Prolegomena to any Future History of Analytic Philosophy

Abstract: The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory.     

Disputes over Philosophical Views in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and Development of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy; that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings, exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people. Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1     

Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise.     

One hundred and fifty years of philosophy

Looking back from 2049 over one-hundred and fifty years of philosophy, a student's essay reveals what became of rival strands in Western philosophy – with a sidelong glance at the special Topoi issue on the theme “Philosophy: What is to be Done?” that was published almost half a century earlier.     

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?

Abstract: This article first surveys the established views on Wittgenstein's relation to analytic philosophy. Next it distinguishes among different ways of defining analytic philosophy—topical, doctrinal, methodological, stylistic, historical, and the idea that it is a family‐resemblance concept. It argues that while certain stylistic features are important, the historical and the family‐resemblance conceptions are the most auspicious, especially in combination. The answer to the title question is given in section 3. Contrary to currently popular “irrationalist” interpretations, Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher in all phases of his career, albeit an exceedingly exotic one whose style transcends the limits of academic philosophy in general. On the historical understanding he qualifies because he was influenced by and in turn influenced mainly analytic philosophers. On the family‐resemblance conception he qualifies both because he developed and employed logico‐linguistic analysis and because he initiated the linguistic turn and the distinction between philosophy and science that characterizes one important strand in analytic philosophy.     

The dissemination and research of Laszlo's systems philosophy in China

Since the 1980s, the so‐called “new six‐theory” (Dissipative structure theory, Synergetics theory, Catastrophe theory, Chaos theory, Fractal theory, and Hypercycle theory), different from the traditional “systems theory,” “information theory,” and “cybernetics theory” (the “old three theory") has been introduced into China. With it, Laszlo's systems philosophy has been given close attention by Chinese scholars. The main elements of this work are analyzed in terms of the publication and research of Laszlo's work on systems philosophy, and more specifically on systems philosophy and the theory of knowledge, systems philosophy and general evolution theory, systems philosophy and the theory of value, and systems philosophy and metaphysics.     

医学哲学课程具身性教学模式探索

具身教学与离身教学共轭以提升教学质量是医学哲学教学改革创新举措。医学哲学课程的教学目标要实现由“重心”到“重身”的转向,教学理念要实现由“离身”到“具身”的进步,教学方法要实现由“宣教”到“体悟”的迁移。医学哲学课程具身性教学模式是医学哲学教学目标设置、教学理念反思和教学方法设计共轭的简约图式。其中回归身体是医学哲学教学理念反思的精髓;教学方法设计包括具身情境感受法、具身情绪体验法、具身认知体悟法、身体主体共轭法。