陶伯特与《德意志意识形态》的编辑和研究

在《德意志意识形态》的百年文献学研究历程中，德国MEGA²编辑专家英·陶伯特的编辑与研究工作可谓至关重要。正是陶伯特首创了MEGA²试编卷中“费尔巴哈”章的编排架构，构想了《德意志意识形态》的完整版框架，并最终正式提出了时间顺序版“费尔巴哈”章。值得一提的是，陶伯特所构想的《德意志意识形态》完整版是理解MEGA²版《德意志意识形态》的重要中介，它为我们在比较视域下编排中文二版《德意志意识形态》提供了有益借鉴。     

马克思对自由主义价值观的批判及当代意义

马克思对自由主义价值观进行了多维批判并表现为由具体到抽象再到具体的逻辑深化的过程。《论犹太人问题》讨论了人的权利、公民权利以及政治解放的局限性,对自由、平等、私有财产进行了分析。马克思在《德意志意识形态》中对自由主义价值观进行了意识形态批判,并基于实践观点重构了个人与社会关系的解释模式,批判功利主义,消解了自由主义价值观的哲学基础。在《资本论》及其手稿中,马克思立足于资本主义经济关系和生产方式,分析了自由、平等、所有权等价值理念与资本主义生产、交换、流通等之间的内在关系,对自由主义价值理念进行了政治经济学批判基础上的内在综合批判。马克思的批判揭示了自由主义价值观的实质以及它的内在缺陷,为我们科学认识当代自由主义,把握现代性的内在矛盾以及可能的发展前景提供了理论基础。     

石元康著《当代西方自由主义理论》

上海三联书店2 0 0 0年版,4 2 62页　　自由主义是西方现代社会的最基本的意识形态,它为现代社会及国家的正当性提供基础;自由主义的特性就是现代西方世界的特性。香港中文大学石元康教授的《当代西方自由主义理论》一著致力于解读当代西方自由主义,是一本不可多得的有关自由主     

《当代意识形态研究》

《当代意识形态研究》宋惠昌１．意识形态概念的分析意识形态是社会哲学的一个基本范畴,是一定社会或阶级的思想体系,社会群体（阶级等等）的根本利益是意识形态的现实基础和灵魂,意识形态是社会（或群体）的理论形态的自我意识,其中心内容是政治文化观念。意识形态具有多维的两重性。即实践性和理论性,阶级性和人类（共同）性,客观性和主观性,现实性和理想性。意识形态的社会功能,一是提供政治“合法性”的依据;二是能够成为凝聚和引导一定社会或群体的“社会水泥”和“思想旗帜”。此外,它在广泛的社会活动中也起着价值导向作用．渗透到人们生活的各个方面。２．资本主义意识形态个人主义是资本主义意识形态的核心,它是适应资本主义私有制的价值观念,在反对封建专制主义、促进资本主义商品生产中,起了巨大的积极作用。它又具有同社会公共利益相矛盾的反社会性,因此,一些资产阶级思想家发出警告：个人主义可能成为资本主义的癌症,并且提出用“合理利己主义”、“新个人主义”取代旧的个人主义。资产阶级个人主义反映到政治法律制度中,集中表现为自由主义,它有一个从古典自由主义到新自由主义的演变过程。古典自由主义,主要是针对封建专制主义的．具有鲜明的革命性质。但在资产阶级     

中国新左派思潮的成因与嬗变略论

作为新启蒙思想界自我分化及其与自由主义持续论争的结果,中国新左派思潮凸显了中国市场化改革过程中深刻的社会变革与权力变迁。基于批判资本主义的阶级立场和追求社会公平正义的价值诉求,新左派思潮以心系国家命运、情注弱势群体的政治取向,展现了其意识形态话语的现实意蕴。为准确把握新左派思潮内在的意识形态属性,有必要对其复杂的现实成因和丰富的嬗变历程进行前提性追问。     

《舍姆斯之书》与伊斯兰经院逻辑学

《舍姆斯之书》是阿拉伯逻辑史上最重要的读本之一,自问世以来便获得了经久不衰的广泛影响。作为经院逻辑学的典型代表,该书在编排体例和主要内容上是对伊本·西那《指示与诠明》逻辑学卷的改编和发展,书中对逻辑学的本质和主题的论述又反映出安萨里和拉齐以来的实证教义学家对逻辑学的基本认知和构想。这种打上了双重烙印的逻辑学形态,也成为明清以来的经堂教育讲授和研究逻辑学的一个范本。     

《德意志意识形态》中关于个性的唯物主义理论

施蒂纳发表攻击费尔巴哈关于人和类的观点的著作《唯一者及其所有物》之后,马克思和恩格斯于1845～1846年写了《德意志意识形态》这部著作。在施蒂纳看来,人或类这个概念是自由主义即共产主义的哲学基础。他主张个人的解放,反对个人在国家中的政治异化、在共产主义社会中的社会的异化和在人或类(前两者的基础)中的“宗教的异化”。马克思批判了施蒂纳的“自由主义的”主张,指出了在什么样的历史条件下和通过何种现实的革命运动,才能实现个人的解放。但是,仅仅指出马克思和恩格斯在阐述唯物史观和共产主义革命观时谈到了个人解放这     

谁在关注别人的“隐私”

自从一本叫做《绝对隐私》的通俗读本在市场上“火”了一“把”后,随之跟风出现了不少克隆读本,而一些出版单位似乎也相互较上了劲,你出了一本《单身隐私》,我就来一册《非常隐私》,市面上有了《我和     

可错论及其他认识论原理——波普哲学介绍之二

波普认为,抽象的哲学认识论并非远离政治的;恰恰相反,不论自觉还是不自觉,认识论观点和政治观点是相互影响的。他赞成罗素的看法,认为否认客观真理的相对主义和实用主义可以成为法西斯主义的理论根据。波普宣称他的认识论观点和他的自由主义政治信念是密切关连的,而且这一关连又是自觉的。他在《自传》中写道,他的自由主义政治信念是促使他发表《科学发现的逻辑》的部分原因,而其后发表的政治哲学著作(《开放社会及其敌人》和《历史决定论的贫乏》)则是从《科学发现的逻辑》“生长”出来的。下面介绍波普的认识论。     

论意识形态与政党政治

意识形态既是政党的合法性基础,也是政党危机的来源;全球范围内主导意识形态的消长不但决定了一个具体政党的地位,而且型塑了世界政党政治的生态。按照19世纪末以来全球主导意识形态的变化,本文把世界政党政治分成以下四个发展阶段并对其变化规律进行了分析:(1)18世纪至19世纪中叶在自由主义和保守主义思潮主导下的政党发展;(2)19世纪中叶至二战结束时在民族和阶级意识形态主导下的政党发展;(3)冷战下的政党发展;(4)"第三波民主浪潮"下宗教和保守主义的回潮与政党政治。本文还试图解答如下问题:世界各国政党的组织形式有什么重要区别?这些区别又是怎么产生的?为什么政党危机是各国政党不得不经常面对的一个问题?当前世界的政党政治势态形成的原因是什么?针对当前世界局势与政党政治的发展趋势中国应当如何应对?为了让读者更好地了解近代以来意识形态的消长规律及其背后的社会学原理,本文还用了较大的篇幅探讨了阶级、民族、自由主义和零和扩张性宗教这些在现代社会中最为重要的意识形态各自所具有的基本性质。因此,本文还可以被视为一篇分析不同意识形态各自的性质,以及这些性质如何影响世界的政党发展乃至整个世界局势的文章。在本文的最后部分,笔者提出了"道德务实政党"的概念,认为这是解决政党危机的一个途径。     

政治的,抑或道德的——对政治自由主义一个关键悖论的解读

政治自由主义试图将其正义观念塑造为纯粹"政治的"观念,而不能是完备性的"道德的"观念。但任何规范性的正义观念似乎都不能不是道德的,这就形成了政治自由主义所面对的一个最根本的悖论。通过分析我们可以看到,政治自由主义要克服这一悖论,必须寻求一种具有自主性的规范性政治概念。此外,政治自由主义把公民的两种道德能力当作理论前提,同时强调道德化的公民美德,这两个因素都加深了这一悖论。通过解释和分析这两种因素所带来的理论难题及其原因,文章认为,"政治的"自由主义之所以难以抹去"道德的"面纱,其根源在于政治在自由主义价值系统中的处境。     

The Implicit Assumptions of Dividing a Cake: Political or Comprehensive?

Rawls's recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls's comments on the division of a cake.     

Respect,Religion, and Feminism: Comments on Lori Watson and Christie Hartley,Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism

There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between the two doctrines. Political liberalism has come under particular criticism from feminists, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This article raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First, it argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second, it takes issue with Watson and Hartley's defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third, it argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism but that it is not itself adequately feminist. It concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists.     

儒家社群主义略论

As a social and political thought, communitarian ideas appeared in the Pre-Qin Confucianism. By the Song Dynasty, it had become a systematic theory, namely, the learning of the “four books.” As a social and political theory, not only can Confucian communitarianism contribute to Western liberalism, but it can also be an intellectual resource for the development of democracy in East Asian countries and regions. The future of the Confucian communitarianism lies in its critique of itself and its discourse with Western liberalism, by which Confucianism evolves from communitarianism into liberalism. __________ Translated from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Literature, History and Philosophy), 2006, (4): 31–37     

Rawls's political postmodernism

John Rawls has recently shifted to a "freestanding" or "political" liberalism from his earlier "comprehensive" and "moral" liberalism. I argue that this move is based on several key features that make Rawlsian liberal pluralism indelibly postmodern. Two of the more obvious features are the denial of foundationalism and the rejection of a truth status for public-sphere justifications of the basic political structure. In conclusion, I suggest that a late-modern postliberalism is a viable alternative. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Leninism and the Enlightenment

Conclusion The outcome of this comparison of the impact of the Englishtenment on two rival philosophical traditions suggests that there are points of contact even on the issues that appear to push Leninism in an opposite direction from liberalism. The lack of communication between these two traditions results in a lack of vigor in developing their philosophies in a way that addresses the accomplishments of rival philosophies. For example, Leninism, which seeks to justify limits on the freedom of speech for those viewed as anti-socialist, would do well to reinforce its position by mastering the reasoning of the liberals who differentiate the rights of the Ku Klux Klan from those of the N.A.A.C.P. And liberalism, which has been concerned with overcoming formal equality to implement real, practical equality of opportunity, is in effect echoing one of Lenin's main concerns about democracy under capitalism.Insofar as Lenin put forward the idea of Marxism as the continuation and sublation of the best accomplishments of human culture, it appears to be a weakness of contemporary Leninism that it fails sufficiently to embrace or confront the body of philosophical thought characterizing the liberal democratic conceptions of the Enlightenment and of contemporary liberalism. Even though this body of thought was known to Lenin and partially appropriated as well as confronted by him, there is a lack of emphasis by Leninists upon the mastering of the arguments advanced by liberalism. The fact that rival, anti-Leninist thought also began from certain ideas of the Enlightenment underscores the importance for Leninism's own self-understanding of studying the evolution of Enlightenment philosophy, its links with twentieth-century liberalism, and the reasons for the rejection of liberal conceptions by Lenin.     

A Neo-Kantian foundation of Corporate Social Responsibility

‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is conceptualized in many ways. We argue that one cannot be indifferent about the issue of its conceptualization. In terms of methodology, our position is that any conceptual discussion must embed CSR in political theory. With regard to substance, we link up with the discussion on whether CSR must be defined on the basis of a tripartite or a quadripartite division of business responsibilities. We share A.B. Carroll’s intuition that a quadripartite division is called for as a basis to define CSR. However, defending the quadripartite division of business responsibilities requires that the distinctions between economic, legal, ethical and discretionary business responsibilities be made intelligible. Carroll’s account is defective in this respect. We argue that contemporary Neo-Kantian political ethics is able to make sense of these distinctions, because of its specific interpretation of liberalism. Interestingly, from a conventional liberal perspective this interpretation of liberalism is atypical, as it extends public morality beyond the domain of the law.

Liberalism and Democracy

ABSTRACT Political liberalism and the democratic ideal together supply the foundation of almost all contemporary political thinking. This essay explores the relation between them. It argues that, despite common parlance, there is an inevitable tension between the two. Furthermore, attempts to resolve this tension by showing that democracy is a good thing in its own right, or that it is the inevitable development of liberal aspirations, or that it is conceptually connected to fundamental liberal ideas, all fail. The conclusion to be drawn is that liberalism requires a pragmatic rather than a principled approach to democratic aspirations.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence

According to political liberalism, laws must be justified to all citizens in order to be legitimate. Most political liberals have taken this to mean that laws must be justified by appeal to a specific class of ‘public reasons’, which all citizens can accept. In this paper I defend an alternative, convergence, model of public justification, according to which laws can be justified to different citizens by different reasons, including reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines. I consider three objections to such an account—that it undermines sincerity in public reason, that it underestimates the importance of shared values, and that it is insufficiently deliberative—and argue that convergence justifications are resilient to these objections. They should therefore be included within a theory of political liberalism, as a legitimate form of public justification. This has important implications for the obligations that political liberalism places upon citizens in their public deliberations and reason-giving, and might make the theory more attractive to some of its critics, particularly those sympathetic to religious belief.