Contexts,Polarities, and Pluralism. Discussion of Slochower’s “Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess”

In her searching paper “Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess,” (this issue) Slochower finds the potential for excess as inherent in any psychoanalytic theory. I argue that context is key in understanding this phenomenon within relational psychoanalysis; what she describes may not be the case for other theories. The beginnings of relational theory as a movement, generational and radical, could lead to therapeutic overconfidence or certainty around countertransference insights and disclosures. Slochower sees an abundance of certainty in this stance, as well as pressure for premature mutuality. As a complement or balance to this intense mode of interpersonal engagement, Slochower elaborates her own work on holding, wherein the analyst “brackets” her experience and respects the patient’s need for privacy and nonimpingement. Uncertainty is an affirmative stance in letting the patient’s inner life come into being. There are a number of polarities in Slochower’s paper—between mutuality and privacy, certainty and uncertainty, and in the origin story of relational psychoanalysis between relational and classical theories. I argue that pluralism offers a path forward from polarities to a rich complex world of multiple possibilities and recognition of different minds and theories.     

Desire,Domination, Sadism,and the Degradation of Love: Reply to Commentaries by Joyce Slochower and Christopher Bonovitz

In her response to commentaries by Joyce Slochower and Christopher Bonovitz, the author further clarifies her understanding of countertransferential sadism and how it compares to other enactments. She addresses Slochower’s concern about psychoanalytic restraint in the relational frame. The author responds to Bonovitz, who used a Fairbairnian perspective to comment on the clinical material she presented, and she considers how Fairbairn’s concepts of the libidinal ego, the rejecting object and the internal saboteur apply to analytic sadism. Finally, she contemplates whether the sadistic enactments described in her paper can be viewed as a prelude to the expansion of analytic love.     

Healing presence in the psychotherapist

Abstract

Throughout graduate school I felt compelled to become a fine psychotherapist. Implicit in that motivation was my curiosity about what makes a psychotherapist effective. My curiosity was inspired by my experience with one therapist who helped me activate profound transformation. After identifying intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 1998, 2000, 2004) as my research method, I explored that experience through meditation, reading, and conversation and eventually identified her healing presence as the core quality that differentiated her from other therapists I had known. Though technique and experience are important, I sensed that it was her healing presence that allowed her to use technique and experience skillfully. Throughout Cycle 1 of intuitive inquiry, the “text” that claimed me was my personal experience of her healing presence, her ability to be present, to connect with me, to see me, and even, to love me. Through intuitive inquiry, I was able to expand my understanding of the healing presence of a psychotherapist to incorporate the experiences of many others.     

The Incompleteness of Ideal Theory

Can one give an account of a perfectly just society without invoking principles governing our responses to injustice? My claim is that addressing this question puts us in a position to reveal ambiguities and problems with the way in which Rawls draws the ideal/nonideal theory distinction that have so far gone unnoticed. In the first part of my paper, I demonstrate that Rawls’s original definition of the ideal/nonideal theory distinction is ambiguous as it is composed of two different conceptual distinctions, before clarifying the distinctions involved, paying particular attention to the unfamiliar distinction between primary and secondary principles. I then show that we can best account for what Rawls is actually doing at the level of ideal and nonideal theory by invoking this distinction between primary and secondary principles. This result sets the stage for my argument in the second part. I first explain why Rawls does not have access to an understanding of the strict compliance condition that can account for the irrelevance of secondary principles for a complete account of the principles regulating a perfectly just basic structure. I then point out that there is a tension between what Rawls claims to be doing at the level of ideal theory and what he is actually doing at the level of ideal theory. On this basis, I argue that Rawls’s ideal (domestic and international) conceptions of justice are incomplete because they do not encompass secondary principles. The Conclusion unpacks the contributions this article makes to the ideal/nonideal theory debate.     

“Pleasure and Joy in the Work”: Using Simone Weil in the Classroom

Richard Rorty once wrote that inspired teaching “is the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the [teacher’s] conception of who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged her priorities and purposes.” In a teaching career more than three decades long, no author has influenced me more profoundly as a teacher and as a human being than Simone Weil. She has changed how I think about myself, my relationships, the world around me and ultimately about what transcends me. And this could not help but change how I am in the classroom. This essay is a reflection on how Simone Weil has changed my life, both in and out of the classroom.     

A New Instrumental Theory of Rights

My goal in this paper is to advance a long-standing debate about the nature of moral rights. The debate focuses on the questions: In virtue of what do persons possess moral rights? What could explain the fact that they possess moral rights? The predominant sides in this debate are the status theory and the instrumental theory. I aim to develop and defend a new instrumental theory. I take as my point of departure the influential view of Joseph Raz, which for all its virtues is unable to meet the challenge to the instrumentalist that I will address: the problem of justifying the enforcement of rights. I then offer a new instrumental theory in which duties are grounded on individuals’ interests, and individuals rights exist in virtue of the duties owed to them. I argue that my theory enables the instrumentalist to give the right sort of justification for enforcing rights.     

How One Unitarian Universalist Integrates Evolution into his Theology and Religion

Evolution can be a "weasel word" unless circumscribed to mean only a morphological change over time. When this is done, the fact of what can be distinguished from the faith of how . I believe that evolution is purely a natural process, but recognizing that everyone creates his or her own God, I feel justified in giving the name God to that mysterious presence in every interaction that causes transformation, since this is what gives the universe its dynamism. I relate how this God concept informs my religious and ethical life and gives my life meaning and purpose.     

Happiness theories of the good life

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory.     

General-purpose content

In this paper, I consider the objection, raised by Radu Bogdan, that a teleological theory of content is unable to ascribe content to a general-purpose, doxastic system. I begin by giving some attention to the notion of general-purpose representation, and suggest that this notion can best be understood as what I term "interest-independent" representation. I then outline Bogdan's objection in what I take to be its simplest form. I attempt to counter the objection by explaining how a teleologist might ascribe content in a particular case - the case of a perceptual judgement whose content is learned. I reject the idea that the teleologist can appeal to the way in which the subject has used the judgement, or its constituent concepts, in the past, on the grounds that it is possible for the subject to produce judgements and concepts that never help her to satisfy any of her interests. Instead, my account depends on the idea that the process of learning is regulated by a mechanism whose function is to produce a harmony between the information carried by perceptual judgements and the way in which they are used in inference.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

“A Lingering Whiff of Descartes in the Air”: From Theoretical Ideas to the Messiness of Clinical Participation: Commentary on Paper by the Boston Change Process Study Group

From a perspective in recognition of my unconscious attachment to their theoretical conceptualizations as well as intrinsic blind spots to both their and my conceptualizing, I offer a consideration of the clinical assistance and difficulty created by the Boston Change Process Study Group's formulation of the reflective, the implicit and the disjunction between the two as an “intention unfolding process.” I first consider how their conceptualizations can either clarify or obscure organizing experience for the analyst trying to make sense of what is going on between her and her analysand. Then I consider how these ideas might guide or mislead the analyst's active participation in the micromoment process flow of clinical interaction. The impact of dissociation is recognized as constitutive of a messiness and uncertainty that accompanies, and often can undermine, the adoption of any theoretical “idea,” including these, for clinical organizing and intervening activity.     

The Strangeness of Passing: Commentary on Paper by Christopher Bonovitz

Christopher Bonovitz gives us a rich landscape of the theoretical, historical, and relational aspects of his work with his mixed-race patient. In my response I explore what seems missing: a stronger sense of the patient as a person, more of her own history in her family, more of the clinical back and forth with her therapist, a sense of what is being played out in the transference, and particularly what “passing” is for her. I show how his choices about how to think about her story and how to tell it are oversaturated with awareness of identity and race at the expense of the basic human relationship. In the face of such racial anxiety, there is a pull to rely too strongly on countertransference as a way to gain privileged access to knowledge about the other. I attribute many of these problems to the inescapable power of race in our culture. Furthermore, I address the themes of hatred, silence, secrecy and transgression as they relate to the history of transgenerational trauma for this patient and invite our broadening our awareness about how they play out in the therapeutic process. We are faced with the difficult, yet the essential task of holding and living out the patient's anger and outrage at the racial hatred that has been endured.     

Sexual Experience: Foucault,Phenomenology, and Feminist Theory

This paper explicates Foucault's conception of experience and defends it as an important theoretical resource for feminist theory. It analyzes Linda Alcoff's devastating critique of Foucault's account of sexuality and her reasons for advocating phenomenology as a more viable alternative. I agree with her that a philosophically sophisticated understanding of experience must remain central for feminist theory, but I demonstrate that her critique of Foucault is based on a mistaken view of his philosophical position as well as on a problematic understanding of phenomenology.     

The Dream Sense,Emergent Clinical Process,and the Question of Symmetry: Reply to Brown and Colombo

In recent years I have become interested in Bion and neo-Bionian field theory, but the origin of my interest in dreaming does not lie in scholarly or clinical sources. The source of the idea of the dream sense is my own experience. After addressing that point, I reject what appears to be Colombo’s impression (this issue) that detailed inquiry is necessarily the basis of interpersonal and relational clinical practice, and then take issue with Brown’s understanding of expressive participation in relational thinking (this issue). Responding to Brown’s wish that I offer more detail about my own clinical process, I present an overview of my understanding of the way I work. I conclude by addressing the understandings offered by the discussants of symmetry in the analytic relationship, and offering more details of my own.     

Face to Face

In “Face to Face,” I explore my work as a Jewish analyst with a Lebanese woman, Ara, who is strongly identified with the Palestinian cause. As the work unfolded I find myself thrust into a psychic and social space I had not wanted to inhabit, into the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the turmoil of Jewish identity. Ara and I were in the midst of ghosts of historical traumas, intersecting and interweaving history and identity between us. It was her history and my history and the history of nations, of broken bonds and damaged victims suddenly all present in the room. I will hold together, in tension, the micro and the macro, the intrapsychic and social, the drama of the encounter between Ara and me and between Palestinians and Jews. I ask what it takes to find one's way into an understanding of the other, a recognition of the other and the legitimacy of their suffering when one's own history is suffused with the trauma of centuries of victimhood. “Face to Face” is an exploration of how to inhabit the Other, how to negotiate difference, moving beyond the dynamics of victim and victimizer, beyond that of oppressor and oppressed to what Emmanuel Levinas refers to as a welcoming of the stranger, a transcendent experience.     

ON AGGRESSION TURNED AGAINST THE SELF

Deliberate self‐harm is a common presenting problem suffered by young people. Several patients referred to the NHS outpatient clinic where I work have been able to stop harming themselves during intensive psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In this paper, I shall discuss a variety of motives for persistent cutting by one adolescent girl. I am most interested to show how the healthier part of her personality overcame her motives for harming herself, and eventually allowed her to make use of my understanding of a sadomasochistic internal object that worked against us.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

Reply to Janine de Peyer’s “Traversing the Ineffable: Commentary on Sharon Farber’s ‘Becoming a Telepathic Tuning Fork’”

Janine de Peyer’s thoughtful and stimulating response to my paper evoked a good deal of thinking about playfulness and creativity in doing psychotherapy, what part intuition and empathy play in promoting telepathic communication, the distinction between thoughts and feelings unconsciously transmitted between people within close proximity and those transmitted across geographical distance, where there is no reliance on sensory clues involving sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste. De Peyer’s summary of research on telepathy tells us that most of the research tries to rule out the variable of unconscious sensory exchange by physically separating the “sender” from the “receiver.”

In her discussion of my paper, Janine de Peyer raises some very interesting questions about how telepathy is to be defined. I recall reading years ago about someone who had gone to a medium and heard some startling information about herself and those in her circle. As I wondered how the medium could know so much about someone she had never before met, it occurred to me that there was a lot of knowledge about a person conveyed by the brain-to-brain sensory cues, and this was not telepathic but more a function of intuition and empathy. I think that was true about the relationship I had with my patient. but as with the medium there was a lot of other information I received about her that did not depend on sensory cues, and that information was, I believe, conveyed telepathically. So yes, I say, to de Peyer’s (this issue) question, “Is it not worth differentiating between in-session heightened intuitive receptiveness, and unexplainable transmissions of affect/thoughts/information that traverse time and geographical space?” (p. 736, italics in the original). In considering the time spent in my patient’s physical presence, much of my empathic attunement originated from the intuitive response that was induced in me by her physical presence. I think the increasing empathic attunement laid the foundation for subsequent telepathic communication.