沉没成本效应中的心理学问题

沉没成本效应是一种常见的非理性行为。本文从心理学角度对其进行了系统地介绍。文章概括了沉没成本及沉没成本效应的定义,沉没成本的种类和发生领域,并用心理学理论对沉没成本效应进行了解释。此外．文章还讨论了沉没成本的逆效应以及影响沉没成本效应的主要因素。     

等待是一种折磨？等待时间知觉及其导致的非理性决策行为

等待时间知觉是指人们在等待过程中对等待时长的主观感受和心理体验, 它对人们的决策行为产生影响。影响等待时间知觉的客观因素包括等待过程的填充物、等待时间的确定性、接受服务的阶段和等待的物理环境等; 主观因素有负性情绪、自我控制和人格因素等。等待时间知觉导致的非理性决策行为包括时间沉没成本效应、“延迟-提前”框架效应、峰-终效应、偏好反转等。未来研究可从三个方面开展：(1) 时间启动和金钱启动下等待时间知觉的差异; (2) 基于时间心理账户视角研究等待时间知觉规律; (3) 借鉴时间知觉理论探讨等待(时间)影响决策行为的心理机制。     

行为决策中的默认效应

默认效应指的是当存在默认选项时, 人们决策时倾向于保留默认选项而不做出改变的一种现象。这种现象广泛存在于器官捐献政策、退休金储蓄计划和消费决策等领域并在这些领域中有巨大的应用价值。目前, 研究者主要从损失规避、质询理论、暗含的推荐和神经心理机制四个方面解释默认效应的形成机制。默认效应还受到努力成本、默认选项的框架和个人经验等因素影响。未来的研究可以从深入探讨默认效应的产生根源、加强其跨文化研究以及拓展其应用领域这三个方面来展开。     

说服效应的理论模型、影响因素与应对策略

说服效应是指面临说服性信息时, 个体态度发生转变并影响其决策行为的一种现象, 该现象普遍存在于政治选举、生活消费及商业广告等领域, 具有重要的应用价值。说服效应的两个主要理论模型包括双加工模型和自我功效理论。信息源的可信度、情绪、信息框架、社会网络、事件卷入度等是影响说服效应的主要因素。说服效应的应对策略包括公开承诺和自我控制。未来的研究应该从说服效应的产生根源、特征成分及应用领域等方面进行深入地探讨。     

行为决策中的后悔

后悔是行为决策领域中有关决策情感的最重要研究领域之一.后悔是一种基于认知的消极情感,当个体意识到或者想象出如果先前采取其他的行为,将产生更好的结果时,就会产生后悔情感.许多研究证据表明后悔将会影响人们的行为决策.本文简要回顾了后悔的定义和影响因素,结合研究者提出的不同后悔模型,从作为效应、后悔规避和不作为惯性等方面,具体介绍了后悔对决策行为的作用,并探讨了行为决策中后悔研究的未来发展方向.     

决策评估中的结果偏差

结果偏差又称结果效应,它是发生在决策评估中的一种偏差式判断,即当决策结果与决策质量不存在实质性联系时,评估者仍根据结果信息评估决策质量.针对这一判断谬误的产生根源,研究者们提出了认知解释和申辩模型.结果偏差的影响因素主要包括动机、情境因素和评估手段等.基于先前研究存在的问题和不足,今后的研究应着眼于改进研究手段,理清与其他现象的关系并提出有效的应对策略.     

禀赋效应的心理机制及其影响因素

禀赋效应是指个体在拥有某物品时对该物品的估价高于没有拥有该物品时的估价的现象。这一现象在行为经济学中普遍存在。禀赋效应的研究范式包括经典研究范式与物物交换范式。禀赋效应的心理机制主要包括损失规避与查询理论。禀赋效应的影响因素主要包括认知角度、动机、情绪、交易物品的特征、研究设计的选择等。未来的研究需要从禀赋效应的适用条件、产生根源、研究范式的改进等方面进一步探讨。     

公共决策中的框架效应：理论解释及影响因素

公共决策中的框架效应是指在公共决策情境中, 人们的决策行为受媒体或领导人对同一问题的框架表述形式的影响而表现出不同决策偏好的现象。目前, 研究者对这一现象的解释主要有预期理论、查询理论和模糊痕迹理论。公共决策中框架效应的影响因素主要包括价值取向、知识水平、人际沟通、情绪以及框架的特征等。未来的研究需要从公共决策中框架效应的理论解释及神经机制、跨文化研究以及研究方式和应对策略等方面进一步探讨。     

行为决策中作为价值的时间:基于与金钱的比较

传统经济学家认为,时间就是金钱,而近年来的一些研究却发现了与之不同的结论。后续的研究者主要从损失和受益时的风险偏好和决策依据、沉没成本效应、心理账户和禀赋效应这四个方面对时间和金钱进行比较,但是这方面的研究还处于起步阶段,还有许多问题需要在以后的研究中深入探讨。未来的研究应对时间是否存在损失规避和敏感性递减、时间的沉没成本效应和时间的禀赋效应的形成机制等问题进行探讨。     

时间框架对决策的影响

时间是影响决策偏好一致性的重要因素,时间框架与行为决策之间的相互关系是决策科学领域关沣的重要问题.本研究采用实验方法,运用跨时选择研究范式对延迟决策和提前决策进行对比研究.实验结果表明,时间框架对跨时选样产生显著影响;同一时间距离条件下,提前框架下的时间折扣低于延迟框架下的时间折扣,即存在时间维度的框架效应.     

Let It Go: Positive Affect Attenuates Sunk Cost Bias by Enhancing Cognitive Flexibility

Sunk cost bias is a pervasive problem in consumer decision making. It occurs when people continue to invest resources toward unsuccessful outcomes merely because they previously invested in them. This tendency exists because people devote too much attention to prior investments without considering how other factors may impact their decision outcome. While many suggested interventions to attenuate sunk cost bias involve altering cognitive processes, we examine an alternate affective route. Specifically, we propose that inducing positive affect attenuates sunk cost bias by naturally facilitating flexible thought processes. Across four studies, using hypothetical and real decision tasks, we find that positive affect induced in three different ways consistently attenuates sunk cost bias involving money, time, and effort investments. Further, we demonstrate that this occurs because people experiencing positive affect have enhanced cognitive flexibility. They consider more relevant decision factors and perceive sunk cost as having less of an influence on their decision outcomes. Then, in a fifth study, we show that a thought intervention promoting flexibility can attenuate consumers’ suboptimal commitment tendency in a field setting.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sunk Cost Effects: The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates

Normative principles imply that decision makers′ choices should be affected solely by the prospective future consequences of the options. Previous work, however, has demonstrated the occurrence of sunk cost effects, whereby decision makers are reluctant to abandon options in which they have made prior investments. The present research shows that, contrary to earlier findings, there exist conditions under which sunk cost effects are reduced significantly by instruction in pertinent economic principles. Additional findings indicate that sunk cost effects are mitigated by an important factor that is often present in real-world decision situations but omitted in most sunk cost research paradigms-explicit estimates of the future returns the given options might yield. Theoretical and practical implications are developed and discussed, including possibly common ambiguities about what normative sunk costs principles imply and how they should be applied.     

The effect of accountability on susceptibility to decision errors

Recent research indicates that accountability can influence both what and how people think and might reduce decision makers' susceptibility to a variety of common judgment and choice errors. It is proposed that accountability can reduce decision errors if (1) decision makers are able to anticipate which response will be evaluated as more rational, and without concerns about accountability decision makers tend to select a different response, or (2) the normatively correct response can be identified by the more thorough and complex information processing associated with accountability. Consistent with the first proposition, four experiments demonstrated that accountability can reduce the sunk cost effect. The findings suggest that this debiasing effect reflects the subjects' expectation that they would be evaluated more favorably if they ignored sunk costs. Contrary to the second proposition, the prediction that accountable decision makers, due to their more thorough and multidimensional processing, would exhibit more consistent preferences across preference elicitation procedures was not supported in two studies. Finally, as hypothesized, accountability did not reduce a variety of decision errors for which the correct response was not known and was unlikely to be identified with more thorough information processing. These results are consistent with the notion that accountability effects in decision making are driven by the desire to be favorably evaluated and avoid criticism by others.     

人工智能决策的公平感知

不平等问题是全球社会和经济发展需要应对的首要挑战, 也是实现全球可持续发展目标的核心障碍。人工智能(artificial intelligence, AI)为缓解不平等、促进社会公平提供了新的途径。然而, 新近研究发现, 即使客观上AI决策具有公平性和准确性, 个体仍可能对AI决策的公平感知较低。因此, 近年来越来越多的研究开始关注AI决策公平感知的影响因素。然而, 目前研究较为分散, 呈现出研究范式不统一、理论不清晰和机制未厘清等特征。这既不利于跨学科的研究对话, 也不利于研究者和实践者对AI决策公平感知形成系统性理解。基于此, 通过系统的梳理, 现有研究可以划分为两类: (1) AI单一决策的公平感知研究, 主要聚焦于AI特征和个体特征如何影响个体对AI决策的公平感知; (2) AI-人类二元决策的公平感知研究, 主要聚焦于对比个体对AI决策与人类决策公平感知的差异。在上述梳理基础上, 未来研究可以进一步探索AI决策公平感知的情绪影响机制等方向。     

Sunk Cost and Commitment to Medical Treatment

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to medical treatment was investigated. Three studies were run investigating the influence of sunk cost in the form of money, time, and effort. A total of 637 participants (314 male) with a mean age of 19.58 years were recruited from an undergraduate population. A computer program simulated the process of arranging a course of physiotherapy. Participants invested one of three amounts of sunk cost (under budget, on budget, or over budget) into arranging sessions with a chiropractor. Participants then decided how much time they wished to commit to these chiropractor sessions or to an alternative treatment with a better chance of success. Results revealed a significant effect of invested money, a significant effect of invested effort, but no effect of invested time. Invested money produced a sunk cost effect, while invested effort appeared to exert influence via cognitive dissonance. The implications for healthcare decision-making are discussed.     

Sunk Cost,Emotion, and Commitment to Education

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to a course of education was investigated. The moderating effects of the emotions of anger and fear over this commitment decision were also investigated. A total of 425 participants (214 male) with a mean age of 19.92 years were recruited from an undergraduate population. A computer program simulated the process of arranging to undertake a course of education. Participants were induced to feel either anger or fear and, then, invested one of three amounts of sunk cost (under budget, on budget, or over budget) to signing up for a course. Participants then decided how much time they wished to commit to this course or to an alternative, identical course with a better chance of success. Results revealed a significant sunk cost effect of prior investment on commitment to a course of education. Results also revealed that anger increased the magnitude of this sunk cost effect. Results did not reveal any effect of fear on the sunk cost effect. Theoretical implications and practical applications were discussed.     

The discounting of ambiguous information in economic decision making

In three experimental studies we investigated how decision makers respond to ambiguous information about costs and benefits. In Experiment 1, we studied the effect of ambiguity about prior costs. Experiments 2 and 3 focused on the effect of ambiguity about future outcomes. The collective results of the three studies suggest that decision makers discount ambiguous information. The findings are related to insights on the disjunction effect, the sunk cost effect, transaction decoupling, and ambiguity aversion. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

Beyond the gambling paradigm: internal controllability in decision-making.

Much research within decision-making has used the standard gambling paradigm, where decision outcomes depend only on chance. Many real life decisions, however, imply personal control over decision outcomes. This paper addressed the question of how internal controllability influences decision-making. Internal controllability is assumed (i) to enhance unrealistic optimism and (ii) to result in a better cost:benefit ratio. Both tendencies support each other and predict an enhanced attractiveness for internal and controllable choice options. Participants read a scenario and made a decision afterwards. Results supported the prediction: decision-makers take the option they can personally control. This finding widens the narrow perspective inherent in much previous research based on the gambling paradigm.