生命自主:当代生命伦理学的终极价值追求

1　生命自主的含义人的生命 ,首先表现为一种自然存在形式和物质复合体 ,也就是指人的自然生命。但是 ,人之为人 ,不在于他有自然生命 ,而在于他还有着特定的人格 ,在于他的“价值生命”。“价值生命”作为对自然生命的否定 ,是人的自为之有的存在状态。在生命的类化过程中 ,人扬弃的是自然生命的自在性 ,超越的是生命的内在性和主观性 ,获得的是一个新的以意识自觉为前提的个体性的生命 ,即价值生命的创生。按照马克思的说法 ,“动物和它的生命活动是直接同一的。人则使自己的生命活动本身变成自己的意志和意识的对象。正是这一有意识的生…     

国际生命伦理学和伦理学相对主义

国际生命伦理学和伦理学相对主义美国威斯康星大学教授ＤａｎｉｅｌＷｉｋｌｅｒ国际生命伦理学会会长东亚生命伦理学学术会议（ＥＡＣＢ’９５）召集人邱教授和坂本教授邀请我谈谈伦理学和文化相对主义与国际生命伦理学的关系。这是一项困难的任务,一项超过我个人作为生...     

人本主义与生命伦理学

任何社会、任何历史阶段 ,人性论都是医学伦理观建立的基础 ,这应该是毋庸置疑的。我国古代医学伦理观的基础是儒家的性善论 ,西方近代医学伦理观的基础是西方近代人性论 ,现代西方生命伦理学的基础就是现代西方人本主义文化思想。因为任何时代的医学家、伦理学家都是在受一定社会文化环境的影响而成长起来的 ,他们对医德伦理问题的思考或多或少受当时人文文化的熏陶 ,而有其所处时代的文化烙印。正如西方著名文化学学者兰德曼所说 :任何时代、任何人都不可能不受其文化环境的影响 ,“文化如同人体内的血管系统是属于人的一部分 ,而血管里流…     

全球生命伦理学

探讨生命伦理学的起源,并阐述了不同理论支持者的观点,发现无论准确的生命伦理学历史起源是什么,目前生命伦理学已经变成了一种真正的全球现象。它在全世界具有重要的意义,因为人类不仅仅是欧洲人或亚洲人,也是世界公民和一个全球道德共同体的成员。生命伦理学对任何地方、任何人都是重要的,并不是因为它是"拿来"的,而是因为它提供了一个普遍的框架去解释和管理正在经历的变化,这个变化包括了目前所有的国家和文化。然而,这个框架的解释和应用必须依据本土环境。因此,现代生命伦理学具有全球性和本土特征的特点。     

关注焦点:女性主义伦理学、发展理论与人权

从两个方面探讨--强调全球性的关注和女性主义伦理学的交叉:人权及发展理论.首先,对以权利为基础的理论进行批评.其次,在人权运动中,努力考虑全球的健康问题.尔后,采纳可选择的范例是,寻求结合发展和人权理论形成一个全球伦理.最后,对于全球女性主义伦理学提出一个可选择的框架,对于实践有更充分的应答,以加强所有人享受健康及生育的能力.     

医学伦理学与生命伦理学的联系与区别

医学伦理学和生命伦理学有共同的哲学伦理学和医学的学科基因。二者都遵守共同的伦理原理和原则,但是它们实施原理原则的方法和路径却有区别。医学伦理学构建了常态下的医德原则和规范体系。在经常的医疗卫生活动中医务人员会\"以义导利\"。当医务人员的选择面临价值冲突时,会按照伦理学原则提出的价值顺位安排医疗卫生行为的优先顺位。生命伦理学面对的常常是高科技带来的道德冲突,没有现成的价值顺位可以套用。在生命伦理学的许多具体案例中,人们只能通过协商讨论来寻求方案,达成共识。二者都是哲学伦理学和医学的子集,两者之间有交集,但是侧重不同。     

医学伦理学与生命伦理学——《中国医学伦理学辞典》条目选载之三

1　医学伦理学 (ｍｅｄｉｃａｌｅｔｈｉｃｓ)对医学伦理学的界定直接与对生命伦理学的界定有关 ,即医学伦理学与生命伦理学是谁包括谁亦或是两个各自独立的学科 ?ＷａｒｒｅｎＲｅｉｃｈ在 1971年准备编写《生命伦理学百科全书》时 ,开始时用的《医学伦理学百科全书》名称 ,可见 ,医学伦理学和生命伦理学已是两个不同的概念。ＤａｎｉｅｌＣａｌｌａｈａｎ在《生命伦理学百科全书》第二版中的生命伦理学条目中 ,把医学伦理学与生命伦理学相比 ,认为“医学伦理学是古老的学科 ,代表很窄的范围 ,只强调医生的道德义务和医患关系 ,虽然在现今…     

生命伦理学与医学人文学的关系

生命伦理学的界线并不十分清楚,人们习惯上将生命伦理学看做应用的规范伦理学,并看做医学人文学的组成部分.其实,生命伦理学与医学人文学有着内在的深刻联系.除了道德哲学,医学人文学是生命伦理学理论与实践的基础,具体说,也是作为描述生命伦理学的存在形态.     

生命伦理学前沿问题综述

近年来，伴随着生命科学技术的进步，生命伦理学也蓬勃发展，研究者对生命伦理学问题有了更多的思考和讨论。下面我们将从三个方面对此予以梳理和总结。     

人的尊严与生命伦理

“尊严”是频繁出现在生命伦理学中的一个概念,但关国学者麦克琳却在最近认为,尊严在生命伦理学中是个无用的概念,可以毫无损失地用其它概念,比如尊重人的自主性概念所代替。反驳了麦克琳的观点,定义了尊严的含义,认为生命伦理学的使命就是在当代生命科技高度发达的情况下如何尊重和保护人的尊严。     

History, Human Rights, and Globalization

An illustrative comparison of human rights in 1948 and the contemporary period, attempting to gauge the impact of globalization on changes in the content of human rights (e.g., collective rights, women's rights, right to a healthy environment), major abusers and guarantors of human rights (e.g., state actors, transnational corporations, social movements), and alternative justifications of human rights (e.g., pragmatic agreement, moral intuitionism, overlapping consensus, cross‐cultural dialogue).     

The Moral Foundations of Human Rights Attitudes

Human rights are claimed to be innate and based on moral principles. Human rights attitudes have been shown to be related to political ideology, but there have been few studies investigating their relationship with morality. Using moral foundations theory, we examine whether morals can predict human rights attitudes across two studies. The first study used questionnaires to show that human rights are based exclusively on individualizing moral foundations; however, increases in individualizing and decreases in binding foundations predict increases in human rights endorsement. Moral foundations also mediated the relationship between political identification and human rights. Both individualizing and binding foundations performed a role in explaining the lower endorsement of human rights by conservatives as compared to liberals. The second study used textual analysis of newspaper articles to show that human-rights-related articles contained more moral language than other articles, in particular for the individualizing foundations. Conservative newspapers had a greater use of binding foundations in human rights articles than liberal newspapers.     

Asylum Seekers and Human Rights

Asylum seekers, by their very circumstances, test our common assumptions and practice in relation to human rights. The treatment of asylum seekers in many European countries has become harsher, more restrictive and less tolerant in recent years, raising questions about the violation of their rights. The article examines the bases of the rights that asylum seekers do have and whether these are best supported as human rights or more limited rights that attach to the place of their temporary residence and to obligations made by their country of temporary residence. Given the propensity of receiving countries to afford increasingly limited rights, the article identifies a limited set of rights that should take priority in a hierarchy of rights and which might claim widespread acceptance as those which asylum seekers must enjoy. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

探析美国国家生命伦理学委员会--历史沿革及启示

在一个没有单一国教或价值权威能全盘解决科技政策与价值问题的多元社会中,由政府设置公共论坛性质的政策咨询委员会,是一项值得采纳的作法.美国先后设立过6个国家生命伦理学委员会,探析它们的建立与变迁,可以为我国类似组织提供参考.     

Welfare Rights and Conflicts of Rights

The fact that welfare rights – rights to food, shelter and medical care – will conflict with one another is often taken to be good reason to exclude welfare rights from the catalogue of genuine rights. Rather than respond to this objection by pointing out that all rights conflict, welfare rights proponents need to take the conflicts objection seriously. The existence of potentially conflicting and more weighty normative considerations counts against a claim’s status as a genuine right. To think otherwise would be to threaten the peremptory force – and hence the analytical integrity – of rights. The conflicts objection is made more pressing once we have conceded that welfare rights give people entitlements to what are potentially scarce goods. I argue that welfare rights can survive the conflicts objection if, and only if, we take scarcity into account in the framing of a given welfare right. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop in Oxford and the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress 2006 at York University. I am grateful to Adam Swift, David Miller, Idil Boran, Sarah McCallum and two anonymous referees for their comments, and to the Economic and Social Research Council for research funding.     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Toward the 'Rights of the Poor' Human Rights in Liberation Theology

In this article, the author traces the response of liberation theologians to human rights initiatives through three distinct stages over the past thirty years: from an initial avoidance of the concept, to an early critique, and then to a nuanced theological appropriation. He contends that liberation theology brings a thoroughgoing concern for the poor and an innovative methodology of historicization to the discussion of human rights. In clarifying the treatment of human rights within a specific religious movement, the author also addresses larger questions about the specific role of human rights language. To this end, the article shows how liberation theologians have grappled concretely with the divisions among different 'generations' of rights, various rights discourses, and diverse options for rights advocacy.     

生命伦理学的知识场域与现象学问题

生命伦理学还不是一个成熟的学科,研究者还要做许多重要的工作。目前,生命伦理学研究中首要的是对相关知识、基本概念、语词的统一,诸如对生命、医学、疾病、死亡等确立生命伦理语境下的认知,是一项重要的任务。应该挖掘所有人类的理性遗产和文化资源,建立和构建生命伦理学理论框架和体系,从而解决对具体生命伦理问题和现象评价的困难。生命伦理学存在一个多维的知识场域,揭示、解释和勾绘这个场域,对生命伦理学的学科建设具有重要意义。