共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
2.
Michael Jacovides 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):437-439
The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mind-independent body against
criticism from Smalligan Marusic. The author also specifies the resemblance requirements that Berkeley places on conceivability,
concedes that the principle that ideas can only be like other ideas is not, strictly speaking, a premise in the Master Argument,
and clarifies his views on the relation between possibility and conceivability.
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Michael JacovidesEmail: |
3.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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Melissa FrankelEmail: |
4.
5.
Giovanni Battista Grandi 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):373-378
According to Daniel Flage, Berkeley thinks that all necessary truths are founded on acts of will that assign meanings to words.
After briefly commenting on the air of paradox contained in the title of Flage’s paper, and on the historical accuracy of
Berkeley’s understanding of the abstractionist tradition, I make some remarks on two points made by Flage. Firstly, I discuss
Flage’s distinction between the ontological ground of a necessary truth and our knowledge of a necessary truth. Secondly,
I discuss Flage’s attempt to show that, according to Berkeley, the resemblance relation does not constitute a necessary connection.
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Giovanni Battista GrandiEmail: |
6.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
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Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
7.
Bill Brewer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):87-97
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind
in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy
replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational
content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly
consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting
mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.
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Bill BrewerEmail: |
8.
Mythological language is sometimes understood as a way of representing, by concrete imagery, more abstract notions. In this
paper, we will pose some metaphysical questions about the possibility of such a representation. These questions will serve
to motivate a brief tour of Mishkāt al-Anwār (Niche of Lights)—Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s commentary on the famous ayat al-nur (“verse of light”) of the Qur’an—wherein is discussed, among
other things, how symbolic imagery is possible, and “the respect in which the spirits of the meanings are specified within
the frames of the similitudes.”
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Edward Omar MoadEmail: |
9.
Richard Menary 《Topoi》2009,28(1):31-43
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore,
be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all
mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that
makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality,
I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics
is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence
that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to
develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational
principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction.
Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and
representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in
action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
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Richard MenaryEmail: |
10.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
11.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(3):435-443
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent
counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
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Jonathan IchikawaEmail: |
12.
Brian Findsen 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(6):545-559
Central tenets of Freirean philosophy and pedagogy are explored and applied to the emerging field of older adults’ learning
(educational gerontology), a sub-field of adult education. I argue that many of Freire’s concepts and principles have direct
applicability to the tasks of adult educators working alongside marginalized older adults. In particular, Freire’s ideas fit
comfortably within a critical educational gerontology approach as they challenge prevailing orthodoxies and provide a robust
analytical framework from which radical adult educators can work effectively in promoting social transformation.
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Brian FindsenEmail: |
13.
Sandra E. Marshall 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):253-257
Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways
rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions.
I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.
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Sandra E. MarshallEmail: |
14.
Chad Kleist 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):257-266
An inverse akratic act is one who believes X, all things considered, is the correct act, and yet performs ~X, where ~X is
the correct act. A famous example of such a person is Huck Finn. He believes that he is wrong in helping Jim, and yet continues
to do so. In this paper I investigate Huck’s nature to see why he performs such acts contrary to his beliefs. In doing so,
I explore the nature of empathy and show how powerful Huck’s empathic feelings are. Drawing from Martin L. Hoffman, I show
the relationship between empathy and a principle of justice. This relationship leads to Huck acting virtuously, as Rosalind
Hursthouse maintains.
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Chad KleistEmail: |
15.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
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Erin EakerEmail: |
16.
Guy Fletcher 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):149-152
Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis
(The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions
in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value.
I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
相似文献
Guy FletcherEmail: |
17.
Marjorie Spear Price 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):129-140
According to the Particularist Theory of Events, events are real things that have a spatiotemporal location. I argue that
some events do not have a spatial location in the sense required by the theory. These events are ordinary, nonmental events
like Smith’s investigating the murder and Carol’s putting her coat on the chair. I discuss the significance of these counterexamples
for the theory.
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Marjorie Spear PriceEmail: |
18.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
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Manfred KupfferEmail: |
19.
20.
Peter van Schilfgaarde 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):121-136
Empowerment is a key word in Catherine Audard’s new book on Rawls and a central characteristic of Rawls’ approach to justice.
A very different “hermeneutic” approach to justice is presented by Paul Ricoeur, the French philosopher and theologian who,
against the background of his own work, examined Rawls’ views in several publications. This essay compares the two views and
defends the proposition that empowerment is the common denominator. The author suggests that Rawls would not have objected
to including some of Ricoeur’s ideas in the past-principle stage of his Theory.
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Peter van SchilfgaardeEmail: |