On the Affine Structure of Perceptual Space

Affine geometry is a generalization of Euclidean geometry in which distance can be scaled along parallel directions, though relative distances in different directions may be incommensurable. This article presents a new procedure for testing the intrinsic affine structure of a psychological space by having subjects perform bisection judgments over multiple directions. If those judgments are internally consistent with one another, they must satisfy a theorem first proved by Pierre Varignon around 300 years ago. In the experiment reported here, this procedure was employed to measure the perceived structure of a visual ground surface. The results revealed that observers' judgments were systematically distorted relative to the physical environment, but that the judged bisections in different directions had an internally consistent affine structure. Implications of these findings for other possible response tasks are considered.     

论自然律与因果知识的知觉经验基础

<正>一、引论自休谟以来,特别是在科学哲学的演进中,自然律理论与因果理论从来是不可分离的。相比而言,自然律理论具有某种优先地位。因为按照休谟的广为接受的论证,人类的知觉经验并不能直接辩     

知觉整体优先性的研究及其进展

知觉的性质是整体的还是分析的 ?这是心理学家们长期争论不休的问题。本世纪 70年代以来 ,一些认知心理学家提出知觉加工的整体优先性假设 ,强调整体在知觉加工中的优先地位。这一假设激发了大量整体 /局部范例的研究。本文综述了这方面的研究 ,分析了它们的理论假设 ,指出了这方面研究的局限以及替代的探讨。     

知觉经验与知觉内容

知觉(perception)是指我们通过视觉、听觉、触觉、嗅觉、味觉等感觉器官而获得的对事物以及外部世界的意识感知.知觉经验(perceptual experience)的一个显著的特点是它具有某种现象特征,即知觉者会体验到一种"那究竟像什么(what it is like)"的感觉.例如,一个人会从红色视觉经验中体验到"红色究竟像什么"的意识感受性(qualia).知觉内容(perceptual content)粗略地讲是指通过知觉经验向知觉者所传递的信息.关于知觉问题在哲学上的重要性,我们可以从以下几点来看:在形而上学方面,知觉是我们了解外部物理世界究竟存在什么的主要手段;在认识论方面,研究知觉是研究我们如何达到关于外部物理世界的知识的主要手段;在语言哲学方面,知觉内容是我们的心灵与外部物理世界的关联及互动在语言实践上的体现;在心灵哲学方面,知觉经验中的现象特征与意识及意向性之间存在着深层的内在联系.     

The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification

In at least some cases of justified perceptual belief, our perceptual experience itself, as opposed to beliefs about it, evidences and thereby justifies our belief. While the phenomenon is common, it is also mysterious. There are good reasons to think that perceptions cannot justify beliefs directly, and there is a significant challenge in explaining how they do. After explaining just how direct perceptual justification is mysterious, I considerMichael Huemer’s (Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 2001) and Bill Brewer’s (Perception and Reason, 1999) recent, but radically different, attempts to eliminate it. I argue that both are unsuccessful, though a consideration of their mistakes deepens our appreciation of the mystery.     

. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone: Some Perceptual Themes 1946-1996

Three factors that have transformed perceptual research in the last fifty years are the digital computer, single-unit electrophysiology, and molecular biology. Amongst the developments in which members of the Experimental Psychology Society have been central are: the recognition of the role of optic flow in spatial vision; the demonstration that our perceptual systems contain parallel pathways extracting different information from the sensory array; the identification of specific detectors that can be selectively adapted in psychophysical experiments; and the transfer of the concepts of fourier analysis from audition to vision. The history of Opponent Process Theory offers an example where experimental psychologists have been misled by too simple an interpretation of physiological recordings.     

The Microcomputer as Perceptual Tool:

The microcomputer as a medium of instruction is not inherently better or worse than any other medium be it lecture, television, print or practical experience. However, the microcomputer can simultaneously present instruction and collect data on student performance. In order for educators to evaluate the success of instruction presented by computer they must use the microcomputer as a perceptual tool to more sensitively monitor and modify the educational process. Thoughtful consideration of monitoring data by special educators promises to make the microcomputer a revolutionary aspect of school instruction. Such an educational revolution can extend to the delivery of special services provided that the time and ancillary supports needed to utilize performance are made available to school personnel.     

The Development of Perceptual Motor Sequencing Ability

The purposes of this study were (a) to investigate the possibility that short-term memory may be a limiting factor in the development of perceptual-motor sequencing ability, (b) to determine whether sex differences exist in sequencing ability, (c) to determine whether organized information facilitates serial recall, and (d) to ascertain whether the recall of serial perceptual-motor responses results in a bow-shaped serial-position curve. A 2 × 2 × 3 factorial design was used to analyze the independent variables of age, sex, and pattern organization. Further, an age × serial position ANOVA was performed to investigate the serial-position curve. Serial recall improved with age; however young children experienced difficulty in recalling a complex task. The poor recall performance of 5-yr.-old children was discussed in terms of the possibility that young children fail to use labeling strategies to facilitate recall. No sex differences were found. A primacy effect was obtained on the complex task.     

语言线索下视觉空间知觉任务的性别差异

为了探索不同方位辨别方式的男女差异,采用自编的经过心理测量学检测符合指标的空间知觉量表和三个语言线索下方位辨别任务范式实验,在测验和实验3中设计两种空间知觉加工方式,即东西南北和前后左右;在实验1中设计东西南北;在实验2中设计前后左右。测验,实验1和实验3均发现,在东西南北方位辨别上存在显著的性别差异,且男生优于女生;测验,实验2和实验3均发现,在前后左右方位辨别上不存在显著的性别差异。这表明男生更擅长于使用东西南北的方位辨别方式。     

Perceptual Intuitionism

In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferential justification for first‐order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs. As it is formulated, it is plausible that a necessary condition for the view is the truth of Ethical Perception: normal ethical agents can and do have perceptual experiences (at least some of which are veridical) as of the instantiation of ethical properties. In this paper a sophisticated and promising account of Ethical Perception is offered. Extant objections are shown to fail. However, it will be argued that it is far from obvious that the account of Perceptual Intuitionism which emerges constitutes an independent alternative to other intuitionist accounts. This is because we have reason to think that ethical perceptual experience may be epistemically dependent on other epistemic sources, e.g. a priori intuition or emotion.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

Perceptual Particularity

Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.     

Perceptual Learning

The extent of adult improvement in not only complex but also simple perceptual tasks is remarkable. Although this phenomenon has been noted and studied since the middle of the 19th century, recent advances in the study of brain physiology and anatomy afford new insights. Improvement specificity suggests that changes involve early sensory cortical areas, previously thought to lose their plasticity following the first years. The critical role of selective attention, even in learning the simplest tasks, as well as the precedence of learning easy cases, suggests the involvement of high-level cortical areas. Learning easy cases is more general than learning difficult cases. This pattern suggests the involvement of both high- and low-level areas in an orderly manner, with easy learning beginning at high-level areas and harder cases being resolved by access to low-level areas. The mapping of behavioral findings to underlying brain sites provides a unified framework for this interdisciplinary field.