什么是“自然”?

对于多数中国人来说,自然概念可能是最没有问题的概念,有些人甚至都不会想到它是一个重要的哲学概念。即便对于从事哲学研究的人来说,很多人可能也把自然理解为物理世界或自然科学研究的对象的总称。人们未必会把前苏联的官方哲学看在眼里,但对自然的理解恐怕与     

语言表达方式对自然概念语义提取的影响

采用词和图形的快速分类的方法。研究了语言表达方式对自然概念语义提取的影响。结果表明,概念名称中有上属标记有利于自然概念的语义提取,词的熟悉性和概念距其上属的语义距离对自然概念的语义提取有重要影响。显示了与科学概念的语义提取不同的情况。根据这些结果。作者提出了概念结构和提取的混合模型。     

道家的自然概念——从自然与无的关系角度分析

理解道家自然概念的关键在于通过"自然"与"无"之间的张力关系来加以分析和阐释。实际上,"自然"与"无"两个概念既相辅相成,又相反相成:"自然"概念及其理论赋予了"物"的概念以深刻基础,从而深化了老子以来的"无物"思想,完善了道家哲学;"自然"概念及其理论更强化了道家哲学的"无名""无知"理论,进而揭示了思想世界的局限性;"自然"与"无为"概念是相互矛盾的,也是相互依赖的,而"自然"概念内蕴的"自为""自性""自发""自动"等意义皆可能违反"无为",因此重要的是保持"自然""无为"两者之间的必要张力,使之处于动态平衡。     

关于查尔默斯“语词之争”的评论

20世纪初期,西方哲学发生了语言转向,很多哲学家在不同深度上意识到应当把实质研究与概念考察区分开来.在语言转向过程中,很多哲学家把概念考察理解为:所谓哲学问题,其实是语义问题.这样一来,大量甚至所有哲学问题,可以靠查字典加以解决,或最多是要求我们编一本更完备的字典.查尔默斯所引的威廉·詹姆斯就是一例.本文通过分析进一步指出,查尔默斯本人也仍然是在这个方向上来处理语词之争与实质之争的.本文则主张,我们应当把概念考察理解为反省、考察、延伸论理词所体现的一般道理.     

古文"上"字的哲学蕴含——以《老子》文本为例

对语词的考察是哲学研究的基本任务之一,对中国早期哲学的研究,语词考察的重要性尤为显著.<老子>哲学中方位名词"上",以及以"上"所组词语的运用,表达了老子哲学深刻的形上意蕴,彰显出<老子>哲学不同于古代西方哲学的运思方法和独特的学术魅力.     

论经济哲学的部门学科性质

1　　经济哲学究竟属于什么学科 ,是经济哲学研究必须首先弄清的前提性问题。也只有合理地解决了这一前提性问题 ,才能够进一步确定经济哲学的对象和需要研究的问题。本文将通过对经济哲学的概念界定、特别是通过对哲学史所做工作的分析 ,对这一问题进行探讨。经济哲学的概念意     

结构和结构主义〔讨论会〕

东德罗斯托克威廉·皮克大学“哲学和自然科学联合会”于一九七六年四月一日至二日就上述议题举行会议。会议的目的是: 一、深入地讨论马克思列宁主义哲学关于结构的概念;阐述目前已经达到的研究水平;对马克思列宁主义哲学的范畴系统的发展以及这个系统在科学中的应用作出贡献; 二、考察从专门科学知识中,特别是从自然科学和技术科学、数学,甚至社会科学中产生的某些哲学结构概念的可靠性;     

马克思世界观哲学的实践论阐释与合法性辩护

考察世界观概念的起源与演变是深刻理解马克思世界观哲学的基本前提。在德国古典哲学语境中,世界观始终是关于实在世界的总体性认知,并因表达时代精神而对哲学、艺术等产生重要影响。马克思吸收了世界观概念的积极意义,建构了实践论的世界观哲学。这一世界观哲学具有超越于"德意志意识形态"的包容性、科学性、革命性、实践性。它也有别于海德格尔所批判的那种使主客二元对立、导致现代人无家可归的世界观哲学——主体形而上学。这种主体形而上学正是马克思的新世界观哲学所要批判、超越的对象。     

陈嘉映哲学思想专题讨论之二

<正>本期刊出的两篇论文是从第二届《哲学分析》论坛与会代表的发言中选出的。郁振华的"哲学之为穷理达道之学"一文把陈嘉映的哲学观概括为,"消极地说,哲学不是实证科学(广义的物理学),也不是语言学;积极地说,哲学致力于经验反省和概念考察,是一门通过穷理而达乎道的学问",并对整体性概念和     

对模态和可能世界概念的哲学考察

模态逻辑是现代逻辑的一个蓬勃发展的分支。它所取得的许多重要成果对逻辑的其他分支产生了深刻的影响,同时也为逻辑哲学和语言哲学研究提供了新课题。因此对它的基本概念和主要方法在理论上进行研究就十分必要了。目前国内涉及这方面的文献不多。本文仅就模态和可能世界这两个概念及其有关问题作哲学的考察。     

Yin and Yang,and the Hot and the Cold

Yin and Yang are important concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy.Western scholars have become more familiar with these two concepts recently,but for a long time almost no one considered comparing them with their own tradition such as the ancient Greek philosophy,and especially with the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Presocratic philosophy.In this paper,I make an attempt to do exactly that,and especially make a detailed comparison between the thoughts of two ancient thinkers:Laozi and Anaximander.I discuss the thought of Yin and Yang in Laozi-who was the earliest philosopher making use of the concepts Yin and Yang-to express his cosmological thought in ancient Chinese philosophy.Comparatively,I discuss the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Anaximander,the earlier among Presocratic philosophers referring to the Hot and the Cold as fundamental concepts used to establish his cosmological system.Through this comparison,I indicate that the similarity between ancient Chinese and Western traditions is far more significant than what people are used to imagining.     

A defence of Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation

Calls to decolonise the university and revise what we research and teach is a challenge that ought to be taken up by those working in African philosophy and philosophy in Africa, more generally. Often, the thought is that such decolonisation will involve a complete subversion, destruction or deconstruction of colonial attitudes, processes and concepts. A more moderate proposal for decolonisation of philosophy can be found, however, which is Kwasi Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation. In this paper, I defend the project from two categories of objection, what I call the decolonisation and methodology objections. I argue that the objections are misdirected and unfair because they fail to recognise the theoretical backing of Wiredu’s wider work. The critical reflection central to Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation can be a genuinely helpful and viable route to take when tackling the challenges of decolonising philosophy.     

Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry that if there is a plurality of concepts of explanation, one will not be able to normatively evaluate what counts as good explanation.     

The Square Circle

This article shows that there are square circles (or equivalently, round squares) in the sense that there are mathematical objects that are at the same time both perfectly circular and perfectly square. The philosophical significance of this is discussed, especially in view of philosophy's widespread use of “square circle” as a typical example of an impossibility. In particular, the focus is on what the existence of square circles means for the possibility of conceptual analysis, and more generally what we can learn about the nature of non‐formal concepts and their use in philosophy.     

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.     

Concepts and Intuitions: Adorno After the Linguistic Turn

Adorno's conception of conceptually articulated experience can be defended and made fruitful for a critical philosophy after the so-called linguistic turn. The aim is both to answer the criticisms raised by Jürgen Habermas and others that Adorno's philosophy remains bound by the premises of a subject-centred philosophy, and to criticize social-pragmatism from the vantage-point of Adorno's philosophy of language. It is shown that Adorno is committed to a picture of experience very much in line with the recent views of John McDowell, which extends the space of reasons beyond the space of concepts. Further, it is shown that non-inferential justification can be combined with an expressivist picture of judgment. Finally, it is argued that what is called the extended space of reasons is ultimately social; that representation, the aboutness of thought, serves expressive roles in a socially articulated space of reason-giving. The advantage of Adorno's position vis-à-vis a one-sided social-pragmatism consists in his defence of what is called subjective-material proprieties of judgment. Adorno's idea that the extended space of reasons implies the acknowledgement of what he refers to as the non-identical within conceptually articulated experience is thus reconstructed and defended. Such non-identity, it is claimed, is exhibited in successful art-works which thereby ought to be counted as forms of reasoning. On this basis, Adorno's philosophy acquires critical and normative significance after the linguistic turn.     

Ethics Naturalized: Feminism's Contribution to Moral Epistemology

A survey of Western feminist ethics over the past thirty years reveals considerable diversity; nonetheless, much recent work in this area is characterized by its adoption of a naturalistic approach. Such an approach is similar to that found in contemporary naturalized epistemology and philosophy of science, yet feminist naturalism has a unique focus. This paper explains what feminist naturalism can contribute to moral philosophy, both by critiquing moral concepts that obscure or rationalize women's subordination and by paying attention to real-life practices of moral inquiry, including those used by women.     

Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning?

The paper elucidates Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as devoid of theories or theses, comprehending this as an articulation of a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, it clarifies Wittgenstein's conception by using what he says about the concepts of meaning and language as an example and by developing an interpretation that purports to make plain that what Wittgenstein says about these issues does not constitute a philosophical thesis. Adopting Wittgenstein's approach, we can, arguably, have a richer view of meaning and language than a commitment to philosophical theses allows for. I conclude with remarks on the method of analysis in terms of necessary conditions.     

The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis

In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition‐driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not sufficiently well understood for this method to be dependable.