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1.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
2.
This paper is an attempt to clarify the relation between, on the one hand, the construct of ‘objective happiness’ recently
proposed by Daniel Kahneman and, on the other hand, the principal focus of happiness studies, namely subjective well-being
(SWB). I have two aims. The first, a critical one, is to give a theoretical explanation for why ‘objective happiness’ cannot
be a general measure of SWB. Kahneman’s methodology precludes incorporation of relevant pieces of information that can become
available to the subject only retrospectively. The second aim, a constructive one, is to clarify the exact connection between
‘objective happiness’ and the wider notion of SWB. Unlike Kahneman, who treats the notion as a useful first approximation,
I propose that its applicability should be thought of as context-dependent: under some conditions it could be the right measure
of SWB but what these conditions are involves both psychological and ethical considerations. 相似文献
3.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
4.
5.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
6.
Daniel Cohnitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):373-392
Summary In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor”
ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought
experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg
and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy
and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment
I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both,
the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion
in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.
For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).相似文献
7.
In the face of the business community’s widening concern about corporate ethical behavior, business schools are reexamining
how they ensure that students appreciate the ethical implications of managerial decision making and have the analytical tools
necessary to confront ethical dilemmas. The current approaches adopted by colleges vary from mere ‘lip service’ to embedding
ethics at the core of the curriculum. This paper examines the experience of several US universities that have incorporated
business ethics into their curricula. In particular, the paper describes the issues facing Central Washington University as
it seeks to integrate ethical decision making into its core undergraduate business curriculum. Issues addressed include the
technical challenges of establishing a common element of curriculum across the various business disciplines, determining the
major conceptual foundations of ‘ethical thinking’ while recognizing students’ existing value systems, and how to obtain ‘buy
in’ by faculty to the initiative. 相似文献
8.
9.
Hermann Schmitz Rudolf Owen M��llan Jan Slaby 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):241-259
The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928).
In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction
with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives
an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process:
A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’)
as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced
to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to
phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for
what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s
philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers
Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects
of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to
its potential applications in science and society. 相似文献
10.
Gerald Vision 《Topoi》2010,29(2):109-123
Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform
implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional
with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting
to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising
deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail. 相似文献
11.
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best a partial similarity
to reality, was a core element of his philosophy of science. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a neglected aspect
of it, namely its significance for the issue of scientific explanation and understanding, regarded by Boltzmann as central
goals of science. I argue that, in addition to being an epistemological view of the interpretation of scientific theories
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie has implications for the nature of scientific understanding. This aspect has as yet been ignored because
discussion of the Bildtheorie has been restricted to the realism-instrumentalism debate. To elucidate my analysis of Boltzmann’s
Bildtheorie concrete examples are presented, and the pragmatist and Darwinist roots of Boltzmann’s view are discussed.
Moreover, I propose to use Boltzmann’s ideas as a starting-point for developing a novel analysis of the notion of scientific
understanding, of which a brief impression is given. It shows that the study of Boltzmann’s philosophy is not only of historical
interest but can be relevant also to modern philosophy of science and to the methodology of theoretical physics.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
12.
Liisa Steinby 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(3):227-249
In this article, Bakhtin’s early aesthetics is reread in the context of Hermann Cohen’s system of philosophy, especially his
aesthetics. Bakhtin’s thinking from the early ethical writing Toward a Philosophy of Act to Author and Hero in Artistic Activity and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is followed. In Author and Hero, an individual is in his life conceived as involved in cognitive and ethical action but as remaining without a consummative
form; the form, or the ‘soul’, is bestowed upon a person by the creative activity of the artist alone. In his understanding
of artistic creativity and the relationship between the ‘hero’ and the author, Bakhtin closely follows Cohen, with the exception
that for Cohen the object of artistic form-giving is the universal, idealized man, whereas for Bakhtin it is an individual.
In the concept of a ‘polyphonic novel’ as developed in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin, however, considers this view of the activity of the artist (or the novelist) to apply to the “traditional” novel
only, while in a Dostoevskyean novel the characters are not subordinated to any defining power of the author. Bakhtin’s theory
of the Dostoevskyean novel is thus a return to the emphasis of the cognitive and ethical autonomy of the individual. His understanding
of the encounter between persons as a ‘subject’—‘subject’ or an ‘I’—‘thou’ relation has a predecessor, among others, in Cohen. 相似文献
13.
Stephen Pollard 《Synthese》2007,159(1):83-98
Competent speakers of natural languages can borrow reference from one another. You can arrange for your utterances of ‘Kirksville’
to refer to the same thing as my utterances of ‘Kirksville’. We can then talk about the same thing when we discuss Kirksville. In cases like this, you borrow “aboutness” from me by borrowing reference. Now
suppose I wish to initiate a line of reasoning applicable to any prime number. I might signal my intention by saying, “Let
p be any prime.” In this context, I will be using the term ‘p’ to reason about the primes. Although ‘p’ helps me secure the aboutness of my discourse, it may seem wrong to say that ‘p’ refers to anything. Be that as it may, this paper explores what mathematical discourse would be like if mathematicians were
able to borrow freely from one another not just the reference of terms that clearly refer, but, more generally, the sort of
aboutness present in a line of reasoning leading up to a universal generalization. The paper also gives reasons for believing
that aboutness of this sort really is freely transferable. A key implication will be that the concept “set of natural numbers”
suffers from no mathematically significant indeterminacy that can be coherently discussed. 相似文献
14.
Steven French 《Synthese》2010,172(2):231-249
Stein once urged us not to confuse the means of representation with that which is being represented. Yet that is precisely
what philosophers of science appear to have done at the meta-level when it comes to representing the practice of science.
Proponents of the so-called ‘syntactic’ view identify theories as logically closed sets of sentences or propositions and models
as idealised interpretations, or ‘theoruncula, as Braithwaite called them. Adherents of the ‘semantic’ approach, on the other
hand, are typically characterised as taking them to be families of models that are set-theoretic, according to Suppes and
others, or abstract, as Giere has argued. da Costa and French (Science and Partial Truth. OUP, Oxford, 2003) suggested that
we should refrain from ontological speculation as to the nature of scientific theories and models and focus on their appropriate
representation for various purposes within the philosophy of science. Such an approach allows both linguistic and non-linguistic
resources to play their appropriate role (see also French and Saatsi, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 2004 PSA Meeting,
78:548–559, 2006) and can be supported by recent case studies illustrating the heterogeneity of scientific practice. My aim
in this paper is to further develop this ‘quietist’ view, and to indicate how it offers a fruitful way forward for the philosophy
of science. 相似文献
15.
Christopher Cordner 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):593-609
In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to
our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into
obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of
‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly
self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way
of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear
away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures.
To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.
相似文献
Christopher CordnerEmail: |
16.
Chrisoula Andreou 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(3):311-325
I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions.Given my loose usage, the Humean position Bernard Williams defends in his seminal article “Internal and External Reasons” (1981) counts as a version of instrumentalism about practical reason, since it incorporates the idea that every genuine practical imperative takes as its starting point some existing motivation(s) of the agent. It deviates from strict instrumentalism in that it leaves room for specificationist reasoning (reasoning aimed at moving from general ends to specific ends) in addition to means-end reasoning. For example, it leaves room for practical reasoning that is focused on “finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment” or on “thinking how the satisfaction of elements in [one's subjective motivational set] can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering” (Williams, 1981, p. 104). 相似文献
17.
Carl Gillett 《Synthese》2006,153(2):261-296
Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of
‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his
role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an
anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably,
misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious,
and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical
properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims
both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist
position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’
presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists. 相似文献
18.
Maarten Wisse 《Sophia》2010,49(3):359-373
In his Cities of God, Graham Ward advocates for what he calls an ‘analogical worldview’. On the one hand, he suggests that this analogical worldview
has its roots in pre-modern theology and philosophy, especially in Augustine and Aquinas. On the other hand, Graham Ward draws
heavily on contemporary critical theory to express this view. The thesis defended in this paper is that by reading the concept
of analogy from Augustine and Aquinas in terms of contemporary critical theory, especially that of Jacques Derrida, Ward develops
an analogical worldview that has strikingly nominalist ramifications. These ramifications imply that, in the end, there is
no longer an adequacy between the perceiving mind and the reality perceived. The argument is developed in three steps. In
the first step, Ward’s reading of contemporary critical theory, especially with respect to Derrida, is introduced. In the
second step, the theological appropriation of Derrida in the analogical worldview is analyzed. In the third step, the nominalist
implications of this application are shown in terms of Ward’s critique of privileging heterosexual relationships. In this
third section, I will also deal more extensively and precisely with the question of what I mean by labeling his work as ‘nominalism’
as well as outlining the specific form of nominalism that I am here invoking. In the penultimate section, I will attempt to
show that Ward’s nominalism can also be found in the works of Milbank and Pickstock, as it has to do with the specific way
in which they take up the Platonic tradition. In my concluding remarks, I will come back to the discussion about the ontological
status of sexual relations, indicating my own view on this issue. 相似文献
19.
Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is
being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note
the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach
to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition,
‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously
to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity
will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a
human person. 相似文献
20.
Ofra Magidor 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2012,41(2):471-491
Call an argument a ‘happy sorites’ if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking
fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises
of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow
for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at least some happy sorites
arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance
is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten
to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions
on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments. 相似文献