Memory,Rite, and Tradition： A Comparative Confucian-Christian Literary Analysis

I The Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures speak often about the role ＂the past＂ plays in shaping individual and communal character, life, perception, morality and purpose. In both Christianity and classical Confucianism, memory, rite and tradition are each accorded a central place in preserving and interpreting the past as a dynamic force in the present. The first part of this paper studies points of thematic similarity in Christian and Confucian interpretation of memory, rite and tradition. In the second part of the paper, however, critical points of divergence are addressed; for behind the formal similarities lie deeper intellectual, relational and moral differences in understanding the nature and function of ＂the past＂ in determining both the present and the future. Comparative literary analysis provides a rich resource for contemporary application of the Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures to discussion of cultural memory and global harmony. The comparative reading of ＇texts＇ also provides an important point of access for understanding the role literature itself plays in determining the form, content and power of memory, ritual and tradition in both Confucianism and Christianity.     

The Meaning of Xing 形and Moral Transformation in Wuxing

The popular reading of xing yu nei 形於內 (being actualized from the internal) in Wuxing creates a predicament in the understanding of “xing 行 (behaviors)” which is not xing yu nei. As stated in Wuxing and other early Confucian texts, including The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, the Mencius and Xunzi, xing 形 is a process involving multidimensional content including not only deliberated decisions and actions, but also attitudes, facial expressions, and even the charisma that possesses power to transform the world. Xing 形 always operates in an effortless natural style, rather than under cognitive control. Xing yu nei signifies that virtues are possessed to a perfectly deep degree. Therefore, “not xing yu nei” does not mean that “behaviors” are forced by external pressure and thus hypocritical, but rather that although they also originate from internal virtues, the virtues in this case are not deep enough to enable multidimensional and natural manifestations. Xing 行, representing the way of the “human,” is the approach to and is on a continuum with “de zhi xing 德之行 (the behavior of Virtue),” which matches the way of Heaven. Shendu 慎 獨requires paying close attention to and regulating the intentions and emotions emerging at the heart/mind, which is the fundamental work when making the effort of “xing” towards “de zhi xing.”     

On Confucian Political Philosophy and Its Theory of Justice

Traditional Confucian political culture (including its concepts, systems, practices and folk customs) has a legacy that deserves careful reconsideration today. Its theories, institutions, and practices address the source, legitimacy, division and balance, and restriction of political power. Confucian politics is a type of “moral politics” which sticks to what ought to be and what is justifiable, and holds that political power comes from Heaven, mandate of Heaven or Dao of Heaven, which implies that justification and standards rest with the people referring to scholars peasants, workers and merchants. This type of justification is rooted in the public space and the autonomous strength of the people, and it finds guidance in the involvement, supervision, and criticism of the class of scholar-bureaucrats (shi 士). In this article, Western political philosophy will be taken as a frame of reference for evaluating Confucian conception of justice as well as Confucian ideas of distribution, fairness of opportunity, caring kindness for “the least advantaged,” and institutional construction. It will argue that the leading characteristic of Confucian political theory is that of “substantive justice.”     

The Tianzhu Shilu Revisited: China’s First Window into Western Scholasticism

On 29 September 1584, the first Catholic catechism was printed in China under the title The True Record of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shilu 天主實錄). Written primarily by the Jesuit missionary Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) with the assistance of at least two other Jesuits and Chinese interpreters, the catechism inaugurated the rich cultural exchange between China and Europe for which the Jesuit China mission would be renown. Despite the pioneering role of this catechism, it has been viewed for the most part by posterity as a pale forerunner of the later catechism by Ruggieri’s confrère, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shiyi 天主實義). This article attempts to skirt the anachronistic comparison with Ricci’s Tianzhu Shiyi by proposing the Tianzhu Shilu as an autonomous text expressive of a cogent strategy for tailoring Western scholasticism to the contingencies of the Chinese cultural context.     

Joseph Adler,Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi's Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi.

Reconstructing the Confucian Dao offers up the carefully tended fruits of Joseph Adler's research and reflections on a long standing mystery in the annals of Song dynasty (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism (lixue).The mystery surrounds a striking addition Zhu Xi (1130-1200) made to the Confucian Dao succession (Daotong),1 an addition that augured far-reaching consequences for Neo-Confucianism.It must be stressed that the Dao succession not only served to define the orthodox tradition but also underscored the religious dimension of Confucianism by honoring those masters whose teachings most perfectly clove to,and expressed what was deemed to be Confucianism's essence.2 In Confucian the Dao,Adler brings the implications of this religious dimension,and related practice,into play.Zhu Xi's striking addition was not just his inclusion of Zhou Dunyi (1017-73) in the Confucian Dao succession;it was his identification of Zhou as the progenitor of the Song rebirth of the Dao succession,nearly 1,500 years after the passing of its last classical participant,Mencius (372-289 BCE).     

BOOK REVIEW——Stephen C. Angle,Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy.

Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy can be regarded as a creative development and comprehensive expression of Stephen C. Angle＇s former works integrating Neo-Confucian tradition and contemporary ethical and political thought. He cites the idea of conservatism from Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi to propose his own idea that conservatism is rooted in creative practice. It is in the affirmation of basic Confucian values that he sets up his view of progress, which means growing ethically and making the world better （18-19）. In this light, Progressive Confucianism can be seen as a theory that interprets and conserves traditional Confucian values in agreement with contemporary demands. Thus it can be compared with Western ethics, especially with liberalism, which also emphasizes civic virtue and moral education. And so Progressive Confucianism aims at opening up dimensions like constitutionalism and democracy that accord with Western traditions while remaining consistent with Confucian ethics and rituals.     

A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

Between Mind and Trace — A Research into the Theories on Xin 心 (Mind) of Early Song Confucianism and Buddhism

From Han Yu’s yuan Dao 原道 (retracing the Dao) to Ouyang Xiu’s lun ben 论本 (discussing the root), the conflicts arising from Confucianists’ rejection of Buddhism were focused on one point, namely, the examination of zhongxin suo shou 中心所守 (something kept in mind). The attitude towards the distinction between mind and trace, and the proper approach to erase the gap between emptiness and being, as well as that between the expedient and the true, became the major concerns unavoidable for various thinkers to integrate the two teachings and to propel academic development. “To understand by mind” and “to blame for matter” were of crucial methodological significance for transcendence in both Confucianism and Buddhism. The arguments of Confucian scholars like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers on the identity of mind and trace and the unity of void and solid are mutually manifested. The same mind with the same principle means “mind is principle.” The “common axis of Confucianism and Buddhism” exists in the emphasis on mind beyond trace. The unification of mind and trace or the accordance of body and function has actually become the cardinal foundation for the possible mergence of the Three Teachings.     

The Consolations of Boethius

The paper considers the account of happiness given in Boethius＇s Consolations of Philosophy. This account claims that happiness requires security of possession, and argues from this requirement to the conclusion that worldly goods, which of their nature cannot be securely possessed, cannot provide happiness. This argument is shown to depend on assuming a life-driven account of human motivation, rather than a goods-driven account of human motivation. The life-driven account, according to which voluntary actions are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of a certain kind of life, is defended against the goods-driven account, according to which actions are motivated by the pursuit of goods the enjoyment of which can only be episodes in a human life. It is claimed that Boethius is right in holding a life-driven account, and that his account of happiness follows from it.     

Criticism of the Theory of Motivation

The theory of motivation is a theory which takes the executora＇s motivation as the basis of moral judgment. One presupposition of the theory is that motivation can be a common object of understanding. However, motivation exists only in the heart of the executor, and cannot be known exactly by others, so motivation cannot be perceived like a common object, and thus, logically, cannot be the basis of moral judgment. Even if the executor＇s motivation is accepted by others and turned into a common object, the motivation still cannot become the valid basis of a moral judgment. This is the dilemma of the theory of motivation. In practice, the dilemma appears as follows： if one insists on the theory of motivation, one can be led to the result that people do evil with good intentions. However, just because motivation cannot be the basis of moral judgment does not mean that motivation is of no significance. Good motivation is always better than evil motivation. Therefore, in moral education we should carry out motivation education and teach people to strive to have good motivations for their behavior. This is the value of motivation theory.     

Sign,Image and Language in The Book of Changes CYijing 易经）

It is challenging to estimate the degree to which the system of the Trigrams and Hexagrams in The Book of Changes （Yijing） had an impact on the whole history of Chinese thought. The universal paradigm from which it was derived formed the basis of a semiotic theory of evolution which, because of structural analogies, was applied to all fields and aspects of human life where decision making and action in correspondence with a cosmic principle was required. To achieve that goal, countless commentaries on and interpretations of the Yijing have been written. They can be divided into two schools. The first used the Yijing as a book for divination, in combination with manifestations of the universe and nature. The second interpreted it with a philosophical background, making it part of the tradition of Confucian thought. Modem scholars have also contributed some new approaches to the Yijing. My paper is based on the assumption that the Trigrams and Hexagrams of the Yijing cannot be understood in a purely representational way. They do not represent things apart from their relation to human needs or consciousness. Because of the co-determination of text and reader as a task without determinate end-points, it proves to be a unique case of effective-history. In the Yijing, there is no real line between culture and nature, sign/image/language and fact, the universe of semiosis and other universes. With its use of signs, images and language, the Yijing confirms that the universe of semiosis is the universe of heaven, earth and man. Against this background, my explanations will not only focus on the Trigrams and Hexagrams. My paper will also deal with the following topics： （1） interpenetration of linguistic meaning and objective reality and （2） the social nature of verbal or literary expression.     

Joining the Transformation of Nature—The Post-Natural and Confucian Perspective on Earth Stewardship in the Anthropocene

The emergence of the Anthropocene creates a new set of conditions for understanding the relationship between human power and the natural world. These conditions include an increasingly humanized and de-natured natural world, and greater responsibilities of stewardship for human beings. In current literature, there are diverse views on the meaning of the Anthropocene and the role of modern technology in future earth stewardship. Post-natural thought regards the Anthropocene as representing the end of nature, and thus appeals to disenchantment with respect to the idea that nature is an external moral norm. Although this approach correctly addresses the significance of locality and the mutuality between humans and the environment, it fails to provide us with adequate normative boundaries for preventing the endless artificialization of nature. Alternatively, this article defends the position that Confucianism is a more plausible philosophical ground for earth stewardship in the context of the Anthropocene. The Confucian approach is an inclusive humanism which is established on the cosmological ideal of realising the virtue of shengsheng 生生 (life generation) in all beings. Moreover, Confucian ethics draw much attention to the self-regulation of human beings as virtuous persons. This is indeed what is needed in the age of the Anthropocene.     

An Eco-Ethical Interpretation of Confucian Tianren Heyi

Opposed to a commonly held interpretation that Confucian discourse regarding tianren heyi (天人合一) is simply a human-centred philosophical fusion of humanity and nature, this article argues that the Confucian discourse is in fact composed of two contradictory orientations, one ren-centred (roughly equivalent to “anthropocentric”) and the other tian-centred (“nature-centric” in a specific sense), which generally correspond to the two major camps of environmental philosophy in the West in the twentieth century. It will be further argued that the two orientations of the Confucian view have different yet related functions with regard to environmental protection and conservation: the tian-centred understanding establishes a metaphysical and religious framework for Confucian eco-ethical norms, in which ecological prohibitions and policies are built into the political and religious infrastructure, while the ren-centred orientation adds practical values and meanings to the ontological care of the human relation to the environment. In modern times, the two orientations of Confucian eco-ethics are under further development, moving away from being dualistic philosophies and converging on the eco-ethical way of life. Contemporary Confucians are investigating how the two traditional “orientations” can be unified as one holistic perspective which could provide theoretical and practical guidance for our understanding of the human position in the universe, the harmony between humans and nature, and the value of environmental protection and conservation.     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism

Recently, Sean Cordell has raised a problem for Aristotelians who seriously consider social roles: When the demands of the role conflict with the demands of morality, which norms ought one follow? However, this problem, which I call the role dilemma, is not specific to Aristotelians. Classical Confucians face a similar problem. How do Confucians resolve conflicts between the demands of humaneness (ren 仁) and the demands of social roles and the social norms (li 礼) that govern these roles? Confucians who favor humaneness, maintaining that other demands are defeasible, offer an externalism about roles. This response is similar to the Aristotelian argument that the demands of human excellence trump other demands. Consequently, Confucian externalism collapses into a virtue ethic. Confucians who favor the demands of li offer an internalism about roles. However, internalism is undesirable because it implies relativism and condones oppressive social institutions. The Confucian role ethicist must offer a tenable solution that steers clear of the pitfalls of both externalism and internalism. Although I do not advance a solution here, I believe a tenable alternative exists. The goals of this paper, instead, are to demonstrate that classical Confucians face the role dilemma and to initiate a discussion about the theoretical apparatus required of Confucian role ethics in order to distinguish it from other ethical theories. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about additional questions and problems that ought to be addressed.     

Developing Ethical Leadership in China: The Value of Confucian Virtue Ethics

Most research into ethical leadership depends on Western corporate experience, however current research findings may not fit the Chinese context. As a result, it is necessary to appeal to indigenous and traditional Chinese sources of wisdom when defining and evaluating ethical leadership in China. Both rule-following ethics and instrumental approaches, which are mainly used in recent empirical studies about ethical leadership, cannot enable people to have inner motivation to behave ethically. Accordingly, this article intends to establish an ethical leadership model in China by appealing to Confucian virtue ethics. A Confucian ethical leader possesses benevolence (ren 仁) inside and treats others in a proper way according to ritual and rites (li 禮). He/she makes self-cultivation as the first priority and is a virtuous role model, influencing others in a natural way by of his/her moral charisma. For such a person, economic profitableness is not a primary concern, where instead the goals, strategies and practices of his/her organization are defined by the principle of righteousness (yi 義).     

孟子的德性论

Most of the moral entries in ethics of Mencius do not only refer to virtue (德性) that of inherent quality,but also refer to virtuous conduct (德行).In fact,the concept of moral entries (德目) in classic Confucianism often refers to virtuous conduct,virtue,principal,etc.Thus the concept of virtuous topics in classic Confucianism cannot be interpreted only as virtue and that is where careful analysis is needed.The concepts of Ren and Yi (仁义) and etc.in Mencius’philosophy still have the meaning of virtuous conduct,...