Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the “Simulated” Jury Paradigm1

Three experiments examined the effects of real versus hypothetical consequences on juridic decision-making. Real consequences subjects believed their judgments would actually determine what happened to the defendant, while hypothetical consequences subjects believed the study simply dealt with jury decision-making. In Experiment I, the defendant's character attractiveness had no influence on guilt judgments made by real consequences subjects but did so for hypothetical consequences subjects. In addition, character attractiveness affected recommendations of punishment for both real and hypothetical consequences subjects. In Experiment II, the defendant's physical attractiveness influenced neither real nor hypothetical consequences subjects on either the guilt or punishment measures. Experiment III showed that real consequences subjects recalled more situational evidence of the case than did hypothetical consequences subjects. In all three studies, more guilty verdicts occurred in the real consequences condition than in the hypothetical consequences condition. It was concluded that much current research on hypothetical juries may be misleading and that more attention should be given in the future to the variable of real versus hypothetical consequences. Possible mediating factors leading to real and hypothetical consequences differences were explored.     

Perspective-Taking Judgments of Medication Acceptance: Inferences from Relative Importance about the Impact and Combination of Information

Perspective-taking judgments of medication acceptance were studied for hypothetical mental health treatment scenarios. Three types of information were manipulated in all possible subsets: level of trust in the medication prescriber, severity of the hypothetical mental health condition being experienced, and the potential side effects of the medication. Subjects made judgments from four perspectives: self perspective and that of three other hypothetical people who were each said to place the most importance on one of the three cues. The results showed individual differences in self-reports of the relative importance of the cues which, in turn, predicted differences in judgment patterns. Subjects modified their cue use when making judgments from the perspectives of hypothetical others. The interaction patterns and rank orders of the perspective-taking judgments resembled the individual differences in judgments made from subjects’ own perspectives, but the perspective-taking judgments showed extreme effects of the most important cue. There was also some influence of subjects’ own perspectives on their perspective-taking judgments. When only a subset of the three cues was given, the judgment pattern depended on the importance of the cue that was omitted. The relative weight averaging model accounted for the judgments of only a minority of the subjects. Models which propose that subjects infer the value of missing information were also unsuccessful in explaining the data of the majority. Modifications of those models are proposed.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Negative Effect of Probability Assessments on Decision Quality

It is commonly assumed that uncertain information can be reduced to numerical probabilities without biasing preferences. It is also implicitly assumed in much research and many applications that people can express these probabilities. In contradiction to these assumptions Experiment 1 shows that the production of probability assessments biases decisions in an n-person game. Experiment 2 shows that the explicit assessment of numerical probabilities renders choices between gambles concerning future basketball events less optimal. These findings seem to be a result of overweighting the probability dimension relative to the payoff dimension given numerical judgments. Experiment 2 also suggests that without explicit numerical probability judgments subjects are less likely to violate the dominance principle. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

Judging response-outcome relations: The role of response-outcome contingency,outcome probability,and method of information presentation

A series of four experiments investigated college students’ judgments of interevent contingency. Subjects were asked to judge the effect of a discrete response Itapping a wire) on the occurrence of a brief outcome (a radio’s buzzing). Pairings of the possible event-state combinations (response-outcome, response-no outcome, no response-outcome, no response-no outcome) were presented in a summary-table (Experiments 2 and 4), in an unbroken-time-line (Experimente 1, 2, and 4), or in a broken-time-line format (Experiment 3). Subjects judged the extent to which the response caused the outcome or prevented it from occurring. Across all methods of information presentation, judgments were a positive function of response-outcome contingency and outcome probability. In the unbroken-time-line condition, judgments of negative response-outcome contingencies were less extreme than judgments of equivalent positive contingencies. This asymmetry was smaller in the broken-time-line condition and in those conditions in which subjects were encouraged to segment an unbroken time line into discrete response outcome units. Finally, judgments of positive and negative relationships were generally symmetrical in the summary-table condition. Relative to the two time-line portrayals, summary table judgments were also less influenced by the overall probability of outcome occurrence. These judgment differences among format conditions suggest that, depending on the method of information presentation, subjects differently partition event sequences into discrete event pairings.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

Gambles vs. quasi-realistic scenarios: expectations to find probability and risk-defusing information

The paper investigates predecisional information search in risky decisions, specifically information concerning the probability of a negative outcome and whether a risk-defusing operator (RDO) is available. Experiment 1 (54 participants) tested the hypothesis that search for such information is triggered by expectations that it can be obtained in the situation. Cues for the availability of information were manipulated. It was predicted that cues mentioning possible information sources raise expectations and consequently increase search activity. Furthermore, gambles were expected to differ from other real world contexts, with lower expectations for RDOs and higher ones for probabilities. The Method of Active Information Search was employed. The number of questions asked about probability and RDOs in different conditions confirmed the hypotheses. Experiment 2 (36 participants) ruled out the alternative interpretation that the expectation to actually find favorable probabilities or applicable RDOs respectively, rather than the expectation to obtain information, determined information search.     

The Psychology of Contraceptive Surprises: Cumulative Risk and Contraceptive Effectiveness1

Two studies investigated young adults' expectations about long-term contraceptive effectiveness. Subjects were told about five hypothetical methods of contraception varying in reported effectiveness, which was expressed in terms of the likelihood of avoiding pregnancy for base periods of 1 year (Experiment 1), 5 years, or 10 years (Experiment 2) of use. For each method, subjects estimated the likelihood that a woman would avoid pregnancy while using it for periods ranging from 1 month to 15 years, and then rated how satisfied they would be with it. For nearly half of the subjects, estimates of cumulative effectiveness did not decline as time period increased. Those subjects who did realize that cumulative effectiveness declined over time estimated rates that declined too slowly for methods of modest and low reliability, and at rates that were too similar for methods differing in effectiveness. Subjects were overly optimistic about effectiveness for time periods longer than the base period, and overly pessimistic about effectiveness for shorter time periods. Not surprisingly given these results, subjects expressed more satisfaction when a method's effectiveness was expressed in shorter base periods. Such faulty understanding of the long-term implications of contraceptive effectiveness information may undermine people's abilities to make informed contraceptive choices.     

The effect of time pressure on risky choice behavior

Thirty six subjects chose individually between pairs of gambles under three time pressure conditions: High (8 seconds), Medium (16 seconds) and Low (32 seconds). The gambles in each pair were equated for expected value but differed in variance, amounts to win and lose and their respective probabilities. Information about each dimension could be obtained by the subject sequentially according to his preference.The results show that subjects are less risky under High as compared to Medium and Low time pressure, risk taking being measured by choices of gambles with lower variance or lower amounts to lose and win. Subjects tended to spend more time observing the negative dimensions (amount to lose and probability of losing), whereas under low time pressure they preffered observing their positive counterparts. Information preference was found to be related to choices.Filtration of information and acceleration of its processing appear to be the strategies of coping with time pressure.     

Confidence ill stimulus predictions and choice reaction time

In two choice reaction time (RT) experiments, a stimulus prediction and a confidence judgment in the prediction preceded each occurrence of one of two stimulus alternatives. Ss identified each stimulus presentation by pressing a left-hand or right-hand telegraph key. In Experiment I the source of the stimulus predictions and confidence estimates was varied between groups of 20 Ss. For each condition, RT to correctly predicted stimuli was an inverse function of prediction confidence. Following incorrectly predicted stimuli, RT was not reliably influenced by confidence when S gave both predictions and confidence judgments; but RT to incorrectly predicted stimuli was an increasing function of confidence when E verbalized the predictions and confidence estimates or when S predicted and E indicated confidence. In Experiment II Ss made predictions and the validity of Es confidence estimate was manipulated between Ss. When Es confidence was perfectly related to the probability of a correct prediction, choice RT to nonpredicted stimuli was inversely related to confidence. However, choice RT to nonpredicted stimuli was not affected by prediction confidence when Es judgments were random.     

The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than Probability

Two experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Participants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeledcautious optimism:Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of losing for the same phrases (optimism), while participants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gambling situations, affect condition participants were much less likely to gamble than were controls when a real loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect participants used a betting-decision rule that was different from that of controls: They bet less than controls in gambles where potential losses were large, even though probability of loss was small, and they bet more than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a decision rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in terms of mere response bias.     

Causal status as a determinant of feature centrality

One of the major problems in categorization research is the lack of systematic ways of constraining feature weights. We propose one method of operationalizing feature centrality, a causal status hypothesis which states that a cause feature is judged to be more central than its effect feature in categorization. In Experiment 1, participants learned a novel category with three characteristic features that were causally related into a single causal chain and judged the likelihood that new objects belong to the category. Likelihood ratings for items missing the most fundamental cause were lower than those for items missing the intermediate cause, which in turn were lower than those for items missing the terminal effect. The causal status effect was also obtained in goodness-of-exemplar judgments (Experiment 2) and in free-sorting tasks (Experiment 3), but it was weaker in similarity judgments than in categorization judgments (Experiment 4). Experiment 5 shows that the size of the causal status effect is moderated by plausibility of causal relations, and Experiment 6 shows that effect features can be useful in retrieving information about unknown causes. We discuss the scope of the causal status effect and its implications for categorization research.     

Framing effects in judgment tasks with varying amounts of information

Subjects were asked to make evaluations in each of three tasks—a gambling task, a consumer judgment task, and a student evaluation task. Each task involved two important attributes, but information about one attribute was missing on some trials. Half of the subjects received a version of the task in which a key attribute was presented in positive terms (e.g., probability of winning a gamble) and half received a version in which that same attribute was presented in negative terms (e.g., probability of losing a gamble). Even though the information was objectively equivalent in the two versions of each task, there were two significant framing effects. (1) In all tasks, responses to two-attribute stimuli were more favorable in the positive condition than in the negative condition. (2) When the key attribute was missing, evaluations of one-attribute stimuli relative to evaluations of two-attribute stimuli were lower in the positive condition than in the negative condition. Results were discussed in terms of the constructs of prospect theory and information integration theory.     

Effects of active information processing on the understanding of risk information

Two experiments investigated effects of active processing of risk information on participants' understanding and judgments. It was hypothesized that more active processing would lead to better understanding and differences in affective judgments (e.g. increased satisfaction and reduced perceived risk to health). In both experiments participants were given a written scenario about their being prescribed a fictitious medication. This medication was said to cause side effects in 2% of people who took it. Before answering a series of written questions, participants in the active conditions of both experiments were asked to carry out a reflective task (portraying the size of risk on a bar chart in Experiment 1 and answering a reflective question in Experiment 2). The results showed that active participants rated the likelihood of experiencing possible side effects significantly lower than passive participants (Experiment 1), and that active participants were significantly more satisfied with the information and judged perceived risk to health from taking the medication significantly lower than passive participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, active participants were significantly more correct in their probability and frequency estimates. The studies demonstrate that active processing of risk information leads to improved understanding of the information given. This has important implications for risk communication. In the context of health, better understanding should lead to improved decision‐making and health outcomes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimination responses.

This article reports four subliminal perception experiments using the relationship between confidence and accuracy to assess awareness. Subjects discriminated among stimuli and indicated their confidence in each discrimination response. Subjects were classified as being aware of the stimuli if their confidence judgments predicted accuracy and as being unaware if they did not. In the first experiment, confidence predicted accuracy even at stimulus durations so brief that subjects claimed to be performing at chance. This finding indicates that subjects's claims that they are "just guessing" should not be accepted as sufficient evidence that they are completely unaware of the stimuli. Experiments 2-4 tested directly for subliminal perception by comparing the minimum exposure duration needed for better than chance discrimination performance against the minimum needed for confidence to predict accuracy. The latter durations were slightly but significantly longer, suggesting that under certain circumstances people can make perceptual discriminations even though the information that was used to make those discriminations is not consciously available.     

Expectation theories of decision making for duplex gambles

Complete tests of subjectively expected utility (SEU), subjectively expected value (SEV), expected utility (EU) and expected value (EV) theories were made for duplex gambles without measuring subjective probability or subjective utility. All gambles were hypothetical and offered on booklets. The duplex gambles consisted of winning gambles, which offered a chance to win a certain amount of money or to break even; and losing gambles, which offered a chance to lose a certain amount of money or break even.The results indicated that SEU, SEV and EU theories could not account for the strategies of 33%, 53% and 86% of the Ss respectively in the losing form of gambles, while EV theory accounted for 78% of the behavior of Ss.In the winning form of gambles, SEU, SEV and EU theory held for 77%, 65%, and 54% of the Ss respectively, while EV theory held for only 40% of the Ss. Suggestions for further research were made.     

Comparing Risky Decision Making Under Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences

In a series of three experiments, subjects made risky decisions under conditions of hypothetical or real consequences. Task variations across experiments included: (1) type of risk (monetary gambles or investments of time and effort), (2) within-subject and between-subjects manipulations of consequence condition, and (3) single or multiple decisions. The hypothesis of no difference between choices in real and hypothetical consequence conditions was retained in each experiment. Supplemental analyses ruled out various “artifactual” interpretations of the null results. Discussion focused on conditions in which researchers can and cannot infer decision makers’ actual risk preferences from their responses in laboratory tasks.     

Information overload or search-amplified risk? Set size and order effects on decisions from experience

How do changes in choice-set size influence information search and subsequent decisions? Moreover, does information overload influence information processing with larger choice sets? We investigated these questions by letting people freely explore sets of gambles before choosing one of them, with the choice sets either increasing or decreasing in number for each participant (from two to 32 gambles). Set size influenced information search, with participants taking more samples overall, but sampling a smaller proportion of gambles and taking fewer samples per gamble, when set sizes were larger. The order of choice sets also influenced search, with participants sampling from more gambles and taking more samples overall if they started with smaller as opposed to larger choice sets. Inconsistent with information overload, information processing appeared consistent across set sizes and choice order conditions, reliably favoring gambles with higher sample means. Despite the lack of evidence for information overload, changes in information search did lead to systematic changes in choice: People who started with smaller choice sets were more likely to choose gambles with the highest expected values, but only for small set sizes. For large set sizes, the increase in total samples increased the likelihood of encountering rare events at the same time that the reduction in samples per gamble amplified the effect of these rare events when they occurred—what we call search-amplified risk. This led to riskier choices for individuals whose choices most closely followed the sample mean.     

Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.