Don’t Know,Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance,Culpability, and Caution

This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.

Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!

This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest or power.

Don’t Blame the Idealizations

Idealizing conditions are scapegoats for scientific hypotheses, too often blamed for falsehood better attributed to less obvious sources. But while the tendency to blame idealizations is common among both philosophers of science and scientists themselves, the blame is misplaced. Attention to the nature of idealizing conditions, the content of idealized hypotheses, and scientists’ attitudes toward those hypotheses shows that idealizing conditions are blameless when hypotheses misrepresent. These conditions help to determine the content of idealized hypotheses, and they do so in a way that prevents those hypotheses from being false by virtue of their constituent idealizations.     

Damned if You Do,Damned if You Don’t: The Stigma of Weight Loss Surgery

Willpower, as demonstrated through diet and exercise, is constructed as the only acceptable strategy for losing weight. While weight loss surgery (WLS) is an option for morbidly obese individuals, like obesity itself, WLS carries stigma. Using a 40-item survey, we measured 101 participants’ experiences with WLS stigma. We examined whether WLS is stigmatizing, how that stigma is perceived by patients, and tendencies to hide their surgery status in order to manage stigma. Results indicated evidence of perceived stigma despite support from significant others as well as a tendency to hide surgery status from some people as a stigma management technique.     

Don’t say that!

According to pragma-dialectical methodology, a party in an argumentative discussion can be assumed to manoeuvre strategically between dialectical and rhetorical objectives. One confrontational form of strategic manoeuvring occurs when a critic charges an arguer with advancing a standpoint that has socially harmful consequences. In special situations this form of manoeuvring can be dialectically sound, for example when the standpoint is advanced in a way that damages the dialectical process. The boundary between fallacious and dialectically sound applications of this form of manoeuvring is examined by looking for the manoeuvring’s soundness conditions.     

Analysis of Multiple Partially Ordered Responses to Belief Items with Don’t Know Option

Understanding beliefs, values, and preferences of patients is a tenet of contemporary health sciences. This application was motivated by the analysis of multiple partially ordered set (poset) responses from an inventory on layman beliefs about diabetes. The partially ordered set arises because of two features in the data—first, the response options contain a Don’t Know (DK) option, and second, there were two consecutive occasions of measurement. As predicted by the common sense model of illness, beliefs about diabetes were not necessarily stable across the two measurement occasions. Instead of analyzing the two occasions separately, we studied the joint responses across the occasions as a poset response. Few analytic methods exist for data structures other than ordered or nominal categories. Poset responses are routinely collapsed and then analyzed as either rank ordered or nominal data, leading to the loss of nuanced information that might be present within poset categories. In this paper we developed a general class of item response models for analyzing the poset data collected from the Common Sense Model of Diabetes Inventory. The inferential object of interest is the latent trait that indicates congruence of belief with the biomedical model. To apply an item response model to the poset diabetes inventory, we proved that a simple coding algorithm circumvents the requirement of writing new codes such that standard IRT software could be directly used for the purpose of item estimation and individual scoring. Simulation experiments were used to examine parameter recovery for the proposed poset model.     

‘We Like You, But We Don’t Want You’—The Impact of Pregnancy in the Workplace

This study considered whether pregnant women are considered as mothers (to be) in the workplace. Working from the stereotype content model (SCM) we predicted that pregnant women would be stereotyped as warm and incompetent, and experience workplace discrimination; with these effects accentuated in masculine-type occupations. Eighty-two Australian University undergraduates evaluated a candidate who was pregnant or not for a masculine- or feminine-type short-term position. Results provided mixed support for the SCM. Across both occupations, the pregnant candidate was rated as warmer, more competent, but was discriminated against in comparison to the non-pregnant candidate. We suggest that participants may employ a shifting standard of comparison, thus highlighting a potential limitation of the usefulness of traditional SCM measures with individual targets.     

Gleaning Information for Cognitive Operations from Don’t Know Responses in Cognitive and Noncognitive Assessments

The Don’t Know (DK) response – taking the form of an omitted response or not-reached at the end of a cognitive test, or explicitly presented as a response option in a social survey – contains important information that is often overlooked. Direct psychometric modeling efforts for DK responses are few and far between. In this article, the linear logistic test model (LLTM) is proposed for delineating the impacts of cognitive operations for a test that contains DK responses. We assume that the DK response is a valid response. The assumption is reasonable for many situations, including low-stakes cognitive tests and attitudinal assessments. By extracting information embedded in the DK response, the method shows how DK can inform the latent construct of interest and the cognitive operations underlying the response to stimuli. Using a proven recoding scheme, the LLTM could be implemented through commonly used programs such as PROC GLIMMIX. Two simulation experiments to evaluate how well the parameters can be recovered were conducted. In addition, two real data examples, from a noncognitive test of health belief assessment and a cognitive test of knowledge in diabetes, are also presented as case studies to illustrate the LLTM for DK response.     

What We Don’t Know May Hurt Us: An Examination of Systematic Bias in Offender Risk Assessments

Many issues are known to plague the validity of risk assessment, but empirical scholarship in criminal justice has not yet directly investigated how they influence prediction accuracy. This study explores how frequently risk assessment staff classifies information to be insufficient and the extent to which systematic error impacts the validity of risk prediction. Using Oregon’s Juvenile Crime Prevention Risk Assessment Instrument, we identified critical missing risk information and infused the dataset with varying levels of error. Classification outcomes and overall prediction accuracy reacted unfavorably, suggesting that the common practice of knowingly and unknowingly underestimating risk may be highly pernicious.     

Don’t look! don’t touch! inhibitory control of eye and hand movements

Inhibitory control of eye and hand movements was compared in the stop-signal task. Subjects moved their eyes to the right or left or pressed keys on the right or left in response to visual stimuli. The stimuli were either central (angle brackets pointing left or right) or peripheral (plus signs turning into Xs left or right of fixation), and the task was either pro (respond on the same side as the stimulus) or anti (respond on the opposite side). Occasionally, a stop signal was presented, which instructed subjects to inhibit their responses to the go stimulus. Stop-signal reaction times (SSRTs) were faster overall for eye movements than for hand movements, and they were affected differently by stimulus conditions (central vs. peripheral) and task (pro vs. anti), suggesting that the eyes and hands are inhibited by different processes operating under similar principles (i.e., a race between stop and go processes).     

Review of Ordering Don’t Resuscitate in Iranian Dying Patients

Making decision on not to resuscitate is a confusing, conflicting and complex issue and depends on each country’s culture and customs. Therefore, each country needs to take action in accordance with its cultural, ethical, religious and legal contexts to develop guidelines in this regard. Since the majority of Iran’s people are Muslims, and in Islam, the human life is considered sacred, based on the values of the community, an Iranian Islamic agenda needs to be developed not taking measures about resuscitation of dying patients. It is necessary to develop an Iranian Islamic guidelines package in order to don’t resuscitate in dying patients.     

“You Just Know It’s the Only Thing You Can Think”: A Conversation with Chodorow

ABSTRACT

Nancy Julia Chodorow (1944–) is a pioneer feminist theorist who brought together academic fields of sociology, anthropology, and psychoanalysis in her work related to feminist theories and psychoanalysis. Her first book, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978 Chodorow, N. J. (1978; second ed. 1999). The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press. [Google Scholar]), gave primacy to a more generalized account of the developmental and familial origins of prevalent psychological differences between femininity and masculinity from a psychoanalytic sociological viewpoint. Her later books, Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities: Freud and Beyond (1994 Chodorow, N. J. (1994). Femininities, masculinities, sexualities: Freud and beyond. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. [Google Scholar]), The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and Culture (1999 Chodorow, N. J. (1999). The power of feelings: Personal meaning in psychoanalysis, gender, and culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar]), and Individualizing Gender and Sexuality: Theory and Practice (2012 Chodorow, N. J. (2012). Individualizing gender and sexuality: Theory and practice. New York and London: Routledge.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), bring in a rich interplay among socio-structural influences (i.e., culture) as well as intra- and inter-psychic dynamic processes, emphasizing more the importance of individuality and subjectivity. Based on an interview I had with Chodorow on the development of her thought, this paper gives Chodorow’s account of her personal history and academic background, current manifestations in feminist social science research and feminist psychoanalysis based on her contribution and legacy, and reflective narratives on the unfolding of feminist and psychoanalytic theories from the 1970s onward. Chodorow’s note to the next generation of feminist psychotherapists is also included.     

Selective adaptation with reversible figures: Don’t change that channel

An adaptation-test paradigm was used in two experiments examining processes underlying the perceived reversals of a rotating Necker cube. Adaptation and test cubes were either the same or different with respect to their visual fields of presentation (Experiment 1) or their sizes (Experiment 2). Results of both experiments indicated that, following subjects’ adaptation to a different cube, reversal rate of the test cube did not differ from that obtained without prior adaptation experience. In contrast, reversal rate of the test cube was elevated following adaptation to the same cube. Additional findings of Experiment 1 were that a test cube presented to the same visual field as the adaptation cube yielded a higher reversal rate than did a simultaneously presented cube in the opposite visual field. Also, the reversal rate of one cube was not influenced by the simultaneous presentation of a second cube. Results of both experiments were interpreted in terms of the fatigue and recovery of multiple, largely independent, localized neural channels. Thus, the results tie reversible-figure illusions to other visual phenomena thought to involve similar fatigue processes within localized visual channels (e.g., tilt, motion, and size aftereffects).     

How Do You Get Where You Want to Be When You Don't Know Where You Want to Be?

I tell the story of my own development from the childhood of a psychiatrist's daughter in wartime Britain, through a brief career in family medicine, to the position of a member of the Independent tradition in British psychoanalysis. As well as having psychoanalysts from different theoretical orientations in my family, I became confused during my training by the different strands of thought and technique taught and promulgated in the British Psychoanalytical Society. For some time after qualification, I took the lonely path of listening mostly to my patients' material as the prime source of understanding mental suffering. It was only after a few years that I was satisfied at being able to connect psychoanalytic theory with what I heard in the consulting room, and following this was further able to explore different strands of psychoanalytic thinking to reach my own position.     

Don’t Shoot the Messnger: Memory for Misspellings in Context

Misspellings in sentences are usually easy to understand by readers due to top-down influences. Although top-down processing allows for fluent reading of misspelled items, the nature of their representations in memory is not known. If representations of misspellings are distinct from representations of correctly spelled words, their influence should be seen in later recognition decisions. In this set of experiments, participants read words and misspellings embedded in sentences and were later given a recognition test. The sentences contained semantically biased or neutral contexts. In Experiment 1, misspellings were created by removing a single letter (e.g., drveway). In Experiment 2, the recognition items probes were presented in uppercase letters (e.g., DRVEWAY) to reduce the visual similarity between study and test items. In Experiment 3, the misspellings were created by substituting visually similar letters (e.g., driweway). In contrast to the previous experiments, in Experiment 4, participants were explicitly told about the memory test to see how response strategies affect performance. Overall, the results indicate that people retain surface feature information about misspellings which seem to inform their memory judgments, and that the processing of this information cannot be strategically controlled.