谬误与真理之门

“砰！砰！砰！”一个匆匆而来的路人急切地敲打着一扇神秘的门、不久．门开了。“你找准？”门里的人问。“我找真理。”路人答。“你找错了．我是谬误。”门里的人“砰”地一声把门关上了路人只好继续寻找。他超过很多河道、翻过很多座山、可就是迟迟找不到真理、后来他想一真理和评议既是一对冤家．那说不定谬误知道真理在哪儿。于是他重新找到谬误．谬误却说：“我也正要找它呢。”说毕又关上了门。路人不死心．转悠一圈后又继续敲开了谬误的门,可谬误留给他的却是一副冰冷的面孔。就在路人近乎绝望地在讲课门口徘徊的时候,不断的敲门…     

谬误与诡辩析论

本文分析论据不足、心理相关和语言歧义等类型的谬误与诡辩 ,认为谬误与诡辩有其产生的必然性 ,也有其在一定条件下的可避免性。     

善待谬误

有位名叫格德纳的加拿大人,他原是一家公司的普通员工。因一直没有得到晋升,一度思想消沉。有一天,他在复印机旁复印文件,因思想不集中,失手把一瓶液体泼洒在文件上,结果把文件搞得一塌糊涂。老板一气之下,借此把他解雇了。当他     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

非形式谬误

在日常语境中遇到的■,很少以严格、明确的形式出现,有些概念可能模棱两可,或者前提省略,或者真实性被认为十分明显以至不需要清楚地表示,带有省略命题的推论(常常是前提)是不全论证式,一些常见的非形式谬误或逻辑错误出现频繁,足应引起注意,它们往往表现为省略前提的(或虚假的)不全论证式: 1 诉诸个人 (直接攻击其人) 这类谬误出现在前提中,指攻击或贬低(直接攻击其人)一个人而不是指某个问题     

给谬误面子

对与错、好与坏、真理与谬误,并不总是截然对立、水火不容的。有则寓言说得很形象,说谬误邀真理去河边游泳,真理不知是计就跟着下水了,结果谬误跑上来穿上真理的衣服走了。真理被搞得很狼狈,它要么得一直躲在水里不出来,受冻感冒,伤及身体;要么只能赤身裸体地在人们面前出现,惹得四处大声惊叫;甚至还会招来围观殴打。     

热手谬误和赌徒谬误心理机制研究述评

在知觉随机序列时,人们倾向于把序列中实际上各自独立的相邻结果看作是存在正相关或负相关的,而出现热手谬误或赌徒谬误,又称为随机序列中的正负近因效应。有关这两谬误最早的心理机制的探索中,Kahneman 和Tversky采用局部代表性启发法对此进行了解释。但是这种解释也存在诸多不足,因此近期的一些模型（因果模型、Urn模型、记忆模型、适应模型和两阶段格式塔模型）分别从不同角度对两种谬误提出了新的解释。最后文章指出研究方法、神经机制、个体差异以及生活中的应用是该领域研究的几个未来发展方向     

谬误的本质:蒙塔古与桑塔亚那

威廉·P.蒙塔古(William Pepperell Montague)与乔治·桑塔亚那(George Santayana)分别是美国新实在论和批判的实在论学派的两个主要人物.本文旨在通过考察他们对谬误的本质的讨论,厘清新实在论的理论旨趣,并探究实在论作为一种认识论的可行性.本文首先讨论了蒙塔古的“生存对象的领域”(realm of subsistence)和桑塔亚那的“本质的领域”(realm of essence)这两个概念.这两个概念是他们思考谬误的本质的重要理论工具.在此之后,本文又对两位哲学家关于谬误的起源以及如何避免谬误的思考进行了深入的探讨.     

生活中的成功与挫折

某电影制片厂要在两位考生中通过考试选取一名见习演员。工作人员告诉他们：“一进这个房间,我们的考试就开始了。”甲被指定进甲室,乙被指定进乙室。     

国内谬误理论研究

谬误作为思维方面的错误,不仅涉及经验科学和理论科学的每个领域,而且存在于人们日常生活与科学研究的一切方面。因此,开展对谬误问题的系统研究是十分必要的。近年来,国内有的同志已经开始从认识论和逻辑学的角度对谬误问题进行思考与探讨,现将有关理论概述如下。一、谬误的定义“谬误”概念在不同的理论系统中可有不同的定义。目前学术界主要是从逻辑学和认识论这两个不同的角度下定义的。下面是几种常见的表述。     

Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy

Abstract. For many theologians and philosophers, scientism is among the greatest of intellectual sins. In its most commonly cited form, scientism consists in claiming that science is the only source of real knowledge and, therefore, that what science does not discover does not exist. Because the charge of scientism is frequently levied, it is important to be clear about what exactly is being claimed in its name. I argue that scientism can best be understood as a fallacy, specifically as a kind of category mistake. Being clear about this requires an examination of the relationship of scientism to the question of demarcation between science and nonscience, a question that has potential implications for theology.     

Representationalism and the Metonymic Fallacy

Representationalism in cognitive science holds that semantic meaning should be explained by representations in the mind or brain. In this paper it is argued that semantic meaning should instead be explained by an abstract theory of semantic machines -- machines with predicative capability. The concept of a semantic machine (like that of a Turing machine or of Dennett's intentional systems) is not a physical concept -- although it has physical implementations. The predicative competence of semantic machines is defined in terms of independent agreement alone (cf. independent, and yet synchronised, clocks). Abstract theories are analysed as systems of quasi-apriori rules for abstract predicates. A relatively limited number of such theories and a few fundamental dimensions (space, time, mass, etc.) are today assumed to exhaust physical reality. However, that assumption need not be in conflict with predicates that cannot be defined in physical terms – for instance the functional and intentional terms that are crucial for cognitive science.     

Frustration: Theory and practice

Frustration is often dismissed as a transient by-product of thwarted aspirations, a disruptive and uncivilized mark of Cain. Amsel’s work, however, shows the creative and enabling role that frustration can play in the behavior of organisms. The book epitomized here first clarifies the basic phenomenon and its causes, and then extends it by mapping its development, along with that of other behavioral markers, against the development of brain structures. One may take exception to the particulars: Are the chosen variables the best ones to measure? Is frustration an autonomous motive or is it the liberation of the arousal normally focused on the instrumental response? Is the best reading always given to the large and heterogeneous literature? But the whole of Amsel’s work transcends these particulars and exemplifies, as do few other curriculum vitae, the ideal of systematic scientific inquiry that is praised more often than practiced.     

Frustration and instrumentality of aggression

The influence of two different reinforcers of aggression was investigated: Frustration (intrinsic primary reinforcement) and instrumental value of aggression (extrinsic primary reinforcement). In the first part of the experiment frustration was manipulated on two levels by having the stooge interfere very often or seldom in the ?building a village' task of the subject. In the second part of the study the stooge had to judge distances in traffic while the subject was allowed to give him electrical shocks in order to startle and hinder the stooge in his estimation task. The aggression score of the subject was formed by the number and the intensity of the shocks delivered. Instrumentality of aggression was manipulated on two levels by indicating or not that the subjects could earn more money the more and stronger they shocked their partner. Confirming the predictions, significantly more aggression was expressed when this could lead to earning more money than in those conditions where this was not the case. Also confirming predictions, the impact of instrumentality on aggression was stronger than the influence of frustration. Frustration did not lead to a significant increase in the level of aggression.