Conceptual expansion and creative imagery as a function of psychoticism

The ability to be creative is often considered a unique characteristic of conscious beings and many efforts have been directed at demonstrating a relationship between creativity and the personality construct of psychoticism. The present study sought to investigate this link explicitly by focusing on discrete facets of creative cognition, namely the originality/novelty dimension and the practicality/usefulness dimension. Based on Eysenck's conceptualisation of psychoticism as being characterised by an overinclusive cognitive style, it was expected that higher levels of psychoticism would accompany a greater degree of conceptual expansion and elevated levels of originality in creative imagery, but would be unrelated to the practicality/usefulness of an idea. These hypotheses were confirmed in 80 healthy participants who were contrasted based on their EPQ psychoticism scale scores. Our findings suggest that the link between psychoticism and creativity is based on associative thinking and broader but weak top-down activation patterns rather than on goal-related thinking.     

Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery

When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.     

Age-related differences in memory as a function of imagery processing.

The effects of aging on imagery production and use--following the learning of concrete and abstract words--and their relations to subsequent memory performance were explored in 2 experiments. Both experiments demonstrated better free recall of concrete than of abstract words (the concreteness effect). Experiment 1 showed this superiority to be greater for young subjects only under explicit imagery instructions. Experiment 2 revealed that the advantage of concrete over abstract words reflects the use of differential imagery production. The results are discussed in terms of age differences in imagery utilization and the effects of visual processing on recall.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting and mental imagery

In the present article, we present four experiments in which we examined whether mental imagery can initiate retrieval-induced forgetting. Participants were presented with word pairs (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or narratives (Experiment 4) and then engaged in selective mental imagery about half of the details from half of the categories. The results indicated that mental imagery can produce the same pattern of impairment as retrieval practice (Experiment 1) and postevent questioning (Experiment 4). Additionally, mental imagery-invoked, retrievalinduced forgetting was found for category cued recall (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and cued recall (Experiment 2); it was found to dissipate across a 24-h delay, but only when there was no pre-delay test (Experiment 3). Such retrieval-induced forgetting was also found for imagining from the first-person and third-person perspectives (Experiment 4). From these findings, we suggest that the underlying retrieval processes behind mental imagery can initiate retrieval-induced forgetting. The findings are discussed in terms of inhibitory processes.     

The effects of healthy aging on mental imagery as revealed by egocentric and allocentric mental spatial transformations

Previous studies suggest that mental rotation can be accomplished by using different mental spatial transformations. When adopting the allocentric transformation, individuals imagine the stimulus rotation referring to its intrinsic coordinate frame, while when adopting the egocentric transformation they rely on multisensory and sensory-motor mechanisms. However, how these mental transformations evolve during healthy aging has received little attention. Here we investigated how visual, multisensory, and sensory-motor components of mental imagery change with normal aging. Fifteen elderly and 15 young participants were asked to perform two different laterality tasks within either an allocentric or an egocentric frame of reference. Participants had to judge either the handedness of a visual hand (egocentric task) or the location of a marker placed on the left or right side of the same visual hand (allocentric task). Both left and right hands were presented at various angular departures to the left, the right, or to the center of the screen. When performing the egocentric task, elderly participants were less accurate and slower for biomechanically awkward hand postures (i.e., lateral hand orientations). Their performance also decreased when stimuli were presented laterally. The findings revealed that healthy aging is associated with a specific degradation of sensory-motor mechanisms necessary to accomplish complex effector-centered mental transformations. Moreover, failure to find a difference in judging left or right hand laterality suggests that aging does not necessarily impair non-dominant hand sensory-motor programs.     

Spontaneous imagery scanning in mental extrapolation

We report an experiment that suggests a functional application of mental-image scanning. After subjects inspected a simple dot pattern, the pattern was removed, and they were then shown an arrow at an unexpected location. Their task was to judge as quickly as possible whether the arrow pointed at any of the dots in the previously observed pattern. Although the subjects were never instructed to form or scan mental images, most of them reported having done so in order to make their judgments, and their reaction times were directly proportional to the distances separating the dots and the arrows, as typically found in image-scanning experiments. Imagery scanning may therefore serve a useful function when one must judge spatial relations between the positions of remembered objects and newly specified locations.     

Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Effect of mental imagery on realizing affordances

Using a reaction time experiment, we examined whether imagining a response would lead to an increase in the frequency of its execution. During a pre-test and a post-test, participants had to respond as quickly as possible with either their left or their right hand, as they preferred, to the illumination of one of 17 target positions arrayed in front of them in a semicircle. Between these two phases, participants performed a practice condition. Each of 40 right-handed participants was assigned to one of four groups that differed in their practice condition: One group made only dominant-hand responses to all target locations, two imagery groups imagined dominant hand responses to all target locations, and the last group received a no-practice, control task. One imagery group received instructions emphasizing that imagery has a strong effect; the second group received instructions suggesting that imagery was not effective. The results showed an increased incidence of the practised response for both imagery groups during the post-test. No effect was found for the physical performance group and the control group. The change in performance for the imagery groups was not accompanied by a change in reaction time. The results are discussed in terms of imagining the realization of action possibilities and from a neuropsychological point of view.     

Neuroimaging of mental imagery: An introduction

Adaptive mechanisms to protect cognitive performance under stressors through compensation in energy investment have previously received much research attention. However, stressors have also often been found to substantially reduce both performance and investment. The mechanisms underlying this dual negative effect are still unclear. This study tested the hypothesis that stressors can immediately hamper performance, which in turn reduces energy investment in later phases. In an experiment (N=103), we compared control and stressor conditions (noise or time pressure), investigating the effects of stressors on performance and information-sampling investment (as behavioural measure of energy investment) in two phases of a judgement task. The results showed an instant negative effect of stressors on performance and a delayed negative effect on information-sampling investment. Furthermore, impaired initial performance predicted the decline in investment over time. Finally, the effects of stressors on investment decline were partially mediated through initial performance level. The present findings contribute to theories aiming to explain the relationship between hampered performance and motivational losses.     

Visual mental imagery influences attentional guidance in a visual-search task

Visual mental imagery resembles visual working memory (VWM). Because both visual mental imagery and VWM involve the representation and manipulation of visual information, it was hypothesized that they would exert similar effects on visual attention. Several previous studies have demonstrated that working-memory representations guide attention toward a memory-matching task-irrelevant stimulus during visual-search tasks. Therefore, mental imagery may also guide attention toward imagery-matching stimuli. In the present study, five experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of visual mental imagery on visual attention during a visual-search task. Participants were instructed to visualize a color or an object clearly associated with a specific color, after which they were asked to detect a colored target in the visual-search task. Reaction times for target detection were shorter when the color of the target matched the imagined color, and when the color of the target was similar to that strongly associated with the imagined object, than when the color of the target did not match that of the mental representation. This effect was not observed when participants were not instructed to imagine a color. These results suggest that similar to VWM, visual mental imagery guides attention toward imagery-matching stimuli.     

Visual versus kinesthetic mental imagery: Efficacy for the retention and transfer of a closed motor skill in young children

The main purposes of this study were (a) to compare the effects of mental imagery combined with physical practise and specific physical practise on the retention and transfer of a closed motor skill in young children; (b) to determine the mental imagery (visual vs. kinesthetic), which is the most efficient for retention and transfer of a closed motor skill; and (c) to verify the relationship between movement image vividness and motor performance. As for the secondary purpose, it was to compare the effects of gender on motor learning. Participants (n = 96) were selected from 3 primary schools. These participants were divided into 6 groups and submitted to different experimental conditions. The experimental task required the participants to throw, with the nondominant hand (left hand), a ball toward a target composed of 3 concentric circles. The results demonstrated that performance obtained by the mental imagery (visual or kinesthetic) combined with physical practise group was, during the retention phase, equivalent to that produced by the specific physical practise group but significantly superior during the transfer of closed motor skill. These results showed the potential benefits of mental imagery as a retention strategy intended for motor skills and performance enhancement. Such results could be explained by the similarity of 3 principal functional evidences shared by mental and physical practise: behavioural, central, and peripheral (as suggested by Holmes & Collins, 2001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Sex-related differences and visual-spatial mental imagery as factors affecting symbolic motor skill acquisition

The ability of males and females to use visual-spatial imagery as a facilitator of symbolic motor skill acquisition was investigated. Subjects, ordered by gender into control and mental imagery groups, performed 15 trials on a mirrored drawing task. The results indicated that, although both male and female mental imagery groups performed the task more skillfully than the control groups, the male mental imagery group scores over the early stages of performance were better as compared to the female mental imagery group scores. This difference was eradicated during the latter stages of performance. The findings, in addition to supporting the positive effects of mental imagery, lend support to the hypothesis that sex-related differences in selected visual-spatial tasks may be amendable through training followed by practice.