知识产权与人权的价值冲突与统一

知识产权与人权的价值冲突,在本质上反映了现行知识产权制度中手段性价值与目的性价值之间的矛盾关系。确保现行知识产权制度中手段性价值服务于目的性价值、一般目的性价值服从于最高目的性价值,并据以平衡知识产权与人权的价值冲突,乃是改善现行国际知识产权秩序的现实需要。     

从自由与平等的关系看获取正义

获取之正义乃是人类的千古困惑.获取正义之原则必须而且只能从社会主义社会理念中导出,该理念是:人人生而自由,人人生而平等,没有贵族,没有特权,没有压迫,没有剥削,公共职位向所有公民开放,人人有权选择并努力实现自己所向往的幸福生活.在此理念之下,自由与平等之关系是:公民之间的平等是基于自由权利的平等.社会主义社会理念下的获取正义包括:每个公民都有从自然资源中获取收益的社会权利;合法的市场交易所得;其他合法途径,如遗产继承、馈赠等.任何一个认同社会主义社会理念的人均不赞成公共财政充当劫富济贫的\"佐罗\"角色,但保障每个公民都能够从自然资源的收益中获得生存资料乃是政府之责任、公民之权利,税收资源的主要功能是创造和维护社会秩序、保障本民族的集体安全、满足公共事务的需要.     

初期全真道的自由平等观念

全真道对平等自由问题的广泛关注,是中国哲学发展到宋金元时期十分引人注目的现象。而倡导三教合一的全真道能够迅速崛起、发展,同王重阳开创的被七真光大的思想主张密不可分。考察新兴道教派别的精神创造的内容,将是揭示中国哲学与宗教发展成长进程的不可忽视的环节。     

自由飞行下冲突告警对管制员冲突探测绩效的影响

自由飞行是未来空中交通管理系统的设计理念, 会影响管制员的飞行冲突探测绩效, 为其提供自动化的冲突告警是主要的应对思路。已有研究主要围绕冲突告警的通道类型、可靠性、提前呈现时间等单一属性展开, 发现冲突告警的通道类型、可靠性对管制员冲突探测绩效的影响与传统的自动化研究结果存在不一致之处。指出未来在实验中纳入冲突化解任务, 进行冲突告警多属性的整合研究, 有助于解释这些不一致之处、为冲突告警的设计提供更有效的指导。     

柏林式焦虑症与自由的价值

以赛亚·伯林的消极/积极自由二分法建立在一系列误解之上.一方面,即使我们接受伯林指派的观点,把自由价值当作一种具有内在善性的东西,这也并不意味着我们就能像伯林所希望的那样,可以将对自由价值的消极理解设想为一个融贯的思想.另一方面,如果我们对伯林的“不受他人故意干涉”思想作出反思,我们也并不能将其当作是具有内在善性的价值的一个要件.伯林的误解根源于他对客观价值观念的某种过度焦虑.     

自由与平等:形式与实质的矛盾及其解决

如何实现社会的公平正义即社会公正,是近年来我国理论界热烈讨论的一个问题,也是哲学界研究的一个重要问题。无论是国际学术界还是国内学术界,从理论上分析公正或正义都不能离开自由和平等这两个范畴,因为自由和平等都是现代文明的基本价值理念和价值目标,是支撑其他价值的基架。但由     

平等的价值:外在的与内在的

平等是现代社会普遍认可并致力于追求的一种核心价值.在当今这个贫富悬殊的世界,平等显得尤为重要和紧迫.然而,与此同时,人们对于平等的价值(尤其是它的内在价值)的认识并不十分清楚.对平等的追求可以有助于其他价值的实现,如自由、福祉、正义、尊严等,这表明平等具有外在(工具)价值.在某种程度上,不平等本身就是坏的,这表明了平等是具有内在价值的.     

"文化理解"与价值冲突

本文以现代西方解释学为基本理论资源,指出古一今、中一外文化冲突的过程就是文化主体进行"意义"理解"的过程."理解"的对象,不是一般的"作品文本",而是"文化文本".文化冲突中价值建构的关键是确立"文化理解"的理念,进行"文化理解力"批判.文化目的性的合理性、"先见"的反思、创造力的培育,是"文化理解"的基本内涵;"忠实的理解"、"创造性的转化",是"文化理解力"的基本品质.     

毛泽东与文艺知识分子的价值冲突

毛泽东与文艺知识分子的价值冲突,主要表现为大众意识的强调与文艺知识分子的精英情结、为政治服务的要求与文艺知识分子的艺术性追求、思想改造与文艺知识分子的自由心性三个方面的冲突和对立。毛泽东和文艺知识分子常常站在不同的角度,对同一个东西产生了不同的理解,这正是造成毛泽东时代文艺领域悲剧的深层原因。     

庄子与史铁生的自由精神之比较

“乘物以游心”的庄子在乱世以自由逍遥的精神追求探究人生意义,执着的行魂史铁生处盛世思接远古,以个体的自由精神彰显生命本色。前者的自由精神是在时代之匣里对必然人生命运的结果性追求,后者的自由精神是于个体的偶然命运之殇里传递过程的美好。二者穿越时空对自由精神的多向度诉求使得人类的普世价值历久弥新。     

知识产权的公共利益价值取向研究

知识产权规则的建立,可以起到保护智力劳动成果,激励创作和创新的作用。纵观知识产权法的发展及其对社会秩序的作用过程,可以看出该法的价值,不仅在于对个体方面的激励,更在于其对公共利益的维护。对于个体知识产权利益的维护并不能最终实现知识的长远发展与进步,只有从私权保护基础上更高层次之公共利益角度来对待公共领域的保留,方可实现知识产权法的最终价值。为了维护公共领域视角下的公共利益价值,有必要从官方权威构建、社会自治构建、国际协商构建三个层面的协同构建实现知识产权的公共利益价值的综合体系。     

Reconsidering the Value of Equality

Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 Parfit, Derek. 1995. Equality or Priority? University of Kansas: Lindley Lecture. Reprinted in Clayton and Williams [2000: 81–125] [Google Scholar] and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View.     

Intellectual Freedom: Challenges and Responsibilities of Seventh-day Adventist Academic Libraries

A survey was conducted among Library Directors in Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) colleges and universities around the world to learn how Seventh-day Adventist librarians view and define intellectual freedom, whether SDA libraries are having censorship challenges to library materials, and what policies and procedures are used to resolve the challenges. It was found that the majority of libraries surveyed have had materials challenged, most often because of differences in religious/theological beliefs or strong language. A comparison made between this study and Hippenhammer's (1993) survey of Christian college libraries showed significant differences in the following areas: written selection policy, reasons for materials challenges, and group submitting challenges.     

On the Value and Scope of Freedom

We have a practical, not merely theoretical interest in freedom. The question that is considered in this paper, is what it is that we value about freedom. It is proposed that what we value is being able to get what we most want (or value), because that is what we most want (or value). This account is compatible with determinism. Certain accounts opposed to determinism are considered and rejected. On these accounts freedom requires either a particular sort of indeterminism, or requires a special form of causation, agent-causation, or requires that the agent be a certain sort of self-constituting entity. It is argued that even if these accounts were less metaphysically problematic than they are, they would not give us a 'freedom' that we would value, nor would they secure conditions under which an action would be praise – or blameworthy. It is also argued, that a certain sort of capacity to control ourselves is not a precondition for freedom, though such a capacity would add to the scope of our freedom