The meaning of “Evolution”

In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars.     

The “making” of teenage pregnancy

I will do two things in this paper. First, I examine the issue of construction in the social sciences by using “teenage pregnancy” as an example. Following Michel Foucault's genealogical studies, I show that new categories were constructed to study teenage pregnancies, but that the construction involved does not support an extreme theory of construction—a theory which allows of nothing like “reality”. Second, I study the interaction between the categories used in investigations of teenage pregnancies and those to whom such categories are applied, namely the young mothers themselves. The interaction illustrates what Ian Hacking has described as a “looping effect” characteristic of categories used to study people and their behaviour. I claim that with teenage pregnancy, the looping effect is much more complex than Hacking suggests.     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.     

The distinctive “should” of assertability

Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion “should” be made is not merely a function of these other familiar sorts of normativity and is especially connected to truth. Some researchers have challenged this assumption of distinctive normativity. In this paper I report two experiments that test the assumption. Participants read a brief story, judged whether an assertion should be made, and rated several other qualities of the assertion, including its truth value, morality, rationality, etiquette, legality, and folly. Of these qualities, truth value most strongly predicted assertability. The findings support the assumption of distinctive normativity and provide further evidence that the norm of our social practice of assertion is factive (i.e., it makes truth essential to assertability).     

The impurity of “pure” indexicals

Within the class of indexicals, a distinction is often made between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals on one hand, and demonstratives or “discretionary” indexicals on the other. The idea is supposed to be that certain indexicals refer automatically and invariably to a particular feature of the utterance context: ‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, ‘here’ to the place of utterance, etc. Against this view, I present cases where reference shifts from the speaker, time, or place of utterance to some other object, time, or place. I consider and reject the claim that these counterexamples to the automatic indexical theory all involve non-literal uses of indexicals and argue that they cannot be explained away on the grounds that they involve conversational implicature or pretense.     

The Zen Doctrine of “No-Method”

The case is made for a spectrum of methods in Western psychology transcending the normal dichotomy between the categories of quantitative versus qualitative methodology. Although the quantitative–qualitative continuum may be a sufficient representation of methods in the discussion of methodology within the reductionistic sciences, it fails to account for the phenomenology of the science-making process, itself, as a problem of consciousness within the developing human sciences, and also has little relevance for the way non-Western cultures view the problem of the relation of method to theory. A case in point is the problem of method as discussed in Zen Psychology. The act of freeing attention from its attachment to objective thought through the cultivation of wu, or no-thing-ness, is considered in Zen meditation and then applied to an analysis of the method of the koan, or nonrational riddle, which is designed to shock consciousness into a state of release through immediate intuitive insight. The conclusion is that possibly through such means psychologists in the West could free themselves from the overly rigid and narcissistic focus on methods of reductionistic empiricism as the only alleged standard for defining reality.     

The “Ages” of Ogden Nash

This essay looks at the way Ogden Nash, America's Genius of Light Verse, saw his life and times in the 30's, 40's, and 50's. It focuses on a group of poems in which the author mentions his age at the time of writing and explores their insights. They move from young adulthood to retirement and thus become Nash's equivalent of Shakespeare's Ages of Humanity. The author notes how his study of Nash has provided insights in living and illustrates this through poems of his own. In following this particular journey through the stages of life, we might well discover ways of mining the gold in our own experience.     

The ethic of “responsible drinking”

Age‐specific prohibition of drinking has made possible the study of the conditions under which agents of control enforce an unpopular rule. This study examined enforcement of drinking rules at a large urban university. Research in three freshman residence halls over 3 academic years revealed a situational ethic of “responsible drinking.” Residential assistants (RAs) initially enforced the rule against drinking in the residence halls strictly. Then, in time, RAs devised three personal styles of enforcement of the ethic of responsible drinking. They were either “by‐the‐book,” “laid‐back,” or “in‐between.” RAs were less apt to report freshman residents who did not come to their attention, who drank quietly behind closed doors. Periodically, RAs patrolled all floors in the building. RAs were more apt to write up residents of floors other than their own for violation of the no‐drinking rule. Thus, “patterned evasion” outside residence halls recurred inside. The extent to which RAs evaded the norms of their position varied with their interests in enforcement and the degree to which they were able to manage the “friend‐RA” role conflict.     

The pavlovian “principle of strength”

The Pavlovian principle of strength assumed that the magnitude of the conditional response is a linear function of the intensity of the external conditional stimulus. But experiments failed to provide evidence for the universality of the principle. The Pavlovians tried to identify conditions that distorted the linearity of this relationship. Some of the disturbing conditions were external and some were internal intervening variables. It is possible that the relation between the strength of the conditional stimulus and the magnitude of the conditional response is not linear but logarithmic. Pavlov acknowledged the lack of experimental evidence to support the principle of strength in its original form.     

The “Three Rs” of Sex

Summary We have seen that sex has three functions, the reproductive, the relational, and the recreational. We have shown it probable that a great deal of unnecessary marital conflict comes from one party holding relational sex to be all-important while the other considers recreational sex to be of more importance. Finally, we have indicated that it is most likely that if they can compromise this difficulty by each meeting the other on his own ground a part of the time, much of the haggling will stop and many unnecessary divorces will be avoided.The Rev. Maxwell H. Morris, Th.D., following studies in the Old Testament and ancient history in the University of Oregon, the University of Washington, and the University of Southern California, spent a year in Jewish studies at the Hebrew Union College for Rabbinical Studies in Cincinnati. His interest in the psychology of sex grew out of his attempts to understand phallic and fertility cults.     

The Logic of “Most” and “Mostly”

The paper suggests a modal predicate logic that deals with classical quantification and modalities as well as intermediate operators, like “most” and “mostly”. Following up the theory of generalized quantifiers, we will understand them as two-placed operators and call them determiners. Quantifiers as well as modal operators will be constructed from them. Besides the classical deduction, we discuss a weaker probabilistic inference “therefore, probably” defined by symmetrical probability measures in Carnap’s style. The given probabilistic inference relates intermediate quantification to singular statements: “Most S are P” does not logically entail that a particular individual S is also P, but it follows that this is probably the case, where the probability is not ascribed to the propositions but to the inference. We show how this system deals with single case expectations while predictions of statistical statements remain generally problematic.     

The boston bio-bang: The emergence of a “Regional system of innovation”

In this article we will describe the emergence of a great number of small, regionally concentrated, innovative biotech companies. We see these organizations as “hosts” of concepts and ideas, greatly influencing their spreading over the sector. We have chosen an evolutionary perspective following individual companies in their struggle for survival, describing it as “obtaining food” and “fooling predators.” This struggle gives insight in the behavior of the biotech companies and related institutions as a “system of innovation.” One of our findings is that the variety of biotech companies is conditioned by their selection environment, but that this selection environment allows great variety and even encourage variety by keeping the companies small. Haiko Van der Voort is a research associate who lectures and publishes in a wide range of issues including precess management and system innovations. Martin De Jong is associate professor of public management.     

“The primary process”: The vicissitude of a concept

Abstract

During the first twenty years that Freud spent creating his theory, he assumed that most of the functions responsible for creating mental-thought structures were organized according to two different forms or principles of thought. He called these forms “primary process” and “secondary process”. The “secondary process” is identified with rational thinking and the ego, and it is easy to follow the changes that this concept underwent in the works of Freud that followed. The concept of “primary process”, on the other hand, disappeared from his later works with no explanation. This article traces the changes that the “primary process” underwent in Freud's thinking and examines the connection between his analytical technique and his research method. A close study of the changes that the “primary process” underwent reveals that Freud's developmental thought process included concepts whose directional changes may be termed “regressive”.