恐惧管理对道德五基准及道德判断的影响

本研究探讨恐惧管理理论对道德五种基本准则以及道德判断的影响。85名被试随机分配到实验组与控制组。全部被试首先完成道德五基准问卷。实验组被试接受死亡凸显提示后观看短片并完成一系列道德两难问题的判断;控制组接受一般负性事件提示。研究结果显示,相对于控制组而言,实验组被试倾向于作出直觉而非理性判断,并且死亡凸显对道德直觉判断的影响受到厌恶情绪的中介作用。同时,当故事情节发生转换时,实验组被试倾向于作出与原有道德直觉规范相一致的道德判断。本研究从恐惧管理理论出发,为道德判断的情理之争提供了启示。     

厌恶情绪影响道德判断的发展研究

厌恶情绪的产生是为了回避潜在的病菌的威胁。研究发现,相比中性情绪状态下,厌恶情绪让人们更反对违背道德的行为,认为这些行为更错。目前,对于厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展还没有相关的研究。本实验以小学一年级,四年级及成人为研究对象来考察厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展。实验中被试被随机分入厌恶启动组和控制组,完成厌恶情绪任务和行为的道德判断任务。研究结果显示,在启动厌恶情绪之后,四年级和成人被试对道德违背行为的错误程度判断更为严格,同时四年级被试对行为的回避程度更高。一年级被试在厌恶情绪和控制条件下道德判断差异不显著。研究结果说明厌恶情绪对道德判断的影响是从无到有逐渐发展的。     

从具身视角看道德判断

道德判断是个体对于某类行为的善恶好坏和是非对错所进行的评价及判断。随着具身认知理论的兴起, 道德判断的具身研究随之展开。道德判断具身性的研究主要围绕身体清洁、厌恶, 身体温度及身体动作这3个维度展开。从皮亚杰及维果茨基的心理发展观, 概念隐喻理论和进化心理学3个角度对道德判断具身效应进行了理论解释和探讨。考虑到身体变量会通过情绪、认知因素进而影响道德判断, 今后具身认知视角下的道德判断应与道德判断中已有的理论进行整合, 同时对其与道德直觉的关系需要深入探讨, 并需进一步考察具身效应发生的时效性和动态性问题, 探讨道德判断具身效应的调节变量及个体差异, 同时要对道德判断具身效应进行跨文化比较。     

直觉还是推理,道德判断如何形成?

道德判断形成的机制一直存在争议,许多研究者通过实证研究来探索诸因素对道德判断的影响,这有助于理清不同因素的作用,但却难以构建道德判断形成的理论框架。文章系统性地回顾和总结了道德判断形成的五个经典理论模型及其相关理论,并结合实证研究的成果梳理了道德判断形成中理性、情绪、认知、直觉和推理之间的关系。基于此,构建了以直觉和推理为基本路径,基于规则的认知和情绪为调节因素的道德判断形成的理论框架。现有的理论模型和实证研究在该框架下均可以的得到较好的解释。同时,根据该框架,建议未来的实证研究中应当注重对影响因素的分类以及对实验情景的控制。     

心真的会“软”吗?软硬感受与语义改变道德判断

近年来诸多研究发现,物理变量对心理变量尤其是道德会产生影响,而其机制通常是具身认知与隐喻语言两种。本研究意在通过软硬的具身感受以及软硬的隐喻式意义联系来探讨它对于道德判断的影响。实验一通过操纵被试的软硬身体感受,发现感受到软的被试会比感受到硬的被试更倾向于作出义务论判断。而实验二通过启动被试的软硬语义联接,发现在启动了软的意义之后,对比与启动了硬的意义来说,被试体验到了更少的厌恶情绪,并对同样的道德错误表现得更宽容。这表明软与硬这对物理变量在具身认知与隐喻语言两种机制上都对道德判断起到了影响。     

道德直觉加工机制的理论构想

认知和情绪因素在道德判断中的作用机制是社会认知神经科学研究中最具争议的热点问题之一。本文认为, 人类拥有一种普遍性的道德直觉, 它是一种可能同时包含道德知识和情绪情感的自动化加工系统, 决定人们对一个道德违反情境作出快速的判断。据此, 本文就如何深入揭示道德直觉的加工机制提出了研究构想, 研究将首先采用经颅磁刺激技术, 探索当认知功能受抑制后人们的道德加工的特点, 初步探索道德直觉存在的可能性; 然后采用事件相关电位技术, 从外显和内隐两个维度上探讨道德直觉的时程加工机制; 最后采用侧向化运动准备电位指标, 进一步探索道德直觉和基本厌恶情绪的分离。     

不同情境中情绪预期对青少年道德决策的影响

为考察道德情绪对道德决策的影响,研究以123名13岁和16岁的青少年为被试,采用2(年龄：13岁、16岁)×2(情境类型：亲社会、反社会)×2(情绪预期：道德定向、自利定向)的混合实验设计,考察了在不同的情境中和不同定向的情绪预期下青少年的道德决策情况。结果表明,年龄和情境类型的交互效应显著,反社会情境中16岁青少年比13岁青少年更倾向于判断自己会做出道德行为,亲社会情境中两个年龄组的道德决策判断无显著差异。情境类型和情绪预期的交互作用也显著。反社会情境中,青少年在自利定向情绪预期下判断自己会做出道德行为的可能性显著大于道德定向情绪预期;亲社会情境中,两种预期下青少年的道德决策判断不存在显著差异。结果说明,道德情绪会影响青少年的道德决策,在不同的情境中对道德决策的影响不同。     

核心厌恶与道德厌恶唤醒与适应的特异性：来自主观情绪体验和自主神经活动的证据

不同诱发物引发的厌恶情绪是否具有同质性目前存在争论。研究选择核心厌恶和道德厌恶图片为实验材料,以女大学生为被试,考察情绪诱发和适应阶段的主观情绪体验和自主神经活动变化。结果表明,（1）核心厌恶情绪下个体心率下降、心率变异性HF显著升高,在情绪主观体验和生理唤醒上出现适应性反应,表现为随刺激反复出现,厌恶反应减少;（2）道德厌恶下个体心率显著上升,没有出现情绪适应性反应。研究结果支持了核心厌恶和道德厌恶情绪的特异性观点。     

道德直觉合乎道义却不客观

面对道德困境, 道德直觉倾向于促使人们做出道义论的判断。但是, 道德直觉易受情绪因素影响, 具有较强的主观性。道德直觉警惕有意图地使用个人力量造成的伤害, 却会接受由非个人力量或连带作用引发的伤害。“模块近视假说”认为, 大脑中存在一个预警系统, 能快速地对主动伤害的想法发出情绪警报。但该系统的审查机制是一种简单的“单通道”加工, 这种加工局限使连带作用造成的伤害避开了审查机制的监控。道德直觉的不客观提示, 面对现实生活中的道德争议, 不应该仅听凭直觉作为行动的依据。     

道德概念的黑白隐喻表征及其对道德认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法在不同水平上考察道德概念的黑白隐喻表征, 探讨了黑白视知觉对道德认知的影响。实验1a发现, 在词汇选择任务中被试倾向于判断白色希腊文词汇具有道德意义, 判断黑色希腊文词汇具有不道德意义。实验1b通过词性判断任务表明, 当道德词以白色呈现、不道德词以黑色呈现时被试的判断反应更快。实验2显示, 当将道德两难故事呈现在黑色背景上时, 相比于呈现在白色背景上, 被试会在道德评判任务中将故事中人物的行为判断为更加不道德。实验3通过情境实验发现, 相比明亮环境, 在黑暗环境中完成实验的被试会更倾向于认为他人会不公正地对待自己。研究证明, 黑白颜色概念与道德概念的隐喻联结存在心理现实性, 黑白颜色刺激知觉会对道德判断产生影响作用, 且环境的亮度也会影响到人们对道德相关问题的认知判断。     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

Culture and the quest for universal principles in moral reasoning

The importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on rapid, intuitive judgments and see justifications as more or less irrelevant to moral cognition. Despite this dramatic shift, analyses of culture and moral decision-making have largely been framed as a quest for and test of universal principles of moral judgment. In this review, we discuss challenges that remain in trying to understand crosscultural variability in moral values and the processes that underlie moral cognition. We suggest that the universalist framework may lead to an underestimation of the role of culture in moral reasoning. Although the field has made great strides in incorporating more and more cultural perspectives in order to understand moral cognition, theories of moral reasoning still do not allow for substantial variation in how people might conceptualize the domain of the moral. The processes that underlie moral cognition may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play different roles in different cultures. We end our review with a discussion of work that remains to be done to understand cultural variation in the moral domain.     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

The response model of moral disgust

The philosophical debate over disgust and its role in moral discourse has focused on disgust’s epistemic status: can disgust justify judgments of moral wrongness? Or is it misplaced in the moral domain—irrelevant at best, positively distorting at worst? Correspondingly, empirical research into disgust has focused on its role as a cause or amplifier of moral judgment, seeking to establish how and when disgust either causes us to morally condemn actions, or strengthens our pre-existing tendencies to condemn certain actions. Both of these approaches to disgust are based on a set of assumptions that I call, in what follows, the evidential model of disgust. This paper proposes an alternative model, which I call the response model. Instead of looking at disgust as a cause and justification of judgments of moral wrongness, I will argue that disgust is better understood as a response to wrongness. More precisely, I argue that disgust is a response to norm violations, and that it is (sometimes) a fitting response insofar as norm violations are potentially contagious and therefore pose a threat to the stability and maintenance of norms.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

The influence of war on moral judgments about harm

How does war influence moral judgments about harm? While the general rule is “thou shalt not kill,” war appears to provide an exception to the moral prohibition on intentional harm. In three studies (n = 263, n = 557, n = 793), we quantify the difference in moral judgments across peace and war contexts, and explore two possible explanations for the difference. The findings demonstrate that third-party observers judge a trade-off of one life for five as more morally acceptable in war than in peace, especially if the one person is from an outgroup of the person making the trade-off. In addition, the robust difference in moral judgments across “switch” and “footbridge” trolley problems is attenuated in war compared to in peace. The present studies have implications for moral psychology researchers who use war-based scenarios to study broader cognitive or affective processes. If the war context changes judgments of moral scenarios by triggering group-based reasoning or altering the perceived structure of the moral event, using such scenarios to make decontextualized claims about moral judgment may not be warranted.