从义务到权利——论洛克自然法理论的转折

对洛克早期自然法思想的发展脉络进行深入探寻,可以发现,如果像传统自然法理论那样只从义务这一向度去理解自然法,洛克关于自然法何以是一种普遍法则的讨论仍然存在困难。但是,这一困难却有可能通过转向关注和讨论自然法的另一向度即权利而得以化解。洛克的《政府论》通过讨论与揭示自然法的权利向度,不仅在学理上完成了对自然法之普遍性的论证,而且实现了对自然法理论的转折,即从义务到权利,从而为现代国家学说奠定了坚实的理论基础。     

洛克的个体危机及其自然法起源

约翰·洛克的思想在西方世界的政治实践中取得巨大成功的同时,亦带有重大隐患。这一隐患因洛克以个体为起点的哲学理念可被称作"个体的危机",它源出洛克思想中自然法与神圣法的普遍性之争。自然法的取胜,意味着拒斥中世纪传统的以基督论为中介的真理观,让思考的起点重回人类社会。而洛克原本同时依托两者的个体的解释原则,则必须承受因神圣历史解释模式的崩溃而带来的危机。     

析托马斯·阿奎那的自然法概念

作为法律之一类的自然法是托马斯·阿奎那自然法理论体系最重要的概念之一。本文在分析阿奎那的法律定义的基础上,重点阐述了其自然法概念的性质和含义,最后还考察了值得进一步思考与探讨的理论问题。     

洛克自然权利理论的历史性意蕴

约翰·洛克(John Locke,1632-1704)是近代西方自由主义政治哲学的奠基人之一,其对于自由主义的阐述和论证在西方政治思想史中有着极其重要的地位和意义。洛克的政治哲学不仅深深影响了其后政治哲学思潮的发展,更直接成为美国建国的理念和原则,被写进了美国的宪法和《人权宣言》。在     

自然法与宽容:洛克的信仰立场及其现代性意义

洛克的自然法思想的完整性始终是学术界争论的焦点,其关键在于洛克自然法背后的神圣世界观基础。本文试图从洛克自然法学说的信仰前提入手,来讨论洛克是如何将欧洲信仰传统与自己的神圣自然观调和起来,并以此作为自然法学说的基础。本文还尝试进一步讨论洛克的这种改造对于道德与信仰关系的改变,以及相应的对政教关系产生的意义。洛克的宽容思想实际上是其自然法信仰与相应制度安排的自然后果,并对于现代社会有着极为深远的影响。     

在马克思主义与自然法理论之间——马克思主义自然法理论的当代研究

当代马克思主义法哲学研究中,马克思主义与自然法理论是一个关键问题。太渥等人试图在新的阐释中重构马克思主义自然法理论,强调作为一种社会理论的自然法理论与马克思主义的内在关联。这对当代马克思主义法律理论与实践有积极意义。     

思辨哲学与自然法传统的开端——亚里士多德《劝勉篇》中的古代自然法理论

亚里士多德在《劝勉篇》中提出了一种古代自然法理论。根据斯多亚学派的自然法观念,古希腊自然法具有规范性、自然性和恒常性三个特征。而亚里士多德在《劝勉篇》中关于法律的论述符合古代自然法的这三个特征。《劝勉篇》的写作受到了柏拉图主义的影响,反驳伊索克拉底对思辨哲学的批评也是一个重要动机。正是这两个背景,促使亚里士多德提出了一种自然法理论。     

亲属拒证权的人伦精神解读

我国现行法律抛弃了亲属拒证权制度,这不利于社会的和谐与稳定,在司法实践中的危害日益呈现.其实,亲属拒证权作为刑事诉讼中一项重要的证据规则,在中国古代法律以及当今的大陆法系、英美法系国家的证据立法中都有明确的规定.它不但契舍了自然法标准和刑法的期待可能性理论,而且蕴含着独特的人性关怀品格,彰显了法的人伦精神,具有普适存在的相对合理性和现实基础.     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。     

作为一种理性选择的爱国情怀

爱国情怀是人们在公共生活中公开运用理性对生存处境进行分析和反思后所形成的价值判断和行为选择,体现了人之为人的理性精神。就国家而言,人们的共同生活和理性认同构成了国家存续的前提;就个人而言,国家的功能和目的满足了人们追求自由美好生活的理性诉求。正是个人与国家不可分割的密切关联,使得人们在理性的基础上产生了对于自己的祖国的热爱之情,爱国成为人们在公共生活中理性精神的集中体现。     

Divine Nature and Divine Will

This paper examines the relationship between God and those universals that characterize his nature. It is argued that God has sovereignty over his nature, even though he is not self-creating, and does not give rise to the universals that characterize his nature by any act of intellection. Rather, God is himself an act of rational willing in which all that is has its existence. Because the act that is God is one of free will, he has sovereignty over the features it displays, which include all that characterizes his nature.     

Natural Law, Motives, and Freedom of the Will

In this paper I piece together a Wittegnsteinian view of the topics indicated in my title, contrasting it with the views of Bertrand Russell and Donald Davidson - two philosophers who, in words from the Blue Book , seem "constantly to see the method of science before their eyes." I conclude that Wittegnstein helps us understand something those philosphers tend to overlook: that "freedom of the will" gets its meaning not in a belief to be assessed by evidence but, on the contrary, in the expression of a way of living and assessing life that limits the role of "assessing beliefs by evidence."     

Newtonian Idealism: Matter,Perception, and the Divine Will

This paper investigates Isaac Newton's rather unique account of God's relation to matter. According to this account, corpuscles depend on a substantially omnipresent God endowing quantities of objective space with the qualities of shape, solidity, the unfaltering tendency to move in accord with certain laws, and—significantly—the power to interact with created minds. I argue that there are important similarities and differences between Newton's account of matter and Berkeley's idealism. And while the role played by the divine will might at first appear to be a species of occasionalism, I conclude that there are, for Newton, genuine causal relations between minds and bodies. Ultimately, to fully appreciate this account of the creation and persistence of matter, we must consider not only Newton's metaphysical writings, but also his sensorium theory of mind‐body interaction, his heterodox theological commitments, and the influences of Descartes, More, and Locke.     

Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses

This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem that does not require abandoning God's essential goodness.