Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.     

The Pre-reflective Situational Self

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to  this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world.

     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.     

A community psychology of object meanings: Identity negotiation during disaster recovery

What do material goods intended for personal consumption mean to community? We use the extreme example of natural disaster recovery in a community to explore this question. Our work describes how members make sense of material objects that transition from private to public possessions (damaged goods) and public to private possessions (donated goods). By blending consumer and community psychology perspectives with our narratives, we employ a three-dimensional framework for analyzing object meanings: (1) material objects as agents of communitas (a shared sense of “we”), (2) material objects as agents of individualism (a focus on “me”), and (3) material objects as agents of opposition (the “we” that speaks for “me” and “us” versus “them”). This theoretical frame allows us to show how different conceptions of identity lead to conflicting meanings of objects within community, and to explain how and why object meanings shift as objects move across time and space from private to public and from scarcity to abundance. We also provide implications for coping with disasters that consider collective and individual identities as well as oppositional stances in between.     

Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.     

Pre-Reflective Ethical Know-How

In recent years there has been growing attention paid to a kind of human action or activity which does not issue from a process of reflection and deliberation and which is described as, e.g., ‘engaged coping’, ‘unreflective action’, and ‘flow’. Hubert Dreyfus, one of its key proponents, has developed a phenomenology of expertise which he has applied to ethics in order to account for ‘everyday ongoing ethical coping’ or ‘ethical expertise’. This article addresses the shortcomings of this approach by examining the pre-reflective ethical know-how individuals first develop and on which all later forms of ethical expertise are dependent. In the first section an account is given of the ‘ethical second nature’ which every individual develops from childhood onwards and which forms the basis of pre-reflective ethical know-how. The acquisition of an ethical second nature early on opens up the very domain of ‘the ethical’ for us in the first place and is constitutive of our sensitivity to it. The second section turns to pre-reflective ethical know-how and whether it is conceptual in nature. Just as sensorimotor understanding forms the basis of our reflective perceptual concepts, pre-reflective ethical know-how is similarly proto-conceptual and is the source of our reflective ethical and moral concepts. Finally, the third section examines the process whereby ethical second nature and pre-reflective ethical know-how are actually acquired, namely, through immersion in an ‘ethical world’. This world consists of both the web of ethical meanings and significances which has evolved in a particular society or community as well as its members whose actions and interactions continually reproduce that web.     

Ce que soigner veut dire. Le peintre,le patient et le bon samaritain

The hyper-medicalization of our societies and our absolute confidence in curative medicine have made us gradually lose the deep meaning of the words of ailments. Many are now calling on the public authorities to promote a “policy of Care”. The use of anglicisms is certainly “trendy” but opposing “cure” and “care” does not make sense. We invite our readers to try to recover the meaning and the value of the verb to treat and the word care(s), plural and yet so singular. To carry out this quest, we will focus our attention on a few works of art which will perhaps allow us, in three stages, to (re)discover the deep meaning of the care relationship.     

What's Formal about Formal Indication? Heidegger's Method in Sein und Zeit 1

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of “formal indication” is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer “the ontological question of the being of the ‘sum’” (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question “what is it to be the entity I am?” On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence.     

I through thou,and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”     

Intellectuals as missionaries: the liberal opposition in Russia and their notion of culture

The present article is primarily concerned with the imagined community of liberal intellectuals (starting with the Westernizers, in the 1840s, and ending with the Kadets and the participants of the October Revolution in the early twentieth century), rather than the community that “objectively” existed. This imaginary community constructed notions of the collective identity of their own group as well as that of Russian society. For this purpose, they instrumentalized the notions of “progress,” “backwardness,” “culturedness” (kul’turnost’) and “benightedness” (temnota), thereby creating hierarchies in which the “constructors” of collective identities granted themselves the important role of intermediaries between state and society. Special attention is paid to the prominent role Russia’s liberal historians played in this process insofar as historians possessed great power in nineteenth-century Europe—the power to tell their states and societies about their past, present, and future—and this transformed them into professional producers of (national) identities. Their work combined expert knowledge and ideological clichés in a highly complex manner. The central question posed is to what extent and in what respect the reality constructed by Russian intellectuals coincided with the actions of intellectuals in other European regions or, on the contrary, to what extent their discursive activities had a specifically local character.     

The role of noun imagery in the speed of processing the grammaticality of adjective-noun phrases

This experiment investigated speed of processing the grammaticality of phrases consisting of the adjective “one” or “two” followed by a singular or plural noun. The subject’s task was to press one of two keys, depending upon whether the phrase was grammatically correct or incorrect. There were eight types of phrases, formed by the factorial combinations of singular or plural adjectives, singular or plural nouns, and high or low noun imageD’. These served as within-subjects variables. Between-subjects variables were the factorial combinations of sex of subject, duration of stimulus phrase (.2 or 2.5 sec), and hand assigned to the correct-grammar key. A fourth between-subjects variable was whether or not the subject reported using an artificial phrase-scanning strategy to determine grammaticality. Correct grammar, singular noun form, high noun imagery, and reported use of the strategy all produced highly significant reductions in reaction times. Only 1% of the interactions were significant. A multistage serial processing model that could be based upon Sternberg’s additive factor paradigm or even Donders’ subtraction method was found to be highly successful in describing the results.     

Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction

It is now generally accepted that human beings are naturally, possibly even essentially, intersubjective. This chapter offers a robust defence of an enhanced and extended intersubjectivity, criticising the paucity of individuating notions of agency and emphasising the community and reciprocity of our affective co-existence with other living organisms and things. I refer to this modified intersubjectivity, which most closely expresses the implicit intricacy of our pre-reflective neuro-muscular experiential entanglement, as ‘enkinaesthesia’. The community and reciprocity of this entanglement is characterised as dialogical, and in this dialogue, as part of our anticipatory preparedness, we have a capacity for intentional transgression, feeling our way with our world but, more particularly, co-feeling our way with the mind and intentions of the other. Thus we are, not so much ‘mind’-reading, as ‘mind’-feeling, and it is through this enkinaesthetic ‘mind’-feeling dialogue that values-realising activity originates and we uncover the deep roots of morality.     

Recollection is a continuous process: Evidence from plurality memory receiver operating characteristics

Is recollection a continuous/graded process or a threshold/all-or-none process? Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis can answer this question as the continuous model and the threshold model predict curved and linear recollection ROCs, respectively. As memory for plurality, an item's previous singular or plural form, is assumed to rely on recollection, the nature of recollection can be investigated by evaluating plurality memory ROCs. The present study consisted of four experiments. During encoding, words (singular or plural) or objects (single/singular or duplicate/plural) were presented. During retrieval, old items with the same plurality or different plurality were presented. For each item, participants made a confidence rating ranging from “very sure old”, which was correct for same plurality items, to “very sure new”, which was correct for different plurality items. Each plurality memory ROC was the proportion of same versus different plurality items classified as “old” (i.e., hits versus false alarms). Chi-squared analysis revealed that all of the plurality memory ROCs were adequately fit by the continuous unequal variance model, whereas none of the ROCs were adequately fit by the two-high threshold model. These plurality memory ROC results indicate recollection is a continuous process, which complements previous source memory and associative memory ROC findings.     

WHO NEEDS ARAB-JEWISH IDENTITY? FRAGMENTED CONSCIOUSNESS, “INESSENTIAL SOLIDARITY,” AND THE “COMING COMMUNITY”1 (PART 1)

The title, as the study itself, has been inspired by four theoretical contributions: first, Stuart Hall's essay “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’” (in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay. London: Sage, 1996); second, Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, which opens with the sentence: “Striving to be both European and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness. But saying this, I do not mean to suggest taking on either or both unfinished identities necessarily exhausts subjective resources of any particular individual” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, 1). Third, Diane Davis's question: “Is there a way to activate a sense of solidarity among singularities – a way to say ‘we’ – that doesn't automatically exclude, that doesn't just ask for trouble by simultaneously feeding this craving for … Gemeinschaft (in the name of which any number of ‘we's have committed the most horrific atrocities in recorded history)?” (“‘Addicted to Love’; Or, Toward an Inessential Solidarity,” in Jac: A Journal of Composition Theory 19.3 (1999), 639); and fourth, Giorgio Agamben's The Coming Community (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1993). The article consists of four sections, the first is a short theoretical background to the notion of identity. The second section is an examination of four major collective processes, two of them collective exclusionary operations and erasure, which Arabized Jews have undergone. The third section deals with the globalization and the search for inessential solidarities among Arabized Jews. The fourth section is the conclusion to the study, in which the notion of Arab-Jewish identity is revisited.     

WITTGENSTEIN AND DEFINING CRITERIA

Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “Why do you say this man has got angina?” then the answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina, I call “sympton” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion, Then to say “A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of “angina”. But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis. (BB, pp. 24–25)¹     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

The Embodied Subjective Perspective

Perspective is a distinctive feature of external perception. There is a question of how to account for perceptual constancy in spite of changing perspectives. Alva Noe proposes the notion of ＂perspectival property＂ [P-property] and appeals to the perspectival aspect of perceptual content. His proposal conflicts with perceptual experiences and hence incurs many criticisms. Drawing on Husserl＇s phenomenology and Gibsonian psychology, I propose the notion of ＂perspectival awareness＂ [P-awareness]. I will argue that P-awareness is embodied pre-thematic self-awareness instead of the experience of a special kind of objective property. With the notion of P-awareness in mind, I then elaborate on the embodied subjective feature of perspective.     

惠能“心量广大”的文化心理学解读

惠能及其开创的禅宗的核心思想“明心见性”是明白“心量广大”。它包括如下几层含义:(1)“本心”中所包含的估量标准或尺度广大;(2)“心”度量、衡量、审度的对象众多,范围广大;(3)“心”的容量广大;(4)人心的耐受程度和转化能力强大;(5)人心的范围广大和创造力强大;(6)人的心态积极强大。“心量广大”具体体现在平常心、包容心或宽容心、认知力、精神力、心理能量等几个方面。“心量广大”具有浓郁的中国文化特色,蕴含有“自强不息,厚德载物”的中国文化精神,“道德自律和躬身自省”的中国文化伦理与价值追求,“以人为本的人道主义和人文情怀”的中国文化核心思想理念。由此来看,惠能的“心量广大”思想在当代社会仍具有积极的现实价值,对当代文化建设,社会道德构建等有积极作用。     

The networked mind

The paper discusses the role of networks in cognition on two levels: on the level of the organization of ideas, and on the level of interpersonal communication. Any interesting system of ideas forms a network: ideas presented in a linear order (the order forced upon us by verbal expression) will necessarily convey a distorted picture of the underlying patterns of thought. Networks of ideas typically consist of a great number of nodes with just a few links, and a small number of hubs with very many links; that is, they are, to employ Albert-László Barabási’s term, “scale-free.” Barabási fits into a specific tradition: Hungarians had an early influence on the philosophy of networks, and on the philosophy of communication as developed at Marshall McLuhan’s Toronto Circle. In fact, this was the circle in which certain Hungarian and Austrian ideas on mediated collective thinking first came together—a telling testimony to the conditions of disturbed communication and idiosyncratic networking typical of East-Central Europe, past and present. The nodes-and-hubs pattern is characteristic, too, of social networks, in particular of scholarly and scientific networks. The paper analyses the role of “invisible colleges”—informal groups of scientific elites through whom the communication of information both within a field and across fields is channelled. By way of conclusion the notion of a new type of personality, the “network individual,” is discussed: the network individual is the person reintegrated, after centuries of relative isolation induced by the printing press, into the collective thinking of society—the individual whose mind is manifestly mediated, once again, by the minds of those forming his/her smaller or larger community.