社会责任感调节群际替代性排斥中旁观者第三方惩罚

为了考察群体身份对替代性排斥中旁观者惩罚行为的影响,并考察旁观者社会责任感的调节作用,采用数量估计任务对58名不同社会责任感大学生创设群体身份,观看网络掷球游戏形成群际替代性排斥,随后评估游戏中各玩家的愤怒情绪,并采用第三方惩罚来表达对各玩家表现的愤怒。结果发现高社会责任旁观者对替代性排斥体验到更强愤怒情绪,并对排斥者施加更高惩罚;高社会责任感个体对排斥组内成员的组外排斥者惩罚强度高于组内排斥者,而低社会责任感个体对排斥组外成员的组外排斥者惩罚强度显著高于组内排斥者。结果表明旁观者社会责任感调节其在群际替代性排斥中的第三方惩罚。     

他人惩罚信息对第三方惩罚的作用——基于规范性社会行为理论的解释

选取188名大学生进行情景实验.基于规范性社会行为理论,探究了他人惩罚信息以及不同社会规范对第三方惩罚的影响.实验一结果表明高他人惩罚信息组的第三方惩罚力度显著高于低他人惩罚信息组.实验二结果表明社会规范中描述性规范与指令性规范对第三方惩罚力度有显著的影响;同时两者的交互作用显著,当描述性规范较低时,无论指令性规范处于...     

第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。     

第三方惩罚对合作行为的影响:基于社会规范激活的解释

第三方惩罚对合作行为的影响有两面性,可能与其激活的社会规范有关。通过有/无第三方的独裁者博弈范式,研究发现合作行为在有第三方时主要受命令性规范影响;在无第三方时,主要受描述性规范影响。第三方惩罚频率越高,个体在有第三方时的合作行为也越高,撤去第三方后个体合作行为的下降也越大。这可能因为第三方惩罚不仅能有效提示群体中的命令性规范(应该如何做),还能暗示出该情境下的描述性规范(大多数人如何做)。     

人情与公正的抉择:社会距离对第三方干预的影响

第三方干预(third-party intervention)是一种重要的利他行为,它包括惩罚和补偿两种措施。本研究结合情境性问卷与实验法,采用修改后的独裁者博弈范式(Dictator Game,DG),让被试作为第三方对朋友或者陌生人的不公平行为进行干预,考察社会距离对第三方干预的影响。研究发现:(1)对于朋友提出的不公平方案,个体对其的惩罚轻于陌生人,而对第二方(无权者)的补偿没有显著差异。(2)个体对朋友的不公平提议的公平性判断高于陌生人,但提议引发的情绪体验没有显著差异。上述结果表明,社会距离可能通过影响个体对不公平行为的公平感知,进而影响其第三方干预行为。     

公平与惩罚价格对第三方惩罚需求的影响

为了探讨第三方惩罚的影响因素,分析个体在不同公平情境下面临不同的惩罚成本时会采取怎样的第三方惩罚行为,本研究以171名大学生为被试,采用2×2的混合实验设计,通过设置高低两种不公平情境和3种惩罚价格,对被试的第三方惩罚需求进行实验研究。结果显示,个体的第三方惩罚需求都有随着惩罚价格的升高而降低的趋势;不公平程度显著影响第三方惩罚需求。研究表明,惩罚成本显著影响个体的第三方惩罚的实施;在低不公平情境中,被试面对不同惩罚成本时其第三方惩罚行为之间无显著差异,即各种惩罚成本下出现第三方惩罚行为的可能性均较小;而在高不公平情境中,被试面对不同惩罚成本时的第三方惩罚行为之间差异显著,惩罚成本越低出现第三方惩罚的可能性越大。     

互动不公情境下的第三方惩罚:道德愤怒的中介模型

研究以企业员工为被试,通过情境模拟实验,探讨互动不公对第三方惩罚行为的影响及道德愤怒在其中的作用机制.结果发现:与互动公平情境相比,第三方被试在互动不公情境下对不公领导具有更高水平的惩罚;道德愤怒的激活水平在互动不公对第三方惩罚的影响中起到部分中介作用;研究证实了组织互动不公情境下存在第三方惩罚现象,并为组织公正的道...     

“仁者”还是“智者”：第三方惩罚对惩罚者声誉的影响

第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响,然而就影响的方向而言,现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉,实验结果显示,第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明,动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用,并且惩罚者的合作水平越高,其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示,当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时,经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚,而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。     

10～12岁儿童社会价值取向对第三方利他行为的影响：情绪的作用

为探讨10～12岁儿童社会价值取向与第三方利他行为的关系,实验1采用第三方惩罚范式,招募233名儿童被试,实验2采用第三方补偿范式,招募238名儿童被试,考察三种分配(高度不公平、中度不公平和公平)情境下社会价值取向、情绪对第三方利他行为的影响,并对比两个实验的结果。结果显示:(1)在第三方惩罚任务中亲社会儿童(相比亲自我)在高度不公平情境下拿出更多金币用于惩罚分配者;(2)在第三方补偿任务中亲社会儿童(相比亲自我)在两种不公平情境下都拿出更多金币用于补偿接受者;(3)情绪只在高度不公平情境下在社会价值取向与第三方利他行为之间发挥中介作用;(4)采用第三方补偿(相比第三方惩罚)的儿童面对不同分配时情绪波动更小,在中度不公平情境下有更多利他行为。这些结果从发展的角度为社会价值取向对第三方利他行为的影响机制提供证据,强调了亲社会取向对维护社会公平的重要作用。     

认知控制在第三方惩罚中的作用

第三方惩罚是一种特殊的利他行为, 在维护社会规范和人类合作中发挥着重要作用。现有研究对遵守社会规范行为及其认知机制进行了大量探讨, 而第三方惩罚这一维护社会规范行为的认知加工过程, 尤其是认知控制在其中发挥的具体作用, 是目前研究的热点之一。通过(1)借助不同技术方法来探究认知控制在第三方惩罚中的具体作用; (2)从发展的视角, 在认知控制发展的关键阶段来考察其作用随年龄的发展变化, 用以解释第三方惩罚这一利他行为的发展轨迹, 完善对第三方惩罚的认知基础的理解, 并构建第三方惩罚决策的心理模型。     

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.     

儿童的分配公平性:心理理论的作用

心理理论是影响儿童分配公平性的重要因素之一。\"多重动机\"的理论假设认为心理理论能够帮助儿童在不同的动机中权衡利弊,找到满足自我利益和他人需求之间的平衡;其中,感知需求、推断意图、理解情绪是影响独裁者博弈、最后通牒博弈、第三方惩罚中分配公平性的主要成分。未来研究需为此提供更多实证依据,探讨不同类型的公平分配与心理理论各组成成分的关系,以及可否通过训练心理理论能力促进儿童公平概念的发展。     

Amount of altruistic punishment accounts for subsequent emotional gratification in participants with primary psychopathy

We are often willing to incur personal costs in order to punish people that violate group norms. Previous studies have suggested that high-psychopathy participants may engage in more such “altruistic punishment behaviors” than those with lower levels of psychopathy. Although this finding could suggest that psychopathy is in fact associated with prosocial behavior, high-psychopathy participants show clear evidence of various decision-making and emotional deficits. It is therefore possible that the increased altruistic punishment behavior observed in psychopathy participants is in some fashion related to such deficits. To address this possibility, we administered the altruistic punishment paradigm to a group of university students with low and high levels of psychopathy (N = 50). We found that high-psychopathy participants (n = 24) gave defectors significantly more punishment than did low psychopathy participants (n = 26), under personally costly conditions. Furthermore, a mediational analysis revealed that the amount of altruistic punishment administered completely mediated the relationship between primary psychopathy and a person’s emotional gratification subsequent to performing the altruistic punishment behavior. These findings suggest that while high psychopathy participants do appear to engage in greater levels of altruistic punishment behavior, they may do this largely for their own emotional gratification.     

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

This study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.     

Predicting anger in social anxiety: The mediating role of rumination

Anger and the way that anger is expressed have been linked to attrition and poorer treatment outcomes in patients with Social Anxiety Disorder (e.g., Erwin, B. A., Heimberg, R. G., Schneier, F. R. & Liebowitz, M. R. (2003). Anger experience and expression in social anxiety disorder: Pretreatment profile and predictors of attrition and response to cognitive-behavioral treatment. Behavior Therapy, 34, 331–350). Understanding the connection between social anxiety and anger may be one way to improve outcomes in this population. A cross-sectional regression design was used in a sample of 363 undergraduates to examine the suggestion that ruminative thought is a critical factor linking social anxiety to anger. In support of this hypothesis, brooding fully mediated the relationship between social anxiety and trait anger and partially mediated the relationship between social anxiety and outward anger expression. The relationship between brooding and anger suppression became non-significant after depression was controlled. In contrast, reflective pondering partially mediated the relationship between social anxiety and anger suppression. These results suggest that addressing rumination may be useful in the treatment of socially anxious patients who struggle with anger. They also support the utility of considering multiple forms of rumination and multiple anger outcomes in a single study.     

The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans

Laboratory experiments indicate that many people willingly contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a personal cost. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, allow political parties to overcome collective action problems, thereby allowing those organizations to compete for scarce resources and to produce public goods for like‐minded individuals. Using a series of laboratory games, we examine whether partisans contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a greater rate than nonpartisans. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Given the broad theoretical literature on altruistic punishment and group selection as well as our own formal evolutionary model, we hypothesize that it is being a partisan that makes an individual more likely to be a strong reciprocator and not vice versa.     

Mysteries of morality

Evolutionary theories of morality, beginning with Darwin, have focused on explanations for altruism. More generally, these accounts have concentrated on conscience (self-regulatory mechanisms) to the neglect of condemnation (mechanisms for punishing others). As a result, few theoretical tools are available for understanding the rapidly accumulating data surrounding third-party judgment and punishment. Here we consider the strategic interactions among actors, victims, and third-parties to help illuminate condemnation. We argue that basic differences between the adaptive problems faced by actors and third-parties indicate that actor conscience and third-party condemnation are likely performed by different cognitive mechanisms. Further, we argue that current theories of conscience do not easily explain its experimentally demonstrated insensitivity to consequences. However, these results might be explicable if conscience functions, in part, as a defense system for avoiding third-party punishment. If conscience serves defensive functions, then its computational structure should be closely tailored to the details of condemnation mechanisms. This possibility underscores the need for a better understanding of condemnation, which is important not only in itself but also for explaining the nature of conscience. We outline three evolutionary mysteries of condemnation that require further attention: third-party judgment, moralistic punishment, and moral impartiality.