共查询到17条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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道德相对主义又称伦理相对主义,它既是人类道德认识中存在的一种独特现象,又是现实的人类道德生活中的一种行为方式或实践。道德相对主义的存在具有多重合理性,包括社会(实践的、生活的)层面的存在合理性和认识论层面的存在合理性以及价值合理性。从历史和现实来看,道德相对主义所面对的挑战来自两个方面,一个是来自外部的道德绝对主义的挑战,一个是来自其内部的极端的道德相对主义的挑战。道德相对主义在道德多元与道德一元的关系问题、道德工具论与道德目的论的关系问题、道德策略灵活性与道德原则坚定性的关系问题上将激励我们的理论思考。 相似文献
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选取259名4~7岁儿童,考察了其在不同道德情境中的道德情绪判断及归因模式的发展状况.结果显示:情境类型对儿童对行为者的道德情绪判断及归因具有重要影响.在不履行亲社会行为和反社会行为失败情境中,存在与反社会及亲社会情境中不同的情绪判断模式.儿童道德情绪判断归因模式的发展是以"结果定向--道德定向"为主线并整合多种定向,不履行亲社会行为情境中出现了责任定向,反社会及反社会行为失败情境中出现了弥补和掩饰定向. 相似文献
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儿童道德情绪判断及归因模式的实验研究 总被引:12,自引:5,他引:12
运用故事情境的临床访谈方法,本研究考察了4、6、8岁儿童在不同侵犯程度道德情境中的道德情绪判断及归因模式,研究结果表明:(1)儿童对行业者的道德情绪判断经由积极向消极发展.其归因模式为“个人定向一外部惩罚定向一道德定向”;(2)幼儿在道德情境中的观点采择能力受制于其发展水平,4岁儿童在冲突性情境中尚难以区分故事中的行为者与自己作为行为者在情绪体验上的差异;(3)在幼儿道德发展过程中,“快乐的损人者”预期是一种比较普遍性的现象,随着儿童年龄的增长,这一现象逐渐减弱;(4)道德情境的侵犯程度并不影响儿童的判断和归因。 相似文献
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道德判断的社会直觉模型述评 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
传统的理性主义模型认为,道德判断是一系列理性推理的结果;而当前的社会直觉模型认为,道德判断包括直觉系统和推理系统两种加工,很多时候人们的道德判断更多的是一种直觉和情感的结果。近期神经心理学研究的一些成果证实了社会直觉模型的理念。 相似文献
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厌恶与其他消极情绪存在差异, 不同类型的厌恶也不完全相同。可以采用不同的方法来诱发消费者的不同类型的厌恶。产品与服务、宣传、组织行为等均可能导致消费者产生不同类型的厌恶。不同类型的厌恶又会影响消费者行为, 如产品评价、购买意向、支付意愿、延迟决策、口碑、产品消费等。未来可以对厌恶与其他消极情绪对消费者行为影响的差异、不同类型的厌恶对消费者行为影响的差异、厌恶的前因变量与结果变量进行更深入的探索。 相似文献
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Michael Wreen 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(3):361-376
A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (e) moral reasoning is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first defines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length. 相似文献
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Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be. 相似文献
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William H. B. McAuliffe 《Thinking & reasoning》2019,25(2):207-230
The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments. 相似文献
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Jeremy Wyatt 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2018,61(3):252-280
Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste (PPT) have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism (also called realism or invariantism) due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism. 相似文献