选择性注意与视觉空间工作记忆的交互作用

传统上只是从单方面讨论了选择性注意与视觉空间工作记忆之间的关系,即认为注意选择有限信息以进入工作记忆。近期的一些研究发现,视觉空间工作记忆的内容影响选择性注意的分配,注意选择工作记忆中保持的空间或物体表征,选择性注意对于正确保持空间或物体信息是必需的认知调节。文章最后指出,关于选择性注意与视觉空间工作记忆交互作用的研究为将来进一步揭示基于空间与基于物体的注意选择之间的交互作用关系提供了一个很好的途径。     

错误再认:意识、注意和刺激特性

该研究基于错误再认现象,确立了意识知觉和无意识知觉在行为结果上的质的差异。在决定一个刺激是被有意识知觉还是无意识知觉时,刺激特性和注意之间存在着相互补偿的作用。实验一表明,当一个刺激短暂呈现而被无意识知觉的时候,增强刺激特性或提高注意水平都能使它的知觉变为有意识的;相对应地,实验二表明,一个处于分散注意条件下被无意识知觉的刺激,也可以通过使注意集中或增强刺激特性而使它的知觉变为有意识的。该研究对意识、注意和刺激特性三者间的关系进行了讨论。     

攻击者的注意偏向与归因偏向及其关系

在攻击者的认知偏向中,注意偏向与归因偏向尤为引人注目。攻击者常偏向于注意敌意性的刺激,并会对模棱两可的情境作出敌意性的解释。二者的关系存在注意优先模型与解释优先模型两种可能性,注意优先模型认为注意过程先于解释过程,解释优先模型则相反。两种假设各有论据支持,而攻击者注意偏向与归因偏向的关系尚无定论。今后的研究当改进实验方法、运用多种技术从理论和应用两方面更深入地探讨攻击者的这二种偏向及其关系。     

内隐序列学习与注意的关系

内隐序列学习与注意的关系是内隐学习研究领域中的一个热点问题。“双注意机制”理论、“抑制表达”理论和“干扰外显学习成分”理论,从不同的角度阐释了内隐序列学习与注意的关系,但支持证据和反对意见并存,论争激烈。该文试图在一定程度上整合这三种理论,提出了“动态需求”假设,认为内隐序列学习任务对注意的需求是动态变化的,随着内隐序列学习任务中外显学习成分比重的变大,其对注意资源的需求也会随之增加     

驾驶员视觉注意对危险识别的影响及作用机制

驾驶中, 有效的视觉注意模式是驾驶员搜索与识别潜在道路危险的先决条件。通过分析驾驶员视觉注意对危险识别的影响, 提出情境意识假设与心理负荷假设。情境意识假设认为, 情境意识的质量决定了驾驶员视觉注意模式的灵活性, 进而影响危险识别。心理负荷假设认为, 心理负荷水平提高, 驾驶员视觉注意趋于集中, 不利于危险识别。建议未来研究可以在比较不同驾驶员情境意识的认知兼容性, 应用汽车驾驶自动化技术降低心理负荷以及检测并区分情境意识与心理负荷的影响等方面加以深入。     

错误加工意识水平与错误相关脑电成分

错误加工的意识水平包括有意识水平、无意识水平以及介于两者之间的意识水平。意识水平的划分通常通过错误报告范式实现。根据其对意识水平的划分, 可以将相关研究分为二元意识水平研究和多元意识水平研究。已有研究, 主要关注于意识水平与错误诱发的Ne、Pe的关系。两类研究一致表明, Pe受意识水平的调节, 但是并没有得到fMRI研究的一致支持。对Ne的激活是否独立于意识, 研究者们仍存在争议。还有研究考察了注意对错误意识水平的影响, 结果支持Pe与意识水平共变的观点, 但是对注意如何影响错误意识水平还存在质疑。在对以上研究进行整理与分析的基础上, 对将来的研究提出了建议。     

自身意识与内时间意识

自身意识是界定意识的意识性的一个重要特征。高阶理论诉诸两个在个数上有差异的心灵活动之间的外在关系,自身表象理论则将自身意识的关系限制于一阶意识内部,认为意识在指向外在对象的同时将自身作为对象内容进行表象。胡塞尔对内时间意识的讨论提供了理解自身意识的可能方案。胡塞尔通过对内时间意识结构的分析,讨论了意识如何进行自身显现。本论文批评了一些现象学者以对象内容来解释意识在内时间意识中的自身显现的做法,并从现象学的角度论证了,意识如何能够不作为对象内容而以时间性的自身意识的方式显现。     

注意捕获与自上而下的加工过程

注意捕获对揭示两种控制过程——自下而上的加工与自上而下的加工之间的关系有着重要的研究意义。在当前对注意捕获的研究中,主要存在两大类的实验范式：线索化范式与视觉搜索范式;涉及以下几个方面：刺激驱动的注意捕获与自上而下控制的关系;注意捕获是否涉及注意的空间转移;刺激的显著性对注意捕获的影响;实验范式对注意捕获的影响。总的来说,没有任何一种视觉刺激能绝对的独立于自上而下的控制之外来捕获注意,因此也可以这样认为,注意捕获被默认为是一种自动化的过程,但这个自动化的过程可以被内源性的调节所抑制或者易化。     

选择性注意中意识与无意识过程分离的实验研究

以汉语单字词为材料,通过颜色来区分目标和分心物,采用过程分离程序,直接探讨了目标激活与分心物抑制和意识、无意识过程之间的关系。结果表明,（１）靶词充当分心物时,不仅意识过程存在的概率降低,无意识过程存在的概率也降低。这一结果说明,在选择性注意任务中,信息是有关还是无关,并不能分离意识和无意识过程;（２）靶词充当目标时,加工水平影响Ｐｃ,但不影响Ｐｕ,而靶词充当分心物时,加工水平既不影响Ｐｃ,也不影响Ｐｕ。因此,加工水平能否分离意识和无意识过程,依赖于靶词的作用或信息是否有关     

一般流体智力研究中工作记忆与注意的关系

随着对一般流体智力的研究逐步深入,研究者们认为了解工作记忆与注意的相互关系是解决一般流体智力与前二者结构关系的关键。由于工作记忆系统中中央执行器的功能尚不明确,注意控制能力与工作记忆的关系难以确定。研究者中存在两种不同的观点：一种认为两者之间存在着密切的互动,另一种则认为两者就是同功同构的一个认知成分。     

Self-focused attention and the experience of alcoholic intoxication

The present study investigates the relationship between self-focused attention and the experience of emotional and bodily concomitants of alcoholic intoxication. It was hypothesized that self-focused attention would amplify salient mood and bodily concomitants of intoxication after alcohol intake and counteract these concomitants after placebo treatment. Self-focused attention was assessed by measures of private body consciousness, private self-consciousness, and of self-awareness. Since alcohol intake did not influence mood, it was not possible to test our main-hypothesis linking self-focused attention with the experience of mood concomitants of intoxication. As to bodily concomitants of intoxication a strong effect of alcohol intake was disclosed. Further analysis revealed the predicted relationship between self-awareness and private body consciousness on one hand and the experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication, on the other. The relationship between private body consciousness and experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication was moderated by the amount of experience with alcohol. No significant relationship between private self-consciousness and experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication was found.     

国内近十年来意识和无意识关系研究的新成就

近十年来,国内掀起了从自然科学途径进行意识和无意识对比研究的新热潮,尤其在实验范式的引进、修正、完善和模型建构方面,做出了中国学者自己的贡献。错误记忆、内隐时间及不注意视盲等新领域的触及代表了国内学者在意识研究内容上的丰富。“钢筋水泥”、“意识涌现”及“车站监视室”等模型的提出,代表了中国学者在意识研究理论方面的创新。当前国内意识研究与国外基本同步,但存在着“研究领域泛化,神经机制探讨有限,跨学科整合力度有待深化”的问题。     

Über das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Standpunkt der analytischen Philosophie zum Thema ,Aufmerksamkeit‘

What we cannot notice, we cannot be perceptually aware of either: This view, still very popular in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, has been recently defended by M. Tye and A. Noë. The present paper tries to undermine this idea by referring to some empirical cases showing that we can be perceptually aware of something which our thematic attention fails to grasp. The limits of perception do not coincide with the limits of attention, and this holds not only in the case of so called “primary attention,” but also in the case of “secondary attention.” We therefore reject Arvidson’s hypothesis of the identity between the field of attention and the field of consciousness.     

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.     

Epistemic Warrants and Higher‐Order Theories of Conscious Perception

We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher‐order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first‐order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher‐order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so‐called ‘targetless’ higher‐order states. We explain the key notion of an immediate perceptual warrant and show both that it requires the content of the higher‐order attitude to match that of the first‐order perception, and also that it gives a new perspective on the intimate relationship, rightly emphasised by Rosenthal, between consciousness and a subject's testimony as to ‘how it is with her’.     

内隐学习中表征与意识的关系

近年来研究者分别从表征的质量和表征的外显等级两个方面探讨了内隐学习中表征与意识的关系。有关表征质量与意识的研究,清晰地揭示了影响表征进入意识的因素;而有关表征外显等级与意识的研究,则明确地阐明了什么样的表征才是有意识的。但表征与意识的关系是一个十分复杂的问题,目前仍存在着很大的争议,还有待于进一步的探讨     

On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell’s<Emphasis Type="Italic">Reference and Consciousness</Emphasis>

John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context

In the last hundred years Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology has received a substantial amount of attention. Unfortunately, it has been appropriated because of its perceived psychological content—so much so that Gregory's Trinitarian theology becomes re–stated as the Trinity as "personal relationship" or as "locating consciousness(es) in the Trinity." To be sure, a knowledge of Gregory's psychology reveals its role in his Trinitarian theology; however, it also makes clear that personal relationship or consciousness are not important, substantial psychological concepts in the way that they are often taken to be by contemporary interpreters. Rather, Gregory's psychology takes its fundamental shape from a concern for the integrity of the will in its action.