Human feelings: why are some more aware than others?

A recent article reports that human perception of heartbeat timing is mediated by right (non-dominant) anterior insular cortex, and that the activity and the size of this region is directly correlated with individuals' subjective awareness of inner body feelings and emotionality. These results support the somatic-marker hypothesis of consciousness (a modern successor to the James-Lange theory of emotion) and the neuroanatomical concept that human awareness is based on a phylogenetically distinct interoceptive pathway.     

Are two heads better than one? Peer support and children's eyewitness reports

This study examined the effects of peer support on children's event reports. In Experiment 1, 48 children aged between 5 and 10 years who had been scheduled for a school dental visit involving an invasive procedure were interviewed about it 2–4 days later. Children were interviewed alone, with an informed peer (who had also recently had a dental appointment), or with an uninformed peer. Anxiety was assessed both prior to the dental appointment and at the time of the recall interview. Peer support did not influence children's anxiety or the amount or the accuracy of information reported in prompted recall. However, younger children interviewed alone were significantly more likely to be misled than those interviewed in the presence of a support child. In Experiment 2, children aged between 5 and 7 years took part in a neutral event contrived for the study. They were interviewed about it 3 days later, either alone or with an informed or uninformed support child present. The support child was encouraged to take an active part in the interview and to help the target child to describe what happened. Peer support did not influence the recall of the target child in either prompted recall or in response to questions. However, together the target and informed support children reported more information than did children interviewed alone or with uninformed support. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are two heads better than one? Experimental investigations of the social facilitation of memory

The hypothesis that two people collaborating in recall would remember more than a single person was examined in a series of four experiments. All the experiments used variations on the same ‘sequential’ design where, in social conditions, people recalled alone initially and then recalled jointly in pairs: as a control for reminiscence, some people recalled alone on two separate occasions. On the second recall in all of the experiments two people always recalled more than one, but this was simply due to the independent statistical summation of two people's memories: no evidence whatsoever was found for the pairs of people generating new information that was not available to either member of the pair. This surprising result was not attributable to artefacts linked to the complexity or familiarity of stimulus material, nor was it linked to variations in people's cognitive perspectives. No evidence of social facilitation of memories was therefore found: two people recalling together certainly pool their separate memories so as to outperform individuals but the social interaction does not appear to generate previously unavailable memories.     

General and relationship-based perceptions of social support: are two constructs better than one?

Two hypotheses derived from a theory of perceived social support were investigated: (a) relationship-based perceptions of social support are distinct from general perceptions of support, and (b) measures of each construct contribute uniquely to the prediction of loneliness. Ninety-four male and 116 female undergraduates completed measures of loneliness and general perceived social support and the Quality of Relationships Inventory, a new instrument to assess relationship-based perceptions of social support, conflict, and depth in specific relationships. General and relationship-based perceptions of social support were found to be related, but empirically distinct, constructs. Relationship-based perceptions of support and conflict from mothers and friends each added to the prediction of loneliness after considering the contribution of general perceived social support. Implications of these findings for understanding the perceived social support construct are discussed.     

Only one or two cultures?

One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature, edited by George Levine, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987, 359 pages, hb $45, pb $12.95     

Why are some people with neurological illness more resilient than others?

The current qualitative study was designed to evaluate the coping strategies of people living with a chronic progressive neurological illness and their carers. The neurological illnesses were Huntington's disease, motor neurone disease, multiple sclerosis and Parkinson's disease. Participants included 15 people who showed high levels of adjustment and 15 who showed low levels of adjustment. Participants were selected from an earlier study, to ensure that they satisfied the inclusion criteria for the current study. Interviews were completed to determine the strategies used to cope with the demands of the illness. Participants who demonstrated good adjustment were more likely to draw on social support to provide them with the resources to deal with the illness. In contrast, those who evidenced poor adjustment were more likely to draw on external supports to complete tasks for them. The implications of these findings for people with chronic neurological illnesses and their families are discussed.     

Why are some obsessions more upsetting than others?

Little is known about why certain obsessional thoughts are more upsetting than others for people with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Obsessional thought content often seems arbitrary to sufferers. The current study examined three possible reasons why particular thoughts would be especially upsetting for individuals, based on suggestions put forth by cognitive theories of obsessional thoughts. Twenty-eight individuals with a principal diagnosis of OCD completed questionnaires and interviews at two different periods of time on (1) their most upsetting current obsession and (2) their least upsetting current obsession. Results suggested that more upsetting obsessions were evaluated as more meaningful or significant than less upsetting obsessions, and more upsetting obsessions contradicted valued aspects of the self to a greater degree. All examples of current obsessions, both most and least upsetting, arose in the context of life concerns or issues. Results support cognitive theories in that the strength and nature of appraisal appears to be linked with the distress associated with a thought, and more upsetting thoughts are those that have implications for a person's sense of self.     

Neuropsychological status of French children with developmental dyslexia and/or developmental coordination disorder: Are both necessarily worse than one?

Developmental dyslexia (DD) and developmental coordination disorder (DCD) co-occur frequently, raising the underlying question of shared etiological bases. We investigated the cognitive profile of children with DD, children with DCD, and children with the dual association (DD + DCD) to determine the inherent characteristics of each disorder and explore the possible additional impact of co-morbidity on intellectual, attentional, and psychosocial functioning. The participants were 8- to 12-year-olds (20 DD, 22 DCD, and 23 DD + DCD). Cognitive abilities were assessed by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Fourth Edition (WISC-IV) and the Continuous Performance Test – Second Edition (CPT-II) and behavioral impairments were evaluated by the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL). No differences were found between the three groups on attention testing (CPT-II) or psychosocial characteristics (CBCL), but a higher percentage of DD + DCD children had pathological scores on psychosocial scales. Significant between-group differences were observed on Processing Speed Index scores and the block design and symbol search subtests, where DD children fared better than DCD children. No significant differences were evident between the co-morbid vs. the pure groups. Our results clearly show significant differences between children with DD only and children with DCD only. In particular, visuo-spatial disabilities and heterogeneity of intellectual profile seem to be good markers of DCD. However, it should be noted that despite these distinct and separate characteristics, a common cognitive profile (weaknesses and strengths) is likely shared by both neurodevelopmental disorders. Surprisingly, concerning co-morbidity, DD + DCD association is not associated with a decrease in intellectual or attentional capacities.     

Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?

Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so.     

Two in one or one in two? Pushing off from Jung with Wolfgang Giegerich

This paper responds to a recent paper by Wolfgang Giegerich entitled ‘Two Jungs: apropos a paper by Mark Saban’. Giegerich disputes my assertion that the ‘rigorous notion’ at the heart of his psychology ‘finds no source in Jung's psychology, implicit or explicit’. In order to do this he posits the existence of two Jungs, an exoteric Jung and an esoteric Jung. The implications of Giegerich's binary scission of Jung are explored in this paper, and show that the tendency to exalt one Jung while disparaging the other betrays a comprehensive blindness toward the contradictory complexity of Jung's psychology as a whole. It is suggested that this blindness is the consequence of Giegerich's systematic prioritization of a neo‐Hegelian agenda that is in profound conflict with the telos of Jung's psychology.     

Differentiating categorical and dimensional data with taxometric analysis: are two variables better than none?

Taxometric analyses have proven helpful for distinguishing categorical and dimensional data. Many taxometric procedures require at least 3 variables for analysis. What if a construct is defined by only 2 conceptually nonredundant characteristics or a data set contains only 2 empirically nonredundant variables? In Study 1, we performed extensive simulations to determine whether informative results can be obtained when only 2 variables are available for taxometric analysis. The mean above minus below a cut (MAMBAC) and maximum slope (MAXSLOPE) procedures, used with parallel analyses of comparison data, successfully differentiated categorical and dimensional structure. With just 2 variables, it seems especially important that indicators vary across as many distinct values as possible and that investigators obtain as large a sample as possible. Additional findings address questions about the most effective way to implement taxometric analyses. In Study 2, the potential utility of 2-variable taxometric analysis is illustrated using data on proactive and reactive childhood aggression, where the results provided strong support for dimensional structure. As long as high-quality data are available, it appears that one can have confidence in the results of taxometric analyses performed with only 2 variables.     

Why are familiar-only experiences more frequent for voices than for faces?

Hanley,Smith, and Hadfield (1998) showed that when participants were asked to recognize famous people from hearing their voice , there was a relatively large number of trials in which the celebrity's voice was felt to be familiar but biographical information about the person could not be retrieved. When a face was found familiar, however, the celebrity's occupation was significantly more likely to be recalled. This finding is consistent with the view that it is much more difficult to associate biographical information with voices than with faces. Nevertheless, recognition level was much lower for voices than for faces in Hanleyet al.'s study,and participants made significantly more false alarms in the voice condition. In the present study, recognition performance in the face condition was brought down to the same level as recognition in the voice condition by presenting the faces out of focus. Under these circumstances, it proved just as difficult to recall the occupations of faces found familiar as it was to recall the occupations of voices found familiar. In other words, there was an equally large number of familiar-only responses when faces were presented out of focus as in the voice condition. It is argued that these results provide no support for the view that it is relatively difficult to associate biographical information with a person's voice. It is suggested instead that associative connections between processing units at different levels in the voice-processing system are much weaker than is the case with the corresponding units in the face-processing system. This will reduce the recall of occupations from voices even when the voice has been found familiar. A simulation was performed using the latest version of the IAC model of person recognition (Burton, Bruce, & Hancock, 1999) which demonstrated that the model can readily accommodate the pattern of results obtained in this study.     

Interevent differences in event memory: Why are some events more recallable than others?

Interitem differences in the free recall of action events were studied in five experiments. The action events were presented in three different formats: minitasks performed by the subjects in response to verbal instructions from the experimenter (SPTs), minitasks performed by the experimenter (EPTs), and task instructions (TIs). Not only were reliable interevent differences in recall probability demonstrated within each format, but these differences tended to correlate across formats, especially between the SPTs and EPTs; thus, a highly recallable SPT also tended to be a highly recallable EPT. Attempts to explain interitem recall differences in terms of differences in familiarity, vividness, and the availability of environmental cues were largely unsuccessful. An experimental analysis of the action events into action and object components showed the recall probabilities of our events to be mainly dependent on the recall probabilities of their action components, with only a minor dependence on the recall probabilities of their object components.     

Memory for faces: Are caricatures better than photographs?

Because photographs capture an individual at a moment in time, they contain fleeting features as well as more stable ones. Caricature line drawings, however, include stable features and emphasize distinctive ones. As such, caricatures are closer to schematic memory representations than are photographs. Three experiments using faces of public figures test the hypothesis that caricatures yield better performance than do photographs. Contrary to hypothesis, photographs lead to better performance than do line-drawing caricatures in three different tasks: name recall, face recognition, and name-face verification reaction time. Photographs are also rated as more characteristic or representative of their targets than are line-drawing caricatures.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

Cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation: why is a good rotator better than a poor one?

The Vanderberg-Kuse Mental Rotation Test is a standard test of mental rotation ability. Recent experiments have demonstrated that mental rotation is a complex cognitive process wherein different subprocesses (focused attention, visual scanning, perceptual decision, visual memory) play important roles in performance. We classified the population as good and poor rotators by performance of mental rotation (ns = 47: 22 men and 25 women, respectively; mean age: 20.7 yr.). To examine differences cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation of these two groups were compared. There were significant differences between poor and good rotators in performance on Raven's test and the Pieron Focused Attention test scores. The good rotators scored better because their perceptual decision-analytical intelligence (Raven) and focused attention scores were higher.