Diversity in Individual↔Context Relations as the Basis for Positive Development Across the Life Span: A Developmental Systems Perspective for Theory,Research, and Application (The 2004 Society for the Study of Human Development Presidential Address)

Contemporary, cutting-edge scholarship in human developmental science is framed by developmental systems theories emphasizing that the basic process in development involves mutually influential relations between the individually distinct person and his or her diverse, multilevel context; stressing that relative plasticity in development derives from such individual?context relations; and providing optimism about the possibility that applications of developmental science may promote positive development. These ideas underscore the substantive importance of human diversity, seen both as the potential for systematic intraindividual change across life (plasticity) and as interindividual differences in intraindividual change, and stand in contrast to views about diversity as either unimportant, error, or reflecting deficits in development. I discuss these differing conceptions of human diversity and of their distinct implications for the methodological and ethical conduct of science and of applications to programs and policies aimed at promoting positive development.     

Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Social Sciences: Reply to Ingram and Meehan

This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute to the task of improving upon our practical knowledge of on-going social life. After arguing for such a thorough-going pluralism based on the indeterminacy of social action, I defend it from the post-modern and hermeneutic objections by suggesting the possibility of an epistemology of interpretive social science as a form of practical knowledge.     

Prioritizing Rights in the Social Justice Curriculum

The biggest problem facing schools having social justice curricula, beyond implementation of a programme, I claim, is the problem of justification: what grounds what in social justice and how do we make this manifest to ourselves and to the curricula? If we cannot address this, then social justice curricula are doomed to begging the question. I claim that a ranking of human rights is not only necessary to adjudicate competing claims for social justice and at the same time, thwart interference with already agreed-upon human rights: it is necessary for any curriculum of social justice for schools. That is to say, curricular programs of social justice cannot justify social practices that interfere with human rights, nor can they teach otherwise than this. Due attention to the violation of human rights is necessary, I shall argue, and must be central in the discussion of education for social justice.     

The Study of the Development of Civic Engagement Within Contemporary Developmental Science: Theory,Method, and Application

Within contemporary developmental science, models derived from relational developmental systems metatheory emphasize that the basic process involved in the ontogeny of civic engagement involves mutually-influential and beneficial relations between the developing individual and his or her complex and changing social, cultural, and physical contexts (represented as individual ← → context relations). The authors suggest that research on the development of civic engagement should be theoretically predicated, use change-sensitive, longitudinal methods, and be comparative across time and place. Using these facets of scholarship as a lens, we discuss the contributions to this special issue. We conclude that the present set of studies provides a useful basis for future research and applications aimed at understanding and promoting individuals’ civic contributions, and their support of social organizations promoting individual thriving and freedom, liberty, and social justice.     

Connecting Bowen Theory with Its Human Origins

Murray Bowen recognized the importance of grounding clinical practice within a clearly articulated theoretical framework, which could claim its place within the general scientific tradition. Bowen theory has established itself as a significant contribution to the field of family therapy. However, in its insistence on excluding, in the interests of rigorous inquiry, all contributions except those from a natural science perspective, Bowen theory has neglected the very elements that are the identifying characteristics of Homo sapiens. As well as recognizing the common systemic characteristics of all life forms, a theory of the family and family therapy that does justice to the human condition will also need to attend to the ways in which human systems are distinct from those of other life forms. In this enterprise, the social sciences will be as important as the natural sciences.     

Love and Power,and the Development of the Brain,Mind, and Agency

In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a durable arrangement of relations among two or more individuals that is distinguished by shared membership and collaboration in relation to a common function or goal.) Part I summarizes evidence from developmental neuropsychology and social science to show that stable psychosocial organization, across the human life span, is associated with social interaction organized along two dimensions. One dimension involves love, positive affective attachment, and the second involves power, social regulation of the aroused affective energy. Part II draws on Piaget's theory of cooperation and Bradley and Pribrams' theory of communication to describe how mind and agency are generated, and how stable organization is produced, respectively, from the relations involved in the arousal and regulation of affective energy. Combining elements of the two theories, Part III presents a sketch of a holographic model of collective organization in which goal-directed behavior is generated by a feed-forward process involving imaging and information processing of interaction along the two dimensions. Part IV shows how the model accounts for the emergence of human agency within the context of a more general evolutionary theory, such as Laszlo's. The article concludes with a discussion of my approach for building a "fully human theory of evolution."     

DUTIES OF JUSTICE TO CITIZENS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

Abstract: Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society.     

Psychology and phenomenology: a clarification

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth.     

The Work of Feminists is Not Yet Done: The Gender Pay Gap—a Stubborn Anachronism

Lips (2012) critiques the literature, predominantly from the United States, to assess how well human capital theory explains the gender pay gap. Her analysis shows that human capital inputs are an imperfect explanation for the gap and that social psychological influences also provide key explanations. I comment on Lips’s paper using literature from the United States and other English-speaking highly developed countries and, to a lesser extent, from European countries. I elaborate and extend her position, promoting the argument for the effect of social influences and for their interactive and incremental effects. I place the phenomenon of the gender pay gap into a societal context. I borrow from the literature for the effect of gender discrimination on women’s advancement in management to discuss explanatory influences. I extend the inference that the gender pay gap supports and maintains the lesser status of women in society and that it helps to preserve the status quo with respect to gender roles. To explain the gender pay gap, I propose that the development of an integrated theoretical framework is needed. The framework would combine the direct and interactive influences of human capital and social psychological inputs, in the context of a cumulative, incremental pattern that occurs over a person’s working life.     

The Phenomenological Film Collective: Introducing a cinematic‐phenomenological research method for social advocacy filmmaking

This paper introduces the vision for the Phenomenological Film Collective ( pfcollective.com ), a research and filmmaking group which utilizes phenomenological research in the service of social advocacy filmmaking. I outline the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of developing a “cinematic‐phenomenological research method” for PFCollective in order to illuminate lived experiences of sociocultural oppression for public viewership via cinematography. The roots of cinematic phenomenology are situated within the theoretical framework of liberation psychology, which calls on psychologists to pursue research that can facilitate consciousness‐raising and social justice across society. The paper provides a methodological overview of existential‐hermeneutic phenomenological research and discusses how its research findings can be disseminated to the widespread public in artistic formats. I demonstrate how filmmaking is an appropriate aesthetic language through which to disseminate phenomenological research about lived experiences of oppression, grounding this proposition in phenomenological philosophy and liberation psychology. I outline the procedural steps for conducting cinematic‐phenomenological research to produce phenomenological films about oppressive sociocultural phenomena. The paper concludes with suggestions for academic disciplines to become more interdisciplinary in our collective pursuit for social advocacy and change.     

Social Justice and Religious Participation: A Qualitative Investigation of Christian Perspectives

This investigation examines how self-identified Christians in the Midwest U.S. understand and work for social justice, with a focus on their process of social justice development and the role of religious congregations in promoting social justice. Using a grounded theory analysis of 15 in-depth interviews, results indicated multiple understandings of social justice such as meeting basic needs, fixing social structures and systems to create equal distributions of resources, promoting human rights and dignity, and as a religious responsibility. Participants also described a process of social justice development facilitated by exposure to injustice, mentors, educating others, and the importance of finding a social justice community. Distinct personal barriers to social justice engagement were identified such as resources and negative emotions, whereas congregational leadership was important for congregational involvement. General frustration with congregations was expressed regarding low social justice engagement; however, participants balanced this frustration with hope for the positive potential of congregations to promote social justice. Together these findings show multifaceted understandings of social justice and a dynamic process of social justice development for these self-identified Christians. Implications for future research and partnership with religious individuals and congregations also are discussed.     

解释心理起源的新理论范式——进化心理学

进化心理学旨在通过进化的心理机制来解释人类行为的适应性,是解释人类心理起源和本质的一种新兴理论范式。该文首先简要分析了进化心理学的诞生背景;其次介绍了该理论的研究内容,其中重点阐述了进化的心理机制的适应性和领域特异性;然后评述了该理论对认知科学、发展心理学和消费者行为学的积极影响;最后对该理论的局限性与发展前景进行了小结。     

In defence of fact-dependency

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1^?1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Dutch Conference for Practical Philosophy, the practical philosophy seminar at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the seminar of the Horizon research group at Utrecht University. I am grateful for the comments and questions I received on these occasions.     

The Qualitative Revolution and Psychology: Science,Politics, and Ethics

Growing interest in qualitative research methods and methodological pluralism in psychology since the 1990s is placed in the historical contexts of long-standing philosophical and scientific rationales and the more recent “qualitative revolution” in other social sciences that began in the 1970s. An examination of areas in which qualitative methods have become most strongly established—applied, feminist, and multicultural psychologies—suggests practical and social motivations as primary and as energizing renewed expression of previously ignored ontological, epistemological, and scientific reasoning in the turn to qualitative methods. Methodological diversification in the arenas of human suffering, women's issues, and cultural politics is traced to psychologists' deeply rooted ethical obligations. The existential philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas articulates an implicit ethics at the heart psychology's increasing acceptance of qualitative methods and provides an understanding of how the emerging methodological diversity can contribute to social justice and human liberation as well as to an enhancement of rigorous scientific knowledge.     

Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge

Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important principled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties of justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson's contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not provide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism's protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of global justice.     

Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self

In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.     

TRUTH, RELATIVISM, AND CROSSWORD PUZZLES

Abstract. Neither the correspondence nor the coherence theory of truth does justice to the truth claims made in science and theology. I propose a new definition that relates truth to solving puzzles. I claim that this definition is more adequate than either of the traditional theories and that it offers two additional benefits: first, it provides grounds for a theory regarding the relations between theology and science that may stand up better to philosophical scrutiny than does critical realism; and second, it blocks the move to relativism based on recognition of the plurality of perspectives and the historical and social conditioning of knowledge.     

Love Life: Aristotle on Living Together with Friends

According to Aristotle, the most characteristic activity of friendship is “living together” [to suzên]. This paper seeks to understand living together in the light of his famous, foundational claim that humans are social by nature. Based on an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, I explain our need for friends in terms of a more fundamental human need to appreciate one's life as a whole. I then argue that friendship is built into the very structure of human life itself such that human living is living together.     

Quidditism without quiddities

Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ??quiddities??. Here I grant that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ??austere quidditism??, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ??property individuation??. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis??s posthumously published ??Ramseyan Humility?? (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis??s argument.     

Developmental Psychopathology: Reactions, Reflections, Projections

In this paper, I describe the field of developmental psychopathology, discuss its major tenets, and delineate its boundaries with other disciplines with an eye toward the future. I articulate how I envision those aspects of developmental psychopathology that I view as central to the discipline affecting the field and evolving over time. The current status and suggested directions for a number of issues are discussed, including: the interface between normal and abnormal development; developmental mechanisms and processes across the life span; the need for an interdisciplinary approach; prevention and intervention; and training. I believe that a continued and expanded interface between the study of normal and atypical development will span the dualisms that exist between the clinical study of and research into disorders of childhood and adulthood, between basic and applied research, and between psychology and biology. If fostered, I envision an exciting new era of theoretical and empirical work in the developmental sciences.