the modal logics it defines semantically are two-valued, first-order versions of the type of language which Husserl viewed as the language of any ontology of experience (i.e. of any science), and conceived as the logic of intentionality.     

Understanding the Heart-Mind Within the Heart-Mind of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nèiyè</Emphasis> (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Inward Training</Emphasis>)

The Nèiyè 內業 (Inward Training) talks of “a heart-mind (xīn 心) within a heart-mind” that is somehow connected to or prior to language. In the context of the overall advice on looking “inward” or “internally” as part of the meditation and mysticism practice that the Nèiyè introduces, this talk of a heart-mind within a heart-mind arguably invites comparisons with a Cartesian “inner theater” conception of mentality. In this paper, I examine the “inner” talk of the Nèiyè in order to tease out its identifiable commitments in philosophical psychology. I consider the ways in which the “inner” talk of the text might be read as marking out one or more of three different inner/outer distinctions, and I argue that we can consistently read the Nèiyè without seeing it as marking any inner/outer distinction that is related to what is often referred to in English as “inner experience.”     

Language Learning in Wittgenstein and Davidson

In this paper, I discuss language learning in Wittgenstein and Davidson. Starting from a remark by Bakhurst, I hold that both Wittgenstein and Davidson’s philosophies of language contain responses to the problem of language learning, albeit of a different form. Following Williams, I hold that the concept of language learning can explain Wittgenstein’s approach to the normativity of meaning in the Philosophical Investigations. Turning to Davidson, I hold that language learning can, equally, explain Davidson’s theory of triangulation. I sketch an account of triangulation as Davidson’s response to the problem of the normativity of meaning and explain the role that language learning plays in this account.     

Granularity and the acquisition of grammatical gender: how order-of-acquisition affects what gets learned

Why do adult language learners typically fail to acquire second languages with native proficiency? Does prior linguistic experience influence the size of the “units” adults attend to in learning, and if so, how does this influence what gets learned? Here, we examine these questions in relation to grammatical gender, which adult learners almost invariably struggle to master. We present a model of learning that predicts that exposure to smaller units (such as nouns) before exposure to larger linguistic units (such as sentences) can critically impair learning about predictive relations between units: such as that between a noun and its article. This prediction is then confirmed by a study of adult participants learning grammatical gender in an artificial language. Adults learned both nouns and their articles better when they were first heard nouns used in context with their articles prior to hearing the nouns individually, compared with learners who first heard the nouns in isolation, prior to hearing them used in context. In the light of these results, we discuss the role gender appears to play in language, the importance of meaning in artificial grammar learning, and the implications of this work for the structure of L2-training.     

‘That&#x27;s just what I do’: Placing emotion in academic activism

In this paper, I wish to critically reflect on the role of emotion/s in how I position myself with regards to research, teaching and learning, drawing on experiences over the past three years as a human geography lecturer ‘doing’ research with refugees and asylum seekers in a local inner city area. While there has been increasing debate regarding what constitutes ‘the activist-academic’, in particular deconstructing any dualism or border between ‘academic’ and ‘activist’, the motivation for undertaking such a role is generally ascribed to an ‘ideological commitment’ to social and personal change of one type or another. For me, such a commitment cannot be separated from how I feel about the issues that I research, learn and teach about. In particular, I explore how emotions relate across different spaces and places in my life to produce motivation for activism and how that activism – specifically the encounters with people through it – feeds back into emotional geographies across my professional (and personal) endeavours. More broadly, I'm concerned with the ways in which emotional becomings and the interconnectivities across spaces of activity/ism and everyday life play out beyond my own individual subjective experience, but rather are caught up in ‘situated, relational perspectives’ (after Bondi, 2005). I argue that recognising the significance of emotion has implications for how we conduct and disseminate research.     

Heidegger's Descartes and Heidegger's Cartesianism

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20^th century's great anti‐Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology‐driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de‐center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti‐Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in SZ §§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de‐center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend?     

Avicenna on the Primary Propositions

Avicenna introduces the primary propositions (or the primaries, for short) as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. (In this paper, we are not primarily concerned with the primary/first intelligibles as concepts/conceptions.) However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is (§2), how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles (§3), what their phenomenology is (§4), what the cause of the assent to them is (§5), how to explain the relationship between the ‘innate [nature] of the intellect’ and the primaries (§6) and, finally, back to their indemonstrability, in what sense they are ‘indemonstrable’ (§7). We will try to fill this gap. As a corollary, we will explain why Gutas’s view [Gutas, Dimitri. 2012. ‘The empiricism of Avicenna’, Oriens, 40, 391–436], among others, according to which the primaries are analytic (in the Kantian sense) is not true in general (§8). More particularly, we will argue that some primary propositions can be categorized under Kantian synthetic a priori, consistent with Black’s and Ardeshir’s conjecture [Black, Deborah L. 2013. ‘Certitude, justification, and the principles of knowledge in Avicenna’s epistemology’, in Peter Adamson, Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, New York: Cambridge University Press; Ardeshir, Mohammad. 2008. ‘Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of mathematics’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri, The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition, New York: Springer]. We hope that this work opens up some space to study Avicenna’s philosophy of mathematics and logic in connection with his epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics.     

Transfert de la conscience morphologique de l’arabe langue première au français langue seconde au cours des trois premières années d’apprentissage

There is a great deal of evidence to support the role of morphological awareness in reading development. However, towards second language acquisition, transfer of morphological awareness from first to second language (L1 to L2) is still discussed. The underlying question concerns the extent to which morphological awareness is a specific or universal process, and its dependence of linguistic features. The aim of this study is to examine cross-linguistic transfer of morphological awareness from Arabic L1 to French L2 (morphological awareness and word reading) at different level of learning French L2 (F_L2). 106 Tunisian children, whose first language is Arabic, in 1st (n = 29; mean age; 8; 10 years), 2nd (n = 33; mean age; 9; 9 years) or 3rd year (n = 44; mean age; 10; 10 years) of learning F_L2 participated to this study. Their morphological awareness (inflectional or derivational oddity detection tasks) and their performance in word reading (one minute test) were assessed in standard Arabic and French, as well as their vocabulary knowledge in French. A series of fixed-order hierarchical regression analysis was performed on derivational awareness performances, inflectional awareness performances and word reading performances in F_L2, controlling for effects of other important variables (e.g. French vocabulary, French morphological awareness with word reading scores as outcome variable and French inflectional or derivational awareness with French inflectional or derivational awareness scores as outcome variable respectively, Arabic word reading, etc.). Results show significant contributions of L1 morpho-derivational awareness on F_L2 morpho-derivational awareness in 2nd year (12%), and of L1 morphological awareness on reading words F_L2 in 3^rd year (5%). These results confirm the cross-linguistic transfer of morphological awareness, particularly derivational, from L1 to L2 among alphabetic — but orthographically and morphologically distances — languages. They also suggest that such a transfer could be relatively limited. It could appear during learning process after achieving a threshold in F_L2 and before specific L2 skills take place. Thus, beyond the morphological opacity of Arabic (nonlinear morphology) and linguistic distance between Arabic and French, the morphological transfer could appear on rich and important morphological dimension in L1 and suggest dealing with the nature of cross-linguistic abilities in depth.     

The role of overt language production in the Hebb repetition effect

The Hebb repetition effect (Hebb, 1961) occurs when recall performance improves for a list that is repeated during a serial-recall task. This effect is considered a good experimental analogue to language learning. Our objective was to evaluate the role of overt language production in language learning by manipulating recall direction during a Hebb repetition paradigm. In each trial, seven nonsense syllables were presented auditorily. Participants had to orally recall the items either in the presentation order or in reverse order. One sequence was repeated every third trial. In Experiment 1, we compared learning from a group that had recalled the items in their presentation order to learning from a group that had recalled the items in the reverse order. The two groups yielded similar learning rates. In Experiment 2, recall direction was varied between trials. The learning rate was not affected when recall direction varied between trials, suggesting a limited role of overt language production in language learning.     

Learning Style,Metacognition and Creativity as Predictors of the Foreign Language Achievement: A Structural Equation Modeling Approach

This current study sought to examine the role of creativity, metacognition and VAK learning style in foreign language achievement. To collect the data, a sample of 122 Iranian English as Foreign Language learners participated in this research. Participants completed Creativity Instrument by Abedi (Creat Res J 14(2):267–276, 2002), Metacognitive Awareness Inventory by Schraw and Dennison (Contemp Educ Psychol 19:460–475, 1994), and visual, aural, and kinesthetic (VAK) learning style initially designed by Chislett and Chapman (VAK Learning Styles Self-Assessment Questionnaire, 2005. http://www.businessballs.com) and modified and validated by the present study researchers using confirmatory factor analysis. Learners’ scores at the end of the term were aggregated as the measure of foreign language achievement. Its reliability was also checked and approved applying Cronbach’s α. According to the findings, all three independent variables positively and significantly predict students’ language achievement, creativity (14.63%); metacognition (29.78%); and VAK learning style (7.20%). Although each of them had a unique impact on foreign language achievement, metacognition outweighs creativity and VAK learning style as the predictor of foreign language achievement. Furthermore, there is a significant difference between genders on all the variables.     

Conceptions about the mind-body problem and their relations to afterlife beliefs,paranormal beliefs,religiosity, and ontological confusions

We examined lay people’s conceptions about the relationship between mind and body and their correlates. In Study 1, a web survey (N = 850) of reflective dualistic, emergentistic, and monistic perceptions of the mind-body relationship, afterlife beliefs (i.e., common sense dualism), religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and ontological confusions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena was conducted. In Study 2 (N = 73), we examined implicit ontological confusions and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity. Correlation and regression analyses showed that reflective dualism, afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity were strongly and positively related and that reflective dualism and afterlife beliefs mediated the relationship between ontological confusions and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results elucidate the contention that dualism is a manifestation of universal cognitive processes related to intuitions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena by showing that especially individuals who confuse the distinctive attributes of these phenomena tend to set the mind apart from the body.     

Meaning,Use and Ostensive Definition in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

In this paper, I argue that the restricted claim in §43a of the Philosophical Investigations is that, for a large class of cases of word meanings, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Although Wittgenstein does not provide any example of words having uses but no meaning as exceptions to the claim, he does hint at exceptions, which are names being defined, or explained, ostensively by pointing to their bearers, in §43b. Names in ostensive definitions, or explanations, are meaningful, but not being used, and are therefore exceptions to the claim that meaning is use.     

STM capacity for Chinese and English language materials

This paper delineates the theoretical implications of a program of research on short-term memory using Chinese characters as stimuli, and compares the findings with studies of short-term memory that use English language materials. The 14 experiments on which it is principally based, carried out in the People’s Republic of China and in the U.S.A., are reported in detail in Yu et al. (1984), W. Zhanget al. (1984), and G. Zhang and Simon (this issue). One major theoretical product of this research is an experimentally tested model that reconciles the chunking theory of STM capacity with the articulatory loop theory of Baddeley, making good quantitative predictions of capacity compatible with both. Another result, obtained by using homophones as stimuli, is a demonstration that STM is mainly acoustically encoded, but that there are an additional two or three chunks of visually or semantically encoded short-term memory available. Chunks are shown to play the same role in immediate recall and rote learning in both the Chinese language and English language stimuli; and STM capacity, measured in chunks, is essentially the same for materials in both languages.     

A Wild West of the Mind

§258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, §258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ‘S’ is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ‘S’ is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ‘S’ correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ‘S’ that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ‘S’; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism.     

English Orthographic Learning in Chinese-L1 Young EFL Beginners

English orthographic learning, among Chinese-L1 children who were beginning to learn English as a foreign language, was documented when: (1) only visual memory was at their disposal, (2) visual memory and either some letter-sound knowledge or some semantic information was available, and (3) visual memory, some letter-sound knowledge and some semantic information were all available. When only visual memory was available, orthographic learning (measured via an orthographic choice test) was meagre. Orthographic learning was significant when either semantic information or letter-sound knowledge supplemented visual memory, with letter-sound knowledge generating greater significance. Although the results suggest that letter-sound knowledge plays a more important role than semantic information, letter-sound knowledge alone does not suffice to achieve perfect orthographic learning, as orthographic learning was greatest when letter-sound knowledge and semantic information were both available. The present findings are congruent with a view that the orthography of a foreign language drives its orthographic learning more than L1 orthographic learning experience, thus extending Share’s (Cognition 55:151–218, 1995) self-teaching hypothesis to include non-alphabetic L1 children’s orthographic learning of an alphabetic foreign language. The little letter-sound knowledge development observed in the experiment-I control group indicates that very little letter-sound knowledge develops in the absence of dedicated letter-sound training. Given the important role of letter-sound knowledge in English orthographic learning, dedicated letter-sound instruction is highly recommended.     

Truth Values,Neither-true-nor-false,and Supervaluations

The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds of sentences. In many cases, this facility is said to produce truth values for sentences that on the face of it seem neither true nor false. Often enough, in this situation appeal is made to the method of supervaluations, which operate by “quantifying out” auxiliary parameters, and thereby produce something like a truth value. Logics of this kind exhibit striking differences. I first consider the role that Tarski gives to supervaluation in first order logic (§2.2), and then, after an interlude that asks whether neither-true-nor-false is itself a truth value (§2.3), I consider sentences with non-denoting terms (§2.4), vague sentences (§2.5), ambiguous sentences (§2.6), paradoxical sentences (§2.7), and future-tensed sentences in indeterministic tense logic (§2.8). I conclude my survey with a look at alethic modal logic considered as a cousin (§2.9), and finish with a few sentences of “advice to supervaluationists” (2.10), advice that is largely negative. The case for supervaluations as a road to truth is strong only when the auxiliary parameter that is “quantified out” is in fact irrelevant to the sentences of interest—as in Tarski’s definition of truth for classical logic. In all other cases, the best policy when reporting the results of supervaluation is to use only explicit phrases such as “settled true” or “determinately true,” never dropping the qualification.     

Why is number word learning hard? Evidence from bilingual learners

Young children typically take between 18 months and 2 years to learn the meanings of number words. In the present study, we investigated this developmental trajectory in bilingual preschoolers to examine the relative contributions of two factors in number word learning: (1) the construction of numerical concepts, and (2) the mapping of language specific words onto these concepts. We found that children learn the meanings of small number words (i.e., one, two, and three) independently in each language, indicating that observed delays in learning these words are attributable to difficulties in mapping words to concepts. In contrast, children generally learned to accurately count larger sets (i.e., five or greater) simultaneously in their two languages, suggesting that the difficulty in learning to count is not tied to a specific language. We also replicated previous studies that found that children learn the counting procedure before they learn its logic – i.e., that for any natural number, n, the successor of n in the count list denotes the cardinality n + 1. Consistent with past studies, we found that children’s knowledge of successors is first acquired incrementally. In bilinguals, we found that this knowledge exhibits item-specific transfer between languages, suggesting that the logic of the positive integers may not be stored in a language-specific format. We conclude that delays in learning the meanings of small number words are mainly due to language-specific processes of mapping words to concepts, whereas the logic and procedures of counting appear to be learned in a format that is independent of a particular language and thus transfers rapidly from one language to the other in development.