A Zero-Relationship Justification of Rights： A Contractual Approach Based on Rawls＇ Device of the ＂Original Position＂

In contemporary moral and political philosophy, there are two leading approaches to the justification of rights. These could be broadly identified as deontological theories and consequential theories. These two schools of theories each have their own strengths and weakness, while there is also a third contractual approach that is under represented. Because Rawls＇ and Scanlon＇s well-known contractual theories are designed for purposes other than the justification of rights, the purpose of this paper is to establish a principle of rights on the basis of Rawls＇ justification device of the ＂original position.＂ First, it supplies a criterion based on human conduct or action. Second, based on this account of human conduct, different types of relationships are constructed and presented to the parties in the ＂original position.＂ Third, it will show that the parties in the ＂original position＂ would choose one of these relationships as the principle of rights. Finally, Rawls＇ first principle of justice will be reformulated. The procedure of choosing a principle of rights in this paper could also be viewed as a demonstration that, when properly situated and motivated, human beings exhibit their potential as rational beings.     

The Meaning of ＂Existence＂ and the Contingency of Sense

In this paper I argue first for a revisionary ontology, that is, for an understanding of ＂existence＂ as the property of a field not to be empty. In this context, I distinguish between ＂metaphysics＂ （the theory of totality or of fundamental reality） and ＂ontology＂ （the systematic investigation into the meaning of ＂existence＂）. In the second part, I provide a sketch for a corresponding revisionary theory of the modalities in light of the new ontology proposed.     

Russell＇s Paradox of Predicates

Russell＇s letter to Frege of June 16, 1902 contains the famous paradox of the class of all classes which are not members of themselves as well as a second paradox of the predicates that cannot be predicated of themselves. The latter paradox arises out of Russell＇s theory of classes and class concepts in Principles of Mathematics.     

Knowledge,Presupposition, and Pragmatic Implicature

It is widely accepted that knowledge is factive, but two different understandings of ＂factivity＂ should be distinguished, namely, the implication version and the presupposition version. While the former only takes the truth of P as a necessary requirement for ＂S knows that P,＂ the latter considers it also necessary for ＂S does not know that P.＂ In this paper, I argue against presupposition and defend implication. More specifically, I argue against Wang and Tai＇s defense of the presupposition version as presented in a recent paper and propose a pragmatic response to the ＂persistence problem＂ of implication. In other words, my positive proposal is an account of implication plus pragmatic implicature. To conclude, I use my version to analyze Wang and Tai＇s distinction between inner skepticism and outer skepticism. My conclusion is that, after abandoning presupposition, we can identify two types of intermediate skepticism between Wang and Tai＇s inner and outer skepticism.     

Introduction to the Special Theme： Finding out the Contemporary Value of Marx＇s Philosophy

Theorists in the period of the Second International mostly regarded Marx＇s theories as an empirical science but refused to admit the existence of ＂Marx＇s philosophy.＂ Marx himself also held the idea of ＂abolishing philosophy＂ and in The German Ideology, he even drew an analogy comparing the relationship between philosophy and empirical science and that between masturbation and actual sexual love. Since Plekhanov, and particularly since Lenin, Dialectical Materialism has been considered to be synonymous with Marx＇s philosophy. Early Marxists from Luk~ics and Gramsci to Korsch were all against the trend that theorists of the Second International consigning Marx＇s theories to empirical science, but, at the same time, they also objected to systemizing Marx＇s philosophy in terms of Dialectical Materialism （they even traced the origin of this approach back to Engels）, and, as the result, they created a new interpretive approach to Marx＇s ＂praxis philosophy.＂     

Environmental Ethics and Linkola＇s Ecofascism： An Ethics Beyond Humanism

Ecofascism as a tradition in Environmental Ethics seems to burgeoning with potential. The roots of Ecofascism can be traced back to the German Romantic School, to the Wagnerian narration of the Nibelungen saga, to the works of Fichte and Herder and, finally, to the so-called volkisch movement. Those who take pride in describing themselves as ecofascists grosso modo tend to prioritize the moral value of the ecosphere, while, at the same time, they almost entirely devalue species and individuals. Additionally, these ecofascists are eager to reject democracy, the idea of progress in its entirety, as well as industrialization and urbanization. They also seem to be hostile towards individual autonomy and free will. In this short essay I will present and discuss Kaarlo Pentti Linkola＇s approach to environmental ethics, one that could be well described as the epitome of Ecofascism. I will argue that his arguments are neither sound nor documented, and I will conclude that Linkola＇s overall approach is, in my view, contrary to the purpose as well as to the very essence of morality.     

Criticism of the Theory of Motivation

The theory of motivation is a theory which takes the executora＇s motivation as the basis of moral judgment. One presupposition of the theory is that motivation can be a common object of understanding. However, motivation exists only in the heart of the executor, and cannot be known exactly by others, so motivation cannot be perceived like a common object, and thus, logically, cannot be the basis of moral judgment. Even if the executor＇s motivation is accepted by others and turned into a common object, the motivation still cannot become the valid basis of a moral judgment. This is the dilemma of the theory of motivation. In practice, the dilemma appears as follows： if one insists on the theory of motivation, one can be led to the result that people do evil with good intentions. However, just because motivation cannot be the basis of moral judgment does not mean that motivation is of no significance. Good motivation is always better than evil motivation. Therefore, in moral education we should carry out motivation education and teach people to strive to have good motivations for their behavior. This is the value of motivation theory.     

Principle,Knowledge, and Personality： Some Reflections on ＂the Good＂ according to Plato

This paper focuses on Plato＇s ＂Form of the Good,＂ or ＂the Good,＂ with an interest in Plato＇s riddle that ＂the Good is the One.＂ Unlike the traditional approach to explaining the Good in the Republic as ＂rational order＂ or a unity of Forms, this ]paper argues that the Good is the unique transcendent principle, like the apex of a hierarchy, but does not encompass the whole structure. According to its Ontological position, its multiple facets （functions） include the Ontological foundation of uniting ＂to be＂ and ＂ought to be,＂ the ultimate source of knowledge, and the Ideal goal of uniting the common good and individual goods. The practical dimension of the Good is highlighted in exploring the lifelong study of the Philosopher-Kings and their political personality. It is also pointed out that ＂sudden enlightenment＂ plays an important role in their path toward the Good. Finally, this paper proposes that the Good should be the a priori beginning of education and the end of the practice of virtues in the community.     

Justice and Civic Friendship： An Aristotelian Critique of Modern Citizenry

Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.     

Exploring the Non-objectified Character of Dao in the Laozi: A Modem Articulation

This article focuses on the interpretation of heng dao 恆 道 (sometimes translated as "the constant dao") and its fundamental character in the Laozi.It argues against the prevailing interpretation of dao as an unchanging metaphysical substance or reality,and maintains that the fundamental feature of heng dao is both dynamic and eternal.Heng dao is beyond language because of its dynamic character,but the Laozi nevertheless strives to express it in three aspects:1) its flexibility and adaptability as represented in the metaphor of water;2) its movement of reversal and return;3) and in its existential significance as a guide for life.Heng dao can be called the non-objectified dao,which produces law,principle,rule,method,and so on.Looked at in this way,the dynamic character of heng dao can be called non-objective.     

From Humanized Nature to Naturalized Humans―Li Zehou’s Transformation of the Classical Chinese “Tianren Heyi ” Paradigm Through the Lens of Kant and Early Marx

Li Zehou belongs among the ranks of the most important Chinese philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries. In his complex theoretical system, he aimed to reconcile the Chinese cultural heritage with the demands of the contemporary world. Besides elaborating on traditional Chinese philosophy, Li launched many innovative views based on his understanding of specific developments in pre-modern and modern Western philosophy. His philosophy could be described as the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional Chinese thought and a specifically Chinese modernization. In order to provide a basic insight into Li’s specific methods of combining Kant, early Marx and classical Chinese philosophy, the present article investigates his elaboration of the traditional Chinese paradigm of “the unity of nature and man” (tianren heyi天人合一) through the lens of ideas about humanized nature (renhua de ziran人化的自然) and naturalized humans (ziranhua de ren自然化的人).     

Plato on Necessity and Disorder

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation： purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. Next I will show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato＇s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, I will argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato＇s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind.     

Daoism and the German Mission in Martin Heidegger’s “The Thing”

In this article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s 1950 lecture/essay “The Thing” (Das Ding) in two ways. First, as a piece influenced by chapter 11 of the Daodejing. And second, as a postwar writing which can be interpreted vis-à-vis the Black Notebooks and his other writings. There are instances in “The Thing” which are analogous to his statements found in the Black Notebooks and his other writings which describe and clarify his controversial political affiliation. In brief, I suggest here that Heidegger’s articulation of the concept of wu 無 of chapter 11 of the Daodejing as the void of the jug in “The Thing” may potentially describe his controversial engagement with German National Socialism as part of his response to the call for German mission. Notably, the fundamentality of the void of the jug is comparable to the exclusivity and exceptionality of the Germans in their mission; and the use of the void of the jug as outpouring is an interesting way to emphasize his disagreement with the regime by pointing out that his support to German National Socialism is not to the extent of brutally annihilating the Jews.     

Plato the Democrat？ Some Thoughts on the Politics of the Laws

In the Laws （which Plato calls his ＂second-best society＂） Plato asserts that the best attainable form of society will combine the better features of autocracy and democracy. The democracy will be one where aidos （＂respect＂） will be a prominent feature, as will be the rule of laws underpinned by the belief that God, not man, is the measure of all things. Unlike in the Republic, the accumulation of wealth and property will be the right of all citizens, including rulers. But it will operate under strict limits： a maximum of four quanta of property will be allowed by any citizen, while a minimum of one （which will provide a good life though perhaps not a rich one） will be guaranteed. The affinity of such a view with that of John Rawls is striking. The article ends with a brief interview between the reader and Plato, in which some of the above issues are discussed.     

马克思主义哲学与自然科学

There are closely dialectical relationships between Marxist philosophy and natural sciences,but as two different fields,they all have the characteristics of the one can not be replaced by the other.The great progress of natural sciences is the prerequisite of Marxist philosophy’s formation and development,and Marxist philosophy is the guiding principle in the world conception and methodology for the developments of natural sciences.Natural sciences shouldn’t stray from or reject Marxist philosophy’s guiding...     

On the Philosophical Relevance of Marx＇s Views Today

This paper revisits some of Marx＇s central philosophical ideas with the attempt to understand the thinker＇s real place in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. It does not only show that the philosophical dimension is central to Marx＇s economic and political works, and therefore his contributions to philosophy merit special investigation, but it also argues that Marx is a descendant of classic German philosophy, and thus his views should be assessed in the context of the development of the philosophical ideas that emerged within that tradition.     

Wang Fuzhi’s Interpretation of Spirit/Shen in His Annotation on the Zhuangzi

This essay systematically explores the concept “spirit” (shen 神) in Wang Fuzhi’s Annotation on the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Jie 莊子解). Following Zhuangzi, Wang Fuzhi interprets spirit as a mass of vital force/jingqi, and regards spirit as the master of human life and human body. Through preserving one’s spirit, one will not only be able to preserve one’s body, but also keep all creatures immune from sickness and plague. This can be accomplished, since a well-preserved spirit will contribute harmonious and pure qi to the universe and make the whole universe more harmonious. In an effort to achieve this purpose, Wang Fuzhi proposes “forgetting all external things” and aiming for an empty and detached mind, on one hand, and asks a person to concentrate his spirit with a constant will, one the other hand. Once one’s spirit is well concentrated, one will be a spiritual person (shenren 神人), who will transcend life and death, fortune and misfortune, always living a leisurely and carefree life. One will also forget all cognitive distinctions and fully become one with the transformation of things and Heaven (tian 天). In this way, one’s spirit will achieve eternity, and fully realize the meaning of human life.     

BOOK REVIEW——Stephen C. Angle,Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy.

Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy can be regarded as a creative development and comprehensive expression of Stephen C. Angle＇s former works integrating Neo-Confucian tradition and contemporary ethical and political thought. He cites the idea of conservatism from Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi to propose his own idea that conservatism is rooted in creative practice. It is in the affirmation of basic Confucian values that he sets up his view of progress, which means growing ethically and making the world better （18-19）. In this light, Progressive Confucianism can be seen as a theory that interprets and conserves traditional Confucian values in agreement with contemporary demands. Thus it can be compared with Western ethics, especially with liberalism, which also emphasizes civic virtue and moral education. And so Progressive Confucianism aims at opening up dimensions like constitutionalism and democracy that accord with Western traditions while remaining consistent with Confucian ethics and rituals.     

The Limits of a Confrontational Approach: Fabian Fukansai’s Critiques of Neo-Confucianism and Christianity

This paper analyzes the critique of Neo-Confucianism by the Japanese Jesuit Brother Fabian Fukansai (c. 1565–1621) in the Myōtei Dialogues (Myōtei Mondō 妙貞問答) (1605), as well as Fabian’s later critique of Christianity. It clarifies the author’s understanding of Neo-Confucian theory and his apology for Christianity by analyzing his explanation of the Great Ultimate (Tai’kyoku/Taiji 太極) and Principle (ri/li 理), which Fabian sees as nothing but an expression of Buddhist monistic mentalism. It also demonstrates that his explanations of the Great Ultimate and Principle have a crucial flaw: they do not sufficiently explain Zhu Xi’s metaphysics, which tried to make the immanent and transcendental characteristics of the Great Ultimate and Principle compatible. This is because Fabian addresses only the elements of “local” religions including Neo-Confucianism with novel keywords that support the framework of Christian Creationism and the Anima Rationalis theory. However, his later work Deus Destroyed (Ha Daius 破提宇子), written after he had rejected Christianity, overturned his former claim by accepting the Neo-Confucian concept of Principle. Fabian’s works are a historical example showing the potential limits of a confrontational approach toward other religions.     

What Can Artificial Intelligence Learn from Wittgenstein＇s On Certainty？.

Meta-philosophically speaking, the philosophy of artificial intelligence （AI） is intended not only to explore the theoretical possibility of building ＂thinking machines,＂ but also to reveal philosophical implications of specific AI approaches. Wittgenstein＇s comments on the analytic/empirical dichotomy may offer inspirations for AI in the second sense. According to his ＂river metaphor＂ in On Certainty, the analytic/empirical boundary should be delimited in a way sensitive to specific contexts of practical reasoning. His proposal seems to suggest that any cognitive modeling project needs to render the system context-sensitive by avoiding representing large amounts of truisms in its cognitive processes, otherwise neither representational compactness nor computational efficiency can be achieved. In this article, different AI approaches （like the Common Sense Law of Inertia approach, the Bayesian approach and the connectionist approach） will be critically evaluated under the afore-mentioned Wittgensteinian criteria, followed by the author＇s own constructive suggestion on what AI needs to try to do in the near future.