Mental object rotation and the planning of hand movements

Recently, we showed that the simultaneous execution of rotational hand movements interferes with mental object rotation, provided that the axes of rotation coincide in space. We hypothesized that mental object rotation and the programming of rotational hand movements share a common process presumably involved in action planning. Two experiments are reported here that show that the mere planning of a rotational hand movement is sufficient to cause interference with mental object rotation. Subjects had to plan different spatially directed hand movements that they were asked to execute only after they had solved a mental object rotation task. Experiment 1 showed that mental object rotation was slower if hand movements were planned in a direction opposite to the presumed mental rotation direction, but only if the axes of hand rotation and mental object rotation were parallel in space. Experiment 2 showed that this interference occurred independent of the preparatory hand movements observed in Experiment 1. Thus, it is the planning of hand movements and not their preparation or execution that interferes with mental object rotation. This finding underlines the idea that mental object rotation is an imagined (covert) action, rather than a pure visual-spatial imagery task, and that the interference between mental object rotation and rotational hand movements is an interference between goals of actions.     

Mental object rotation and the planning of hand movements.

Recently, we showed that the simultaneous execution of rotational hand movements interferes with mental object rotation, provided that the axes of rotation coincide in space. We hypothesized that mental object rotation and the programming of rotational hand movements share a common process presumably involved in action planning. Two experiments are reported here that show that the mere planning of a rotational hand movement is sufficient to cause interference with mental object rotation. Subjects had to plan different spatially directed hand movements that they were asked to execute only after they had solved a mental object rotation task. Experiment 1 showed that mental object rotation was slower if hand movements were planned in a direction opposite to the presumed mental rotation direction, but only if the axes of hand rotation and mental object rotation were parallel in space. Experiment 2 showed that this interference occurred independent of the preparatory hand movements observed in Experiment 1. Thus, it is the planning of hand movements and not their preparation or execution that interferes with mental object rotation. This finding underlines the idea that mental object rotation is an imagined (covert) action, rather than a pure visual-spatial imagery task, and that the interference between mental object rotation and rotational hand movements is an interference between goals of actions.     

视觉表象操作加工的眼动实验研究

本研究通过视觉表象旋转和扫描的眼动实验探讨表象的心理表征方式。实验一结果表明,眼动指标具有与反应时相类似的旋转角度效应。实验二结果显示,表象扫描的反应时和眼动指标都具有与知觉扫描加工一样的距离效应。由此可以认为,表象眼动与知觉眼动模式具有相似性;表象具有相对独立的心理表征方式并有其特殊的加工过程;表象的心理表征可以是形象表征,而非一定是抽象的命题或符号表征     

Interference effects demonstrate distinct roles for visual and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action

Four experiments were completed to characterize the utilization of visual imagery and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action. In Experiment 1, movement time functions for a motor imagery human locomotion task conformed to a speed-accuracy trade-off similar to Fitts' Law, whereas those for a visual imagery object motion task did not. However, modality-specific interference effects in Experiment 2 demonstrate visual and motor imagery as cooperative processes when the action represented is tied to visual coordinates in space. Biomechanic-specific motor interference effects found in Experiment 3 suggest one basis for separation of processing channels within motor imagery. Finally, in Experiment 4 representations of motor actions were found to be generated using only visual imagery under certain circumstances: namely, when the imaginer represented the motor action of another individual while placed at an opposing viewpoint. These results suggest that the modality of representation recruited to generate images of human action is dependent on the dynamic relationship between the individual, movement, and environment.     

Passive tactile feedback facilitates mental rotation of handheld objects

Mental rotation of objects improves when passive tactile information for the rotating object accompanies the imagined rotation (Wraga, Creem, & Proffitt, 2000). We examined this phenomenon further using a within-subjects paradigm involving handheld objects. In Experiment 1, participants imagined rotating an unseen object placed on their upturned palms. The participants were faster at mental rotation when the object was rotated on their palm than when the object remained stationary. Experiment 2 tested whether the performance advantage would endure when the participants received tactile information for only the start- and endpoints of the rotation event. This manipulation did not improve performance, relative to a stationary control. Experiment 3 revealed that ambiguous tactile information, continuous with the rotation event but independent of object shape, actually degraded performance, relative to a stationary control. In Experiment 4, we found that continuous tactile rotation discrepant from imagined object movement also hindered performance, as compared with continuous tactile information aligned with imagined object movement. The findings suggest a tight coupling between tactile information specifying continuous object rotation and the corresponding internal representation of the rotating object.     

Process generalization and the prediction of performance on mental imagery tasks

Kosslyn (1980, 1983) theorized that performance measures on imagery tasks may vary as a function of the existence of independent processes in imaging ability. The present study determined whether improvement can be made in performance on such tasks with practice. It also considered whether performance on such tasks improves with practice and whether this improvement generalizes. Experiment 1 determined whether improvement in a mental rotation task generalizes to improvement in a geometric analogies task, with both tasks weighted in Kosslyn's find process, but not in a line drawing memory task weighted in Kosslyn's regenerate process. In Experiment 2, we examined generalization in improvement from a geometric analogies task to a mental rotation task. In Experiment 3, we tested whether improvement in an animal imagery task (Kosslyn, 1975) generalizes to improvement in a line drawing memory task, with both tasks weighted in Kosslyn's regenerate process, but not to improvement in a mental rotation task. Performance improved with practice on all tasks. Furthermore, performance improved from one task to another only if both tasks loaded on the same process.     

被试自身人手初始状态对心理旋转加工的影响：眼动研

利用眼动追踪技术,探讨在左右手判断任务条件下人手心理旋转加工是否受到被试自身人手初始状态的影响。两个实验的反应时数据和眼动数据均发现：（1）心理旋转加工受被试自身人手初始状态的影响,表现出一致性效应;（2）显著的内旋效应;（3）被试心理旋转加工时注视点取样存在着不均衡性。这些结果表明：在左右手判断任务中,心理旋转加工的对象是被试自身人手的表象,是自我参照的心理旋转,并且内旋效应是由被试对自身人手表象进行旋转时受到人手生理机制约束所致,而不是被试旋转刺激图片的表象由“生理机制约束知识”影响所致     

Mental rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable

When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their “tacit knowledge” of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to “mentally rotate” stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could reorient shapes in one step or avoid reorienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.     

Mental rotation with egocentric and object-based transformations

Two experiments were conducted to address methodological issues with past studies investigating the influence of egocentric and object-based transformations on performance and sex differences in mental rotation. In previous work, the egocentric and object-based mental rotation tasks confounded the stimulus type (embodied vs. non-embodied) and transformation task (egocentric vs. object-based). In both experiments presented here, the same stimuli were used regardless of the type of transformation but task instructions were modified to induce either egocentric (left–right judgment) or object-based (same–different judgment) processing. Experiment 1 used pairs of letters whereas Experiment 2 presented pairs of line-drawings of human hands. For both experiments, it was hypothesized that the mental rotation slope for response time would be steeper for object-based than for egocentric transformations. This hypothesis was verified in both experiments. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed a reduced male advantage for egocentric compared to object-based rotations, whereas this pattern was reversed for Experiment 1. In conclusion, the present study showed that the influence of the type of transformation involved in mental rotation can be examined with the same set of stimuli simply by modifying task instructions.     

Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

For the mind’s eye the world is two-dimensional

The nature of visual mental images is a topic that has puzzled neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers alike. On the one hand, mental images might preserve the 3-D properties of our perceptual world. On the other hand, they might be akin to 2-D pictures, such as photographs, paintings, or drawings. In the present study, 16 observers judged where real objects (Experiment 1) or photographs thereof (Experiment 2) were pointing. Both experiments contained a perception condition and an imagery condition. In Experiment 1, there was a significant difference between the pointing errors in the perception and the imagery conditions, whereas there was no such difference in Experiment 2. In imagined objects, actual photographs, and imagined photographs, the direction in which the objects pointed followed the observer, regardless of his or her vantage point. The results from this study extend the rotation effect, typically found in pictures, to the domain of mental imagery. We found the rotation effect in pictures and mental images alike, but not in direct perception of 3-D objects; thus, we provide evidence that mental images share main characteristics of 2-D pictures.     

Differentiating visual and kinesthetic imagery in mental practice.

Through two experiments, the study sought to emphasize the usefulness of the visual and kinesthetic imagery in mental practice. In Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that when the task to be learned through mental practice necessitates the reproduction of a form by drawing, the visual image, which provides a wide span of apprehension, is more suitable than the kinesthetic image. On the other hand, the kinesthetic image that supplies inputs from the muscles' positions and movements should be more appropriate for the acquisition of the duration of the drawing. In Experiment 2, it was hypothesized that the task, transformed into a motor task necessitating minute coordination of the two hands, would benefit more from kinesthetic imagery. To have optimal control over what was actually experienced during mental practice, the participants' imagery skills were measured. The participants also benefited from prior imagery training. The results demonstrate that when using mental practice to initially acquire a task, visual imagery is better for tasks that emphasize form while kinesthetic imagery is better for those tasks that emphasize timing or minute coordination of the two hands.     

不同平面心理旋转的角色效应

本研究采用实验方法,分别在水平面和冠状面内对第一人称角色和第三人称角色心理旋转进行对比性研究。实验结果表明：空间表征转换的角色方式对心理旋转产生显著影响,第三人称角色心理旋转易于第一人称角色心理旋转,即存在心理旋转的角色效应;心理旋转的角色效应并不是在特定旋转条件下才出现的,具有更大的普遍性     

Motor initiation and execution in patients with conversion paralysis

Motor initiation and motor execution in four patients with conversion paralysis were investigated in a non-affected motor modality (speech). In line with the hypothesis of dissociated control in conversion disorder [Cognit. Neuropsychiatry 8 (1) (2001) 21] motor initiation, but not response duration, was expected to be impaired. The motor initiation times (reaction time: RT) and motor execution times (response duration: RD) were compared on four RT-tasks that required the production of a verbal response: a simple choice RT-task, a mental letter rotation task, and an implicit and an explicit mental hand rotation task. Because conversion disorder is expected to primarily involve an impairment in the initiation of movement, we expected the following task characteristics to uniquely affect RT and not RD: type of instruction (implicit versus explicit instructed imagery), angle of rotation, and target arm (affected versus non-affected arm). The results indeed showed the task characteristics to significantly affect the participants' RT and not their RD. It was concluded that conversion paralysis is associated with a specific impairment in the explicit initiation of processes with a spatial and motor component.     

On the relation between spontaneous perspective taking and other visuospatial processes

Common processes and representations engaged by visuospatial tasks were investigated by looking at four frequently used visuospatial research paradigms, the aim being to contribute to a better understanding of which specific processes are addressed in the different paradigms compared. In particular, the relation between spontaneous and instructed perspective taking, as well as mental rotation of body-part/non-body-part objects, was investigated. To this end, participants watched animations that have been shown to lead to spontaneous perspective taking. While they were watching these animations, participants were asked to explicitly adopt another perspective (Experiment 1), perform a mental object rotation task that involved a non-body-part object (Experiment 2), or perform a mental rotation of a body-part object (Experiment 3). Patterns of interference between the tasks, reflected in the reaction time patterns, showed that spontaneous and instructed perspective taking rely on similar representational elements to encode orientation. By contrast, no such overlap was found between spontaneous perspective taking and the rotation of non-body-part objects. Also, no overlap in orientation representation was evident with mental body-part rotations. Instead of an overlap in orientation representations, the results suggest that spontaneous perspective taking and the mental rotation of body parts rely on similar—presumably, motor—processes. These findings support the view that motor processes are involved in perspective taking and mental rotation of body parts.     

Mental rotation: cross-task training and generalization

It is well established that performance on standard mental rotation tasks improves with training (Peters et al., 1995), but thus far there is little consensus regarding the degree of transfer to other tasks which also involve mental rotation. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effect of mental rotation training on participants' Mental Rotation Test (MRT) scores. Twenty-eight participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a "One-Day Training," "Spaced Training," or "No Training" group. Participants who received training achieved higher scores on the MRT, an advantage that was still evident after 1 week. Distribution of training did not affect performance. Experiment 2 assessed generalization of mental rotation training to a more complex mental rotation task, laparoscopic surgery. Laparoscopic surgical skills were assessed using Fundamentals of Laparoscopic Surgery (FLS) tasks. Thirty-four participants were randomly assigned to a "Full Mental Rotation Training, MRT and FLS," "MRT and FLS," or "FLS-only" group. MRT results from Experiment 1 were replicated and mental rotation training was found to elicit higher scores on the MRT. Further, mental rotation training was found to generalize to certain laparoscopic surgical tasks. Participants who obtained mental rotation training performed significantly better on mental-rotation dependent surgical tasks than participants who did not receive training. Therefore, surgical training programs can use simple computer or paper-based mental rotation training instead of more expensive materials to enhance certain aspects of surgical performance of trainees.     

Incongruent imagery interferes with action initiation

It has been suggested that representing an action through observation and imagery share neural processes with action execution. In support of this view, motor-priming research has shown that observing an action can influence action initiation. However, there is little motor-priming research showing that imagining an action can modulate action initiation. The current study examined whether action imagery could prime subsequent execution of a reach and grasp action. Across two motion analysis tracking experiments, 40 participants grasped an object following congruent or incongruent action imagery. In Experiment 1, movement initiation was faster following congruent compared to incongruent imagery, demonstrating that imagery can prime the initiation of grasping. In Experiment 2, incongruent imagery resulted in slower movement initiation compared to a no-imagery control. These data show that imagining a different action to that which is performed can interfere with action production. We propose that the most likely neural correlates of this interference effect are brain regions that code imagined and executed actions. Further, we outline a plausible mechanistic account of how priming in these brain regions through imagery could play a role in action cognition.     

Mental rotation of random lined figures

The present study investigated the possible occurrence of mental rotation in judgments of whether pairs of line figures were identical. The feasibility of two discrete cognitive explanations based on holistic transformation and on feature computation was examined with varied levels of complexity controlled by the numbers of lines in a figure. In the experiment, participants were required to judge whether simultaneously presented pairs of figures were the same or different. When the participants' data were collapsed for regression analyses, evidence for mental rotation was not detected at any level of complexity, but reanalysis of the data revealed that some participants employed mental rotation in the cognition of complex figures. A monotonous increase in reaction times as a function of the number of lines was evident in identical pairs of figures but not in nonidentical pairs. It is argued that the feature computation explanation would better account for these results than would the holistic transformation explanation.