共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 13 毫秒
1.
William G. Lycan 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(3):199-211
Has any school or movement in all of Western philosophy made a permanent contribution, permanent in the sense that it will last as long as philosophy does? More narrowly, has there ever been put forward a thesis that has achieved lasting consensus? After carefully defining “philosophical thesis” and “consensus,” so as to forestall uninteresting answers, this paper argues that the ancient Greeks made one or two such contributions, and the Analytic philosophers (ca. 1890–1960) made a few, but there have been no others. Moreover (a) the Analytic contributions were more empirical than philosophical, and (b) they were almost entirely negative. So, the basic short answer to our question is “no.” The paper concludes by asking in what way(s) there has been progress in philosophy. 相似文献
2.
Aaron Preston 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(4):445-465
Abstract: The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory. 相似文献
3.
Luciano Floridi 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(3):191-194
This introduction presents the project of a one‐day meeting on the future of philosophical research, hosted by the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, on 13 January 2012. The meeting brought together several distinguished philosophers and scholars in their roles as journal editors and publishing experts, in order to clarify and discuss the future of philosophical research. This symposium in Metaphilosophy collects a selection of the papers presented at the meeting and some invited articles. 相似文献
4.
Bryan Frances 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(1-2):47-57
This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, it comments on the significance of the agreement and (potential) progress. 相似文献
5.
Nicholas Maxwell 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(3):316-338
This paper argues that we philosophers of science have before us an important new task that we urgently need to take up. It is to convince the scientific community to adopt and implement a new philosophy of science that does better justice to the deeply problematic basic intellectual aims of science than that which we have at present. Problematic aims evolve with evolving knowledge, that part of philosophy of science concerned with aims and methods thus becoming an integral part of science itself. The outcome of putting this new philosophy into scientific practice would be a new kind of science, both more intellectually rigorous and one that does better justice to the best interests of humanity. 相似文献
6.
Jana Mohr Lone 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):171-186
Although much has been written about the nature of philosophy and how the discipline can be defined, little attention has been paid to the ways we develop the facility to reflect philosophically or why cultivating this ability is valuable. This article develops a conception of “philosophical sensitivity,” a perceptual capacity that facilitates our awareness of the philosophical dimension of experience. Based in part on Aristotle's notion of a moral perceptual capacity, philosophical sensitivity starts with most people's natural inclinations as children to reflect about life's fundamental mysteries; when this capacity is cultivated with training over time, our attentiveness to the philosophical features of ordinary life becomes almost second nature. In much the same way an aesthetically sensitive person notices certain qualities of experience not readily perceptible by others, philosophical sensitivity involves the development of a particular way of seeing the world. 相似文献
7.
8.
Zhengyu Sun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):124-132
To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy
in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth
century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society
needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations
have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy;
that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings,
exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people.
Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1 相似文献
9.
Helen De Cruz 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):233-249
Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise. 相似文献
10.
Sam Crane 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(4):459-480
What factors shape the movement of systems of thought from one historical‐cultural context to another? This paper provides a preliminary answer to this question by constructing an analytic framework drawn from the sociology of philosophy, and it uses this framework to consider the prospects for the contemporary transposition of Confucianism from China to America. The central, though still provisional, conclusion is that while global power dynamics matter, the particular conditions of the “philosophical fields” of both the original and the recipient locations are of primary importance in determining the extent and significance of any particular case of philosophical transposition. Therefore, due to the dynamics of the philosophical fields in both countries, it is unlikely that Confucianism will gain greater intellectual and political influence in the United States. 相似文献
11.
Jan Bransen 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(4):517-535
Abstract: This article argues that the little everyday things of life often provide excellent entries into the intellectual problems of academic philosophy. This is illustrated with an analysis of four small stories taken from daily life in which people are in agony because they do not know what to do. It is argued that the crucial question in these stories is a philosophical question—not a closed request for empirical or formal information but an open question about how best to conceive of human experience. A discussion follows of the merits and shortcomings of transcendentalism as an attempt by philosophers to make progress. It is argued that reformulating questions is what philosophers can do to contribute to people's comfort in life. This is illustrated with an argument showing that in the small stories discussed the question of what to do should be reformulated as the question of who to be. 相似文献
12.
Vladimir V. Mironov 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):10-14
This article seeks to clarify the concept of progress in philosophy. It treats progress as a kind of development. But not every development is a progress. When we talk about progress, what really matters is the direction of development. In some cases it is relatively easy to reach agreement about this direction. But not in the case of philosophy, if we abstract it from the obvious and the trivial, like the number of books on philosophy. As a result, the article concludes that there cannot be progress in philosophy. Instead we see a continual multiplication of interpretations. 相似文献
13.
ANDREW MELNYK 《Metaphilosophy》2008,39(2):203-219
Abstract: This article's goal is to outline one approach to providing a principled answer to the question of what is the proper relationship between philosophy and the study of philosophy's history, a question arising, for example, in the design of a curriculum for graduate students. This approach requires empirical investigation of philosophizing past and present, and thus takes philosophy as an object of study in something like the way that contemporary (naturalistic) philosophy of science takes science as an object of study. This approach also requires articulating a sense in which philosophy might make, or might have made, progress. 相似文献
14.
Jake Wright 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(2-3):435-454
Philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) places investigations of value, meaning, and the good life at the center of philosophical investigation, especially of one’s own life. This essay argues that PWOL is compatible with general introductory philosophy courses, further arguing that PWOL-based general introductions have several philosophical and pedagogical benefits. These include the ease with which high-impact practices, situated skill development, and students’ ability to “think like a disciplinarian” may be incorporated into such courses, relative to more traditional introductory courses, as well as the demonstration of philosophy’s value to students by explicitly tying philosophical investigation to students’ own lives. 相似文献
15.
Penelope A. Rush 《Metaphilosophy》2016,47(4-5):679-695
This article offers an overview of philosophical methodologies. In an attempt to avoid a certain circularity, the article itself tries to avoid consciously or solely deploying and engaging with any current standard notion of what constitutes a philosophical method or philosophy itself. It hopes to find some of the possible places in which philosophy occurs, and this turns out to include (at least) such endeavours as literature, art, poetry, and linguistics. From here it considers how almost anything—for example, conversation, everyday life, and love—can also be philosophy. An attempt is made to identify some characteristic feature of philosophy as it occurs in all such forms. In the end, the simultaneous enacting of a peculiar optimism and particular humility both, in the search for knowledge, is put forward as potentially sufficient to at least begin to identify philosophy across its many guises. 相似文献
16.
科学证据不仅在司法审判中起着极其重要的作用,而且在科研成果的评价中也是不可取代的,但是在审判和科研成果评估中,对“科学是什么”这样一个更深层次的问题－科学哲学问题,历来没有得到应有的重视,通过美国止吐药本涤汀前后历时20年的审判历程,突出科学哲学在医药审判实践中的地位。 相似文献
17.
P.D. Magnus 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):48-52
Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science. 相似文献
18.
This article reflects upon the state of the philosophical profession vis‐à‐vis a close reading of the hoax perpetrated against the International Journal of Badiou Studies in 2016. This hoax is not a subversive act of disciplinary criticism (as the hoaxers contend). Rather, it is a poorly disguised attempt to enforce a partisan and myopic conception of philosophy and to delegitimize an entire subfield of philosophical production—namely, continental philosophy. The hoax is symptomatic of a deeper problem that plagues the profession today: the willingness exhibited by many philosophers to police the boundaries of the discipline by engaging in what we call “acts of force.” The prevalence of acts of force demonstrates that professional philosophy is shaped not only by the giving and taking of reasons but also by shopworn disciplinary tribalisms (for example, continental versus analytic) and asymmetrical power relations involving agents with unequal amounts of social, professional, and philosophical capital. 相似文献
19.
Elijah Chudnoff 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(4):371-385
According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of ‘negative experimental philosophy’ have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. Cappelen and Deutsch defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture of philosophical methodology it presupposes: philosophers do not really rely on intuitions. In this paper, I defend methodological orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers must rely on intuitions somewhere and that they do in fact often rely on intuitions about thought experiments. I also argue in favor of a reply to the negative experimental critique that is similar to at least part of Deutsch’s own. 相似文献
20.
Studies in East European Thought - The author examines, historically and theoretically, issues related to the state and current tendencies of post-Soviet Russian philosophy. The accent falls on the... 相似文献