正义感及其进化论解释——从罗尔斯的正义感思想谈起

正义感是有助于人类合作的道德情感,但它并不是一种单一性的概念,而是复合性的,它至少包含了感激、愤恨、负罪与义愤,这些情感具有不同的进化机制,因此,对正义感起源的解释也就并非某种单一的进化论模式可以应付,不同的道德情感可能适用于不同的进化论解释模式,这才是理解正义感起源的科学态度.     

董仲舒《春秋》解释方法论

本文认为,董仲舒感应时代课题,重新解释《春秋》,成功地建立起新的儒学理论体系,与他能创立新的解释方法论有直接关系。文章从三个方面具体地论述了这种解释方法论的内涵、性质与功用：一、名号论—探索名号以解释词语;二、辞指论—剖析辞指以解释表达式;三、事例论—通释事例以进行心理解释。三者相互贯通、相互发明,构成了董仲舒《春秋》解释的基本模式;而与毛亨《诗诂训传》创立的“诂一训一传”解释模式原理相通,特色各异,互相竞争,互相影响。     

朱熹《四书》解释方法论

本文认为 ,朱熹通过重新解释《四书》 ,不仅成功地阐发了新的本体论、心性论哲学 ,而且在一定程度上建构起了南宋理宗以后六百年里中国社会的主导思想。而他所创立的《四书》解释方法论 ,既是他解释《四书》的方法论 ,又是他研究儒学的方法论 ,而且还是他认识世界、穷究“天地之理”的方法论。文章从三个方面对此进行了具体的论证 :一、《四书》解释方法论的系统性 ;二、以逐层推捱为关键的语言解释 ;三、以唤醒体验为契机的心理解释     

人类行为的进化论解释及其特征

进化论用于解释人类行为的合理性依赖于对进化论结构的理解,而不能通过直接肯定或否定人类行为有无某种生物学的结构基础来回答。如果进化论是对现象系统的描述,那它在原则上就不能用于对人类行为进化的研究。进化论应被看作是对一类物理系统的定义,理论定义系统与现象系统也只能在现象层面上同构。人类行为进化解释的恰当性,就在于人类行为系统与进化论定义系统在经验上的适合达到了期望的程度。     

人类的判断为什么不精确：进化论和脑科学的解释

人类的判断并非十分精确,而且人类还无法清醒认识到自己判断并不准。进化心理学理论认为看似不精确的判断最小化了人类付出的生存代价,从而使个体具有更大的收益,在竞争资源中具有适应优势;而脑科学领域运用fMRI、TMS等技术发现了前额叶的某些区域与判断的精确性有关。未来的研究有待结合进化发展心理学的角度、进化适应的现实解释性角度和认知神经科学发现临床应用的角度展开。     

进化论医学在防治小儿直立性疾病中的应用

直立性疾病是人类从俯卧位转变为直立位后,因自身重力的改变所导致的一类疾病。小儿的常见病有：直立性调节障碍、胡桃夹综合征、排尿性晕厥、腹股沟疝、鞘膜积液、发育性髋脱位和股骨头无菌性坏死等。因其致病因素是人体的重力,所以防治本病的原则为反重力作用或改变体位。     

宗教信仰的科学解释——人为什么信教？

宗教伴随着人类文明史的发展,是人类文明的一个普遍特征。十八、十九世纪的科学家和理性主义者们预言了宗教的最终消亡。现在看来,这个结论的得出未免为时尚早,宗教至今仍然具有旺盛的生命力。虽然怀疑论者认为,穆斯林的麦加朝圣和印度教徒的恒河沐浴只是源于古代传统信仰的仪式,没     

是神创论还是进化论？——《科学与宗教：它们可调和吗》一书评述（三）

20世纪90年代在美国科学界一些著名科学家参与的、所谓的“科学与宗教运动”。其主要讨论的还是在宇宙学和生物学问题引发的有关进化论与神创论问题．进而又引发了更广泛的科学与宗教关系讨论：特别是当神创论的新变种——“智能设计论”提出后．在美国媒体推波助澜下。引发学界和公众中对此问题更加关注。该书的第二部分“‘智能设计论’亦即神创论对抗进化论”,有5位作者评论了“智能设计论”（新版神创论）对抗进化论问题。分析了“智能设计论”对进化论的疑问与挑战,其流行的现状及其在公众、社会和国家政治层面上的影响．阐述了“科学与宗教运动”带给公众什么样的思考。本文对此进行作者主要观点的介绍。     

《论语》郑玄与朱熹解释之比较

郑玄和朱熹是汉代和宋代经典解释的代表性人物。本文从解释观、解释方法和解释内容三个方面对《论语》郑玄和朱熹的解释作了比较 ,认为他们不同的解释观是决定两者对《论语》作出不同解释的根本原因 ,而二人不同的解释观又产生于各自时代的不同学术思想 ,从而建立了中国经典解释学和中国传统学术史之间的紧密联系     

基于进化论的伦理自然主义

对于进化理论与伦理学之间的关系,不同看法构成了一个连续谱,采取互相排斥立场的两端各有问题,而中间立场的成立需要应对自然主义谬误和休谟法则提出的挑战。对于实践判断的分析能为自然主义清除障碍,而针对婴儿的社会评价行为的系列实验在为基于进化论的伦理自然主义提供依据的同时,也表明一定阶段从进化剥离的认知能力对道德价值的塑造超脱了生物学说明的范围。     

The Evolutionary Challenge for Technology

The evolutionary challenge for technology in the third millennium is one of designing the vehicles for sustainable human and societal development in partnership with earth. The challenge calls for the conscious creation of evolutionary systems-not through the "hard technologies" that shape and mold the physical infrastructure of our planet, but through "soft technologies" that augment creative and constructive processes of human interaction. Through them, humanity has the opportunity to create the conditions for the emergence of a true learning society at both regional and global levels. The meaning of key terms such as evolution, technology, and development must be explored if we are to create a shared understanding of the contemporary survival challenges faced by humanity. This paper explores both the promise and the threat faced by a techno-civilization such as is emerging on our planet in the early twenty-first century.     

Resisting Explanation

Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality.     

对定量归因判断的能力差异解释

该文提出对由两个原因一起作用而产生的结果的定量归因判断的能力差异解释,认为对两个原因定量归因判断之间的差异主要取决于对两个原因能力评估之间的相对差异。两个实验发现,大学生被试一般能根据对两个原因能力评估的相对差异程度,对产生给定结果的贡献在两个竞争原因之间进行相应的比例分配;对两个原因贡献评估的差异随着对两个原因能力评估的相对差异程度的增大而增大。这支持对这种定量归因判断的能力差异解释。     

Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science

Summary  Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

Proportionality,Contrast and Explanation

If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another.     

Rhapsodic Evolution: Essay on Exaptation and Evolutionary Pluralism

Since formulating the theory of punctuated equilibria in 1972, a group of prominent evolutionary biologists, geneticists, and paleontologists have contributed towards a significant reinterpretation of the neo-Darwinian image of evolution that had consolidated during the second half of the twentieth century. We believe a research program, which we might define as "evolutionary pluralism" or "post-Darwinism," has been outlined, one that is centered on the discovery of the complexity and multiplicity of elements that work together to produce changes in our evolutionary systems. We are talking about a three-dimensional multiplicity: a multiplicity of rhythms in evolution (i.e., the theory of punctuated equilibria); a multiplicity of evolutionary units and levels (i.e., the hierarchical theory of evolution); and a multiplicity of factors and causes in evolution (i.e., the concept of exaptation). Although the reductionistic and deterministic view of natural history interprets the intelligence of evolution as a panoptic and executory rationality, evolutionary pluralism, going back to the original flexibility of the Darwinian opus, sees in the intelligence of evolution an ingenious m tis, an imperfect but very creative, craftsmanlike cleverness. The new metaphors of change introduced by evolutionary pluralism and the consequent criticism of the adaptational paradigm offer some very interesting spin-offs for the study of evolutionary systems in widely differing fields, from theoretical economics to the cognitive sciences. I propose a particular hypothesis concerning the possibility and usefulness of expanding the concept of exaptation into a general theory of developmental processes, both in biology as well as in the cognitive sciences.     

Theory and Practice of Evolutionary Civilization

Societal collapse has been a perennial concern of humanity, at least since the early Greeks. Recent publication of Jared Diamond's Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed and Ervin Laszlo's The Chaos Window: The World at the Crossroads renew this concern. Despite the urgency in these and many similar calls to action, no consensus theory and practice of evolutionary civilization exists. This article calls for collaborative action by the evolutionary systems community and related disciplines to provide insight into what has been dubbed “the most important question in the world today” (Smith, 2005 Smith, F. L. Jr. 2005. Jared Diamond and the Terrible Too's. Energy &; Environment, 16(3/4): 423–439. [CSA][CROSSREF] [Google Scholar], p. 436).     

The Deductive-Nomological Account of Metaphysical Explanation

The paper explores a deductive-nomological account of metaphysical explanation: some truths metaphysically explain, or ground, another truth just in case the laws of metaphysics determine the latter truth on the basis of the former. I develop and motivate a specific conception of metaphysical laws, on which they are general rules that regulate the existence and features of derivative entities. I propose an analysis of the notion of ‘determination via the laws’, based on a restricted form of logical entailment. I argue that the DN-account of ground can be defended against the well-known objections to the DN-approach to scientific explanation. The goal of the paper is to show that the DN-account of metaphysical explanation is a well-motivated and defensible theory.