How forgetting aids heuristic inference

Some theorists, ranging from W. James (1890) to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds.     

Heuristics and invariants in dynamic event perception: Immunized concepts or nonstatements?

There is ample evidence showing that observers are able to judge dynamic properties of moving objects on the basis of visual kinematics. It is, however, widely disputed as to how to explain this body of data. While direct perceptionists claim that observers have direct access to the underlying dynamics of the event (kinematic specification of dynamics, or KSD, principle), contenders of the perceptual heuristics approach (PH) suggest that observers use the visual equivalent of a heuristic to arrive at their judgments about dynamics. First, the critical assumptions of the KSD principle are discussed in order to motivate the claim that the KSD principle cannot be falsified and is thus immune to empirical criticism. Then the same scrutiny is applied to the PH approach. It is, in its general form at least, afflicted with a similar lack of falsifiability. In comparing the concepts underlying invariants and perceptual heuristics, my conclusion is that a critical experiment aimed at deciding between the two approaches is impossible, and that KSD and PH can be regarded as nonstatements. The findings reported in the event-perception literature must therefore be reevaluated on these grounds.     

When the brain decides: a familiarity-based approach to the recognition heuristic as evidenced by event-related brain potentials

Humans can make fast and highly efficient decisions by using simple heuristics that are assumed to exploit basic cognitive functions. In the study reported here, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to disclose the psychological mechanisms underlying one of the most frugal decision rules, namely, the recognition heuristic. According to this heuristic, whenever two objects have to be ranked by a specific criterion and only one object is recognized, the recognized object is ranked higher than the unrecognized object. Using a standard recognition-heuristic paradigm, we predicted participants' decisions by analyzing an ERP correlate of familiarity-based recognition occurring 300 to 450 ms after stimulus onset. The measure remained a significant predictor even when later ERP correlates were taken into account. These findings are evidence for the thesis that simple heuristics exploit basic cognitive processes. Specifically, the findings show that familiarity--that is, recognition in the absence of recollection--contributes to decisions made on the basis of such heuristics.     

Heading judgments in minimal environments: the value of a heuristic when invariants are rare

Observers made systematic heading judgments in two experiments simulating their translation through an environment with only two trees. When those trees converged or decelerated apart, observers tended to follow the invariant information and make heading judgments outside the near member of the pair. When those trees accelerated apart, however, observers tended to follow the heuristic information and make judgments outside the far member, although this result was tempered by the angular separation between the trees and their relative acceleration. The simultaneous existence and use of invariants and heuristics are discussed in terms of different metatheoretical approaches to perception.     

Relative size perception at a distance is best at eye level

Relative size judgments were collected for two objects at 30.5 m and 23.8 m from the observer in order to assess how performance depends on the relationship between the size of the objects and the eye level of the observer. In three experiments in an indoor hallway and in one experiment outdoors, accuracy was higher for objects in the neighborhood of eye level. We consider these results in the light of two hypotheses. One proposes that observers localize the horizon as a reference for judging relative size, and the other proposes that observers perceive the general neighborhood of the horizon and then employ a height-in-visual-field heuristic. The finding that relative size judgments are best around the horizon implies that information that is independent of distance perception is used in perceiving size.     

Regularity of symmetry verticality guides perceptual judgments of objects

Previous research indicated that most salient, real-world objects possess natural regularities that observers commonly assume in perceptual judgments of figural orientation and interpretation. Regularities include 3-dimensionality, bilateral symmetry, and the tendency for object tops to possess more salient information than bottoms. Thus, when observers interpret randomly shaped figures, they reliably impose volume, bilateral symmetry, and top and front orientation directions, even when figures are 2-dimensional and asymmetric. We confirmed generalizability for observers to assume these regularities with stimuli that vary in complexity, and we found evidence supporting another regularity, that of symmetry verticality (symmetry about a vertical axis). Findings support use of a family of perceptual heuristics corresponding to natural regularities that constrain stimulus indeterminacy and help guide judgment of object orientation and interpretation.     

Structural similarity and spatiotemporal noise effects on learning dynamic novel objects

The spatiotemporal pattern projected by a moving object is specific to that object, as it depends on both the shape and the dynamics of the object. Previous research has shown that observers learn to make use of this spatiotemporal signature to recognize dynamic faces and objects. In two experiments, we assessed the extent to which the structural similarity of the objects and the presence of spatiotemporal noise affect how these signatures are learned and subsequently used in recognition. Observers first learned to identify novel, structurally distinctive or structurally similar objects that rotated with a particular motion. At test, each learned object moved with its studied motion or with a non-studied motion. In the non-studied motion condition we manipulated either dynamic information alone (experiment 1) or both static and dynamic information (experiment 2). Across both experiments we found that changing the learned motion of an object impaired recognition performance when 3-D shape was similar or when the visual input was noisy during learning. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that observers use learned spatiotemporal signatures and that such information becomes progressively more important as shape information becomes less reliable.     

It just felt right: The neural correlates of the fluency heuristic

Simple heuristics exploit basic human abilities, such as recognition memory, to make decisions based on sparse information. Based on the relative speed of recognizing two objects, the fluency heuristic infers that the one recognized more quickly has the higher value with respect to the criterion of interest. Behavioral data show that reliance on retrieval fluency enables quick inferences. Our goal with the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study was to isolate fluency-heuristic-based judgments to map the use of fluency onto specific brain areas that might give a better understanding of the heuristic’s underlying processes. Activation within the claustrum for fluency heuristic decisions was found. Given that claustrum activation is thought to reflect the integration of perceptual and memory elements into a conscious gestalt, we suggest this activation correlates with the experience of fluency.     

Contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the visual perception of relative mass

Some potential contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the perception of dynamic properties in the colliding balls task were explored. On each trial, an observer is asked to determine the heavier of 2 colliding balls. The invariant approach assumes that people can learn to detect complex visual patterns that reliably specify which ball is heavier. The heuristic approach assumes that observers only have access to simple motion cues. The exemplar-based approach assumes that people store particular exemplars of collisions in memory, which are later retrieved to perform the task. Mathematical models of these theories are contrasted in 2 experiments. Observers may use more than 1 strategy to determine relative mass. Although observers can learn to detect and use invariants, they may rely on either heuristics before the invariant has been learned or exemplars when memory demands and similarity relations allow.     

Semantic consistency versus perceptual salience in visual scenes: Findings from change detection

In a one-shot change detection task, we investigated the relationship between semantic properties (high consistency, i.e., diagnosticity, versus inconsistency with regard to gist) and perceptual properties (high versus low salience) of objects in guiding attention in visual scenes and in constructing scene representations. To produce the change an object was added or deleted in either the right or left half of coloured drawings of daily-life events. Diagnostic object deletions were more accurately detected than inconsistent ones, indicating rapid inclusion into early scene representation for the most predictable objects. Detection was faster and more accurate for high salience than for low salience changes. An advantage was found for diagnostic object changes in the high salience condition, although it was limited to additions when considering response speed. For inconsistent objects of high salience, deletions were detected faster than additions. These findings may indicate that objects are primarily selected on a perceptual basis with subsequent and supplementary effect of semantic consistency, in the sense of facilitation due to object diagnosticity or lengthening of processing time due to inconsistency.     

Interactions between symmetry and elongation in determining reference frames for object perception.

Many theories of object recognition posit that objects are encoded with respect to a perceptual frame of reference. Such theories assume that factors such as symmetry and elongation are critical for the assignment of an object's primary axis, and consequently for the extraction of an object's reference frame. The present experiments directly examined the relative roles played by symmetry and elongation in the determination of an object's primary axis, and the extent to which symmetry and elongation interact with one another. We found that observers use both symmetry and elongation in extracting an object's primary axis, that the extent to which each cue dominates depends on its relative salience, and that symmetry and elongation are processed interactively, rather than in encapsulated modules.     

Visual search asymmetry for viewing direction

In visual search experiments, we examined the existence of a search asymmetry for the direction with which three-dimensional objects are viewed. It was found that an upward-tilted target object among downward-tilted distracting objects was detected faster than when the orientation of target and distractors was reversed. This indicates that the early visual process regards objects tilted downward with respect to the observer as the situation that is more likely to be encountered. That is, the system is set up to expect to see the tops of these objects. We also found a visual field anisotropy, in that the asymmetry was more pronounced in the lower visual field. These findings are consistent with the idea that the tops of objects are usually situated in the lower visual field and less often in the upper field. Examination of the conditions under which the asymmetry and the anisotropy occur demonstrated the importance of the three-dimensional nature of the stimulus objects. Early visual processing thus makes use of heuristics that take into account specific relationships between the relative locations in space of the observer and 3-D objects.     

Seeing the disappearance of unseen objects

Because of the massive amount of incoming visual information, perception is fundamentally selective. We are aware of only a small subset of our visual input at any given moment, and a great deal of activity can occur right in front of our eyes without reaching awareness. While previous work has shown that even salient visual objects can go unseen, here we demonstrate the opposite pattern, wherein observers perceive stimuli which are not physically present. In particular, we show in two motion-induced blindness experiments that unseen objects can momentarily reenter awareness when they physically disappear: in some situations, you can see the disappearance of something you can't see. Moreover, when a stimulus changes outside of awareness in this situation and then physically disappears, observers momentarily see the altered version--thus perceiving properties of an object that they had never seen before, after that object is already gone. This phenomenon of 'perceptual reentry' yields new insights into the relationship between visual memory and conscious awareness.     

Judgments of relative time-to-contact of more than two approaching objects: Toward a method

Observers reported which of as many as eight computer-generated approaching objects would “hit” them first. Accuracy was above chance probability except when two-object displays contained pictorial relative size information that contradicted relative time-to-contact (TTC) information. Mean d’ and response time was greater, but mean efficiency (Barlow, 1978) was smaller with eight objects than with two. Performance was less effective when global expansion contradicted TTC information than when local expansion contradicted TTC. Results suggest that observers can judge relative TTC with as many as eight objects when certain sources of information are consistent with TTC and that observers rely on information other than, or in conjunction with, optical TTC. Also, the sources of visual information that affect performance may vary with set size, and identification (but not detection) judgments may be constrained by limited-capacity processing.     

Salience drives overt selection of two equally relevant visual targets

In the present study, we investigated whether salience determines the sequence of selection when participants search for two equally relevant visual targets. To do this, attentional selection was tracked overtly as observers inspected two items of differing physical salience: one a highly salient color singleton, and the other a less salient shape singleton. Participants were instructed to make natural eye movements in order to determine whether two line segments contained within the two singletons were oriented in the same or in different directions. Because both singleton items were task-relevant, participants had no reason to inspect one item before the other. As expected, observers fixated both targets on the majority of trials. Critically, saccades to the color singleton preceded saccades to the less salient shape singleton on the majority of trials. This demonstrates that the order of attentional object selection is largely determined by stimulus salience when task relevance is equated.     

Aging and the detection of observer and moving object collisions

The authors examined age-related differences in the detection of collision events. Older and younger observers were presented with displays simulating approaching objects that would either collide or pass by the observer. In 4 experiments, the authors found that older observers, as compared with younger observers, had less sensitivity in detecting collisions with an increase in speed, at shorter display durations, and with longer time-to-contact conditions. Older observers also had greater difficulty when the scenario simulated observer motion, suggesting that older observers have difficulty discriminating object motion expansion from background expansion from observer motion. The results of these studies support the expansion sensitivity hypothesis-that age-related decrements in detecting collision events involving moving objects are the result of a decreased sensitivity to recover expansion information.     

Continuous Response Monitoring of Relative Time-to-Contact Judgments: Does Effective Information Change During an Approach Event?

In many previous studies of time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of approaching objects, a response was measured after observers viewed the entire event and was used to infer the informational basis for the judgment. Such measures primarily reflect the information used at the end of the approach event and may not reveal whether observers used different information at different times during the event. Evidence indicates that observers use multiple information sources and that the effectiveness of information varies with distance. We introduce a method in which observers continuously report which of 2 approaching objects would reach them first, throughout the approach. We identified the occurrence and time of response reversals. Most observers changed their relative TTC judgments during the event. The pattern of responses indicated that observers did not use tau early during the approach when objects were far and did not use optical size later when the objects were closer. Most observers relied on either optical size or optical expansion rate early during the approach and expansion rate later during the event, although there were individual differences. A single relative TTC judgment measured after observers view an approach event may not reflect judgments or their informational basis throughout the entire event.     

Visual space under free viewing conditions

Most research on visual space has been done under restricted viewing conditions and in reduced environments. In our experiments, observers performed an exocentric pointing task, a collinearity task, and a parallelity task in a entirely visible room. We varied the relative distances between the objects and the observer and the separation angle between the two objects. We were able to compare our data directly with data from experiments in an environment with less monocular depth information present. We expected that in a richer environment and under less restrictive viewing conditions, the settings would deviate less from the veridical settings. However, large systematic deviations from veridical settings were found for all three tasks. The structure of these deviations was task dependent, and the structure and the deviations themselves were comparable to those obtained under more restricted circumstances. Thus, the additional information was not used effectively by the observers.     

When motor attention improves selective attention: The dissociating role of saliency

There is evidence that preparing and maintaining a motor plan (“motor attention”) can bias visual selective attention. For example, a motor attended grasp biases visual attention to select appropriately graspable object features (Symes, Tucker, Ellis, Vainio, & Ottoboni, 2008). According to the biased competition model of selective attention, the relative weightings of stimulus-driven and goal-directed factors determine selection. The current study investigated how the goal-directed bias of motor attention might operate when the stimulus-driven salience of the target was varied. Using a change detection task, two almost identical photographed scenes of simplistic graspable objects were presented flickering back and forth. The target object changed visually, and this change was either high or low salience. Target salience determined whether or not the motor attended grasp significantly biased visual selective attention. Specifically, motor attention only had a reliable influence on target detection times when the visual salience of the target was low.     

Smaller holistic processing of faces associated with face drawing experience

The type of experience involved with an object category has been regarded as one important factor in shaping of the human object recognition system. Laboratory training studies have shown that different kinds of learning experience with the same set of novel objects resulted in different perceptual and neural changes. Whether this applies to natural real-world objects remains to be seen. We compared two groups of observers who had different learning experiences with faces, using holistic processing as a dependent measure. We found that, while ordinary observers had extensive individuation experience with faces and displayed typical holistic face processing, art students who had acquired additional experience in drawing faces, and thus in attending to parts of a face, showed less holistic processing than did ordinary observers. These results converge with laboratory training studies on the role of type of experience in the development of different perceptual markers for different object categories. It is thus insufficient to categorize expertise simply in terms of object domains (e.g., expertise with faces). Instead, perceptual expertise should be classified in terms of the underlying process or task demand.